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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SHARIR IMPLIES TABAH HOTEL TO STAY IN ISRAELI HANDS

TA210827 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 21 Oct 82 p 2

[Report by Mikhal Yudelman and David Landau]

[Text] Tel Aviv--The Tourism Ministry will cut off funds for tourism projects in towns which fail to legislate and enforce by-laws to maintain cleanliness around their hotels, in their streets, on their beaches and other places, Tourism Minister Avraham Sharir said yesterday at the opening of the school year of the Israeli Tourism School at Tel Aviv University's Bar Shira Auditorium.

Sharir said tourism cannot thrive if next to a large hotel there is a crumbling, dilapidated building, or garbage on beaches and outside stores. He said he had written letters instructing the mayors of Israel's big cities and resort towns, threatening to cut off the ministry's aid unless they take responsibility for the cleanliness.

Sharir also announced the opening next month of the Sonesta Hotel in Tabah, near Elat. "This hotel will demonstrate our presence in that area," Sharir said, implying that the hotel will remain in Israeli hands despite the territorial dispute in which both Israel and Egypt are claiming the area.

David Landou adds:

Israel and Egypt were due to negotiate the final status of Tabah under an interim agreement signed earlier this year: But the Lebanon war intervened before the negotiations began, and since then the issue--along with most other areas of Israel-Egypt dialogue--has been frozen.

It was not clear yesterday whether the Tourism Ministry has taken advice from government legal experts on whether opening the hotel would be in accordance with the interim agreement. The Egyptians are likely to claim that it is a violation.

The agreement provided basically that ongoing activities at Tabah hitherto could continue--and thus construction of the hotel was continued to completion. Israel presumably would argue that opening and operating the hotel should be classed as an ongoing activity--for that was the purpose of building it.

CSO: 4400/46

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN BORDER--Beersheba, 14 Oct (ITIM)--The new Israeli-Egyptian border demarcation work has not yet been completed and some stones marking the border, inscribed in both Hebrew and Arabic, have not yet been laid due to a dispute over the final location of those stones. ITIM correspondent Uri Binder has been told by the Israeli-Egyptian-Joint Military Committee (through the IDF spokesman): "Not before those points of dispute are settled will the stones be laid to mark the new border." Meanwhile, these stones are stacked near the IDF camps adjacent to the points of dispute and visitors can see one such stone near Mt Harif in the "Upper Negev Hills" National Park. [Text] [TA141256 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1245 GMT 14 Oct 82]

CSO: 4400/46

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

RECOMMENDATIONS OF SEMINAR SPONSORED BY ARAB CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES

Mecca AKHBAR AL-'ALAM AL-ISLAMI in Arabic No 791, 30 Aug 82 p 8-9

[Article: "Seminar on Security Responsibility for Information Facilities in the Arab Countries Issues Its Recommendations"]

[Text] The 4th scientific seminar on security responsibility for information facilities in the Arab countries, which was organized by the Arab Center for Security Studies and Training and in which a delegation from the Islamic World League participated, has concluded its business in al-Ta'if. Prof Muhammad Mahmud Hafiz, director of the press and publication department, delivered an address on behalf of the secretary general of the League. The seminar released its recommendations which stressed that Arab information policies should abide by the teachings of the Islamic faith, give a firm foundation for the Islamic doctrine in the hearts of men and revive their Islamic discipline. It advocated enlightening society of its Islamic duties and of the conspiracies which are being hatched against it. The seminar's recommendations reaffirmed the responsibility of the information media for protecting the tenets of the nation and provide ideological soundness for them; to achieve social harmony and to cooperate in all this with the educational and social institutions, using the skills which are committed to the faith, morality, integrity and truth.

Following is the text of these recommendations:

The final recommendations of the 4th scientific seminar held by the Arab Center for Security Studies and Training are broken down as follows:

1. Arab information policy.
2. Arab information facilities and security responsibility.
3. Recommendations concerning the Arab Center for Security Studies and Training [ACSST] in al-Riyadh.

With regard to Arab information policy, since the sole premise of our Arab information media in various educational, cultural and guidance fields is Islam as a doctrine, law, mode of behavior and way of life....

The seminar recommends that the information policy comprise the following:

1. Advocacy of a commitment to the teachings of the Islamic religion by striving to give a firm foundation to the Islamic doctrine in the hearts of the members of society and revive the religious discipline which guides the consciences of men to excellence, doing good and refraining from evil and harm.
2. Enlightening society of its Islamic duties, such as brotherhood, altruism, and shunning the reprehensible, along with enlightening it of the conspiracies which are being hatched against it.
3. Given the importance and influence of the information media from the standpoint of society, culture and security, we hope that the media in each Arab country will have as a basis a defined, clearly demarcated information policy clarifying the goals of the information institutions and the specifications required for an information person and his relationships with the various sectors of the state, particularly with security facilities.
4. Since the Arab countries and people possess more than others the elements and bases of unity and potential for broad cooperation, namely, strong ethics, security and stability within and effective economies for forces of cohesion--because of this the Arab information media language should be strong in order to reach world public opinion to give to the fullest on the Arab region.
5. Since it is a task and responsibility of the information media to combat crime in the intellectual sense and it is the task of security to combat crime in the physical sense, it is essential to create an objective unity and interchange in the relationships between the media and security in combatting crime.

It is clear that some Arab information sources proceed to disseminate details of crimes and events in a manner as to arouse viewers and readers to the point of portraying the criminals as heroes. This constitutes a threat to the young people and is an incentive to deviationist behavior.

In reaffirming the functional relationships between the media and security, the responsibility of the Arab media in combatting crime to cover current events from their basic sources, to examine the facts without exaggerations and not to be overtolerant in presenting news that prompts crime. That should be within the framework of cooperation with the security people and publicizing and covering crime should be conformity with the circumstances.

6. The information facilities are responsible for protecting the tenets of the nation and providing ideological soundness for them in everything published in the information field. They are responsible for social harmony, particularly since ideas inimical to Islamic principles and doctrine have crept into the Arab homeland and since the Arab countries have become a stage for imported social, cultural and sectarian struggles.

7. The various Arab information media machinery should take care not to use or disseminate any information or details pertaining to national security so as not to give the enemy an opportunity to benefit from it. The same holds true for matters that have not yet been announced to the appropriate authorities.
8. They should avoid diverse information stances which create contradictions at odds with the single information goal or in conflict with the cooperation with educational or social institutions.
9. Concern on the part of Arab information media in various fields with selecting information skills which are characterized by religious commitment, morals, accurate presentation, faith, patriotism and feelings of security sensitivity.
10. The Arab information policy should take pains to lay out, improve and devise security information programs and to assist education, social and youth institutions in providing facilities bringing security to the individual, family, society, and the state and in protecting society from deviation.
11. Concern from the information standpoint in supporting and blessing Arab unity and avoiding anything that could harm national unity or the internal affairs of any country.
12. Striving to provide citizens with secure immunity from the dangers of ideological encroachment, deviations or sliding into arrogance and striving to support the information media to enable it to give this immunity from hostile and destructive ideological currents.
13. Taking an interest in security studies in the educational institutions, working to implant the idea of individual security responsibility with the young people.
14. Since ideological security is the base for public security and the media are the disseminators of ideas, coordination between the security and media personnel in security programs is important. Therefore, there should be coordination through channels of communication between the security machinery and the information facilities where the security machinery will present the ideas and content of security information materials, seeking the assistance of the thinkers and leaders in the Arab nation, while the information machinery will prepare, produce and disseminate the security information material by using the appropriate approach and means.
15. Striving to interwork forces and efforts to create Arab and Islamic press institutions and institutions to produce information programs which are to the point with these institutions completing the technical and scientific preparations. It is essential to design Islamic educational information programs to instill awareness and guide prisoners and criminals of levels, directing attention to juveniles and young people, and striving to prepare and guide them psychologically and socially to rejoin society as upright citizens.

The information facilities should work to avoid publishing or showing information material which is characterized by violence in its production, particularly what is shown to children and young people. The information facilities should select the appropriate programs while working to create joint Arab information institutions for production of magazines, books, programs and films for children and young people, receiving assistance in this from religious 'ulema and specialists in psychology, sociology, history, etc., who can understand the needs of the Moslem Arab child.

With regard to Arab information facilities and security responsibility, the seminar recommends that those facilities strive for the following:

1. Trying in earnest to benefit from biographies of Muhammad in preparing media material for epic series and humane stances for heroic acts and sacrifices so that we can meet a humane standard for young people.
2. Working to embody and clarify the information goal, defining the effectiveness of the methods used, and playing up this goal on the basis that it is a comprehensive Islamic goal so that it can be a starting point and model for advocates of constructive information and so that Arab information media can get rid of its traditional dependency.
3. Given the importance and effectiveness that information now had and the social cultural and security dangers to which it may be exposed, the media in each Arab country should lay out a defined information policy clarifying the goals of the information institutions and defining the qualifications of the information people and their relationships with the various sectors of the state, particularly the information facilities.
4. Given the rapid spread of television and its effect on the young, it is essential to study the negative and positive aspects of its spread and propose effective means to avoid the dangers to Arab society arising from its misuse and, effectively benefiting from its advantages.
5. There should be field visits exchanged among the information and security personnel with the goal of developing security services in each country and among the Arab countries.
6. The information media and machinery should help to work on developing security and national awareness on the part of citizens through constructive information programs, this in cooperation with the security machinery.
7. Attention should be directed to the factual nature of the media and its reliability in presenting facts, avoiding dissimulation, deception, errors, twisting of concepts and exaggerating negative content.
8. The information media should avoid presenting complex family problems remote from Moslem Arab reality which would provoke misbehavior in individuals who are far removed from these problems and which would have the effect of deluding and fragmenting the awareness of the young people.

9. The Arab information media should put a stop to showing methods of planning crimes by boycotting films, magazines and other informational materials promoting crime which arouse innate drives, whims and moral perversions and which usually are meant by their investors to make material gain, justifying their use by spurious advertising and labels.

10. The information media should play a leadership role in showing constructive information material within the context of reform and avoiding contradictions so that it can avoid responding to the desires of those segments of the people who seek to gratify their whims and caprices because constructive information is based on directing and guiding various ideas to moderate ideological levels, supplying those moderate people with things responsive to their aspirations and furthering their education and social cohesiveness.

11. The societies, institutions and bodies which share in building and reforming society should work to assist the ministries of information by supplying them with informational material that would help to clarify social bonds in coordination with the facilities that play their role in information planning which insures that the constructive informational material reaches all levels of society.

12. The information media, both television and radio, should not excessively prolong the hours of broadcasting lest this cause a crowding of programs or the presentation of informational material in conflict with sound information guidance and lest it divert the young people from their studies and work as this also has bad social and economic effects

13. The information media should supply remote parts of the homeland with informational coverage on the basis that the informational and security services cannot be measured by an economic yardstick.

14. The information media should increase security information programs based on guidance, appeals and instruction and covering individual, social, national and international security. These programs should cover health, moral, social, civil and political aspects so that these information campaigns would have an effect in raising the consciousness of the Moslem Arab citizen and guiding him on the correct course. The best possible methods of production and release should be used in this.

15. Calling on the Arab countries to hold local seminars on the national level with a view toward coming up with a plan and program for security information. With regard to the center's recommendation for security studies and training, the seminar recommends:

1. The assistance of the ACSST should continue in setting up seminars, training sessions, research and studies on security methods to serve the objectives of the security and stability of Arab societies.

2. The ACSST in al-Riyadh should undertake studies on standards for technical information production to include studies referred to in the preceding recommendations concerning the effects of television on society and evaluating its' negative and positive aspects and proposing suitable solutions.

3. Working to create a specialized mechanism for a framework for the ACSST to handle coordination of the activities of the departments of culture, guidance and public relations in the Arab ministries of interior in the areas of information research, publications and films which would focus on security guidance and crime prevention and then working to circulate them to the information media.

4. The center should hold a similar seminar for persons in charge of public relations or cultural guidance in the ministries of interior of all Arab countries with specialists in these fields participating.

5. The center should handle the invitation to convene a similar scientific seminar to explain the responsibility of the universities and educational institutions in the Arab homeland toward security responsibility.

6. The center should handle an invitation to convene a special seminar on information and youth (youth information).

It should be noted that a number of university professors, information personnel and security officials in the Arab countries participated in preparing the research and studies. A total of 15 research papers were presented in addition to three lectures opened for discussions. Views were exchanged on them and on related issues concerning Arab societies with regard to the role of contemporary information media and its positive and negative interaction with security regarding the information facilities in the Arab countries.

8389

CSO: 4404/6744

INTERVIEW WITH ABDELHAMID ADJALI REPORTED

GF201704 Tehran IRNA in English 1615 GMT 20 Oct 82

[Text] Tehran, Oct. 20, IRNA--In an interview with the Persian daily ETTELA'AT published today, the new ambassador of Algeria to the Islamic Republic, Abdelhamid Adjali, said that investigations concerning the crash of the Algerian plane carrying the late Algerian foreign minister, Mohamed Ben Yahia last May 3, 1982, had not been completed. He said that various information had to be taken into consideration from a number of countries in order to reach final results.

Adjali added, however, that the only thing that could relieve the anguish of his death was when the war between Iran and Iraq ended.

He said that Algeria did not recognise the article in the Fes resolution passed last September, in relation to the Iraqi imposed war, because "it was not logical to pass a resolution (on the war) without the presence of both these countries in the conference." Adjali added that what the Algerian delegation had in mind was to prevent a decision on the issue of the Iraq-Iran war which would have a negative effect on peace, brotherhood and understanding among the Islamic countries.

Algeria participated in the Fes summit in order to render support to the Palestine Liberation Organisation, he said. "I must tell you honestly that we are not adherent to the 'empty seat' policy and Algeria must be present wherever there is struggle," the ambassador was quoted as saying.

On issues concerning Lebanon and the reaction of the Arab regimes towards the Zionist aggression, Adjali said that Algeria was "not at all pleased at the present condition" of the Arab and Islamic countries. If the Palestinian issue experienced such catastrophic aspects it was because some of the Arabs procrastinated in carrying out their duties...and refrained from confronting the main enemy (Zionist regime), he said.

He said that the struggle against the Zionists should cover all political, economic and cultural aspects and to include those who support the Zionists as well.

Commenting on Lebanese President Amin al-Jamayyil, the Algerian ambassador said that he did not have the authority to give his views about the head of state of a government and he said that the Lebanese people should do this instead. He said that any president who did not have the backing of his people could not implement a positive policy in the long run. Adjali said that in Lebanon, the policy which is imposed by the people will prevail.

CSO: 4500/16

CALL FOR ACTION ON VARIOUS PROBLEMS IN COUNTRYSIDE

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 714, 6 Sep 82 pp 4-5

[Article by 'Isam Rif'at: "Egyptian Countryside Sits on Sea of Mine-fields"]

[Text] Circumstances dictated that I meet with al-Mansurah University youth in their camps which has 1,000 university students in various specialties, in a free and democratic dialogue on the issues preoccupying all of us.

This opportunity enabled me to gain a quick and fast glimpse of our Egyptian countryside and to have a lengthy and in-depth dialogue with the youth who live in it and who learn in the so-called regional universities.

Rat Catastrophe

There is a danger that nobody is taking into account, namely, rats, which constitute a grave danger. Even the word danger is no longer commensurate with what rats do and what they will lead to. It is a national catastrophe that will not wait for a national campaign, for high-level meetings and for planning committees. Rats are smarter, faster and spread more rapidly.

Rats are feasting in the fields, the houses, the alleys and the roads, and nobody is confronting them.

One of the negative solutions to which the farmers have resorted is to harvest their crops, especially fruit and vegetables, before they ripen fully.

This means unripe produce that does not contain all of the nutritional ingredients.

Production also drops because vegetables and fruit are not left until they fully mature. Moreover, the premature harvesting of crops deprives us of the next phase of production, not to mention the threat of diseases spread by rats.

They say in the countryside that this is "wrath from heaven."

So why doesn't the Ministry of Religious Trusts call for prayers following the Friday prayers so that heaven can respond to the pleas of millions and stir the feelings, conscience and minds of the officials? Or should we wait until the rats attack the cabinet headquarters, the People's Assembly and the Consultative Council before we move?

There are other economic manifestations that I will note here quickly. These manifestations are not independent of one another but ultimately form a "vicious and frightening circle" that needs a complete, not partial, solution.

There are black markets, not just one black market, for foreign currency. These markets have emerged as a result of the emigration of agricultural workers, teachers, principals and others and as a result of dealings in foreign currency. When these people return, they function like banks or black markets for foreign currency.

Therefore, it is not surprising to see an old woman who cannot read or write and who doesn't know the difference between the pound and the dollar going to the new usurer who controls the currency black market, carrying to him a check in foreign currency sent to her by a son or a husband so that this usurer can exchange it for Egyptian currency.

We are not objecting here to Egyptians becoming familiar with foreign currency. Our objection focuses mainly on the foreign currency black market, which has expanded to cover the entire country.

Thus, foreign currency is outside its legal channels.

This currency is accumulating but we don't know why, where it goes and what commodity it finances.

Why don't we exert efforts in one way or another to gather this foreign currency at black market prices and then channel it toward creating branches of the Egyptian Village Bank--a bank that deals with the savings of Egyptians in local and foreign currency and channels them toward investment projects?

India has preceded us in this by long strides.

Drain Called Subsidy

One of the issues that emerges from within the folds of the Egyptian countryside and its governorates is the issue of subsidy.

We stress here what the peasants and the youth have said: They don't get the subsidy. There are merchants who exploit the subsidy.

Subsidized rice and subsidized goods are nonexistent.

The lucky in al-Daqahliyah Governorate can get a cylinder of subsidized butane gas after a 3-week wait.

They suggest complete abolition of the subsidy with an increase in wages, for example, or tying some subsidized goods to ration cards and allowing the rest to be free. What is important here is that this is not the opinion of citizens with [high] incomes but that of youths who are still in school.

Labor Drain

One of the more serious manifestations experienced by the Egyptian countryside is the drain of labor to the extent that it has become a must for women to work in the fields. The men have emigrated to Iraq, in particular, to find work, any work.

It may be good that women constitute one-half of society and are now proceeding to help men. But when men abandon their fields to work abroad, this is a phenomenon that needs to be regulated and not left to whims, chaos and rights that have become chaotic. The constitutionally guaranteed right of movement should not act against the state's general economic interest and its economic security.

Other manifestations complement this one.

University youth are in a hurry to graduate so that they can leave the country to work in Iraq, in particular, considering that no visa and no specialization is required. There, somebody stands in a square to offer them work and a chance to earn a living without any specific terms or contracts to help them earn a decent income. The goal of the youth here is to earn enough income to help them get married, purchase a piece of land or build a better future in Egypt.

Tied to this phenomenon of labor drain is another serious development, namely, replacement of the traditional rural method of construction with mud bricks by the modern method of construction with reinforced cement and red bricks.

We are for modernized construction but not for chaotic construction.

Turning Patients' Health Into Business

One of the strangest phenomena to extend to the countryside is that of exploiting the public interest for personal interest or, to put it more explicitly, of exploiting whatever is governmental or belongs to the public sector to achieve personal gain.

If we move closer to the picture, it will tell us that the phenomenon of some civil servants who deal with the masses directly and who utilize their positions and refuse to serve the people's needs unless they get a return for their service has extended to the countryside and is embodied in the doctors of the rural units.

Medical service at night is impossible and prohibited.

In the daytime, the doctor charges 2 pounds for a visit, in addition to the 5-plaster fee set by the government. Without these 2 pounds, no patient is examined, regardless of his condition. As for medicine, there is no medicine, and God is the healer.

So as not to be unfair to the doctors of these units, we must say that the issue has two sides, which constitute the elements of this ugly crime—the fact that the doctor does not earn proper wages on the one hand and the fact that the patient does not get the proper examination and treatment on the other.

The reason for this is the frozen central thinking in Cairo, because the 5 plasters (the value of the examination fee) is no longer worth anything and nothing can be purchased with it. Why shouldn't this fee be raised to make it compatible with the medical service and with the value and effectiveness of the medicine?

We demand reconsideration of the medical examination fee in the rural medical units and demand that the doctors be given the proper incentives to wipe out this manipulation.

These are some of the mines I have heard about from the mouths of the youth and all of them require quick, decisive and complete solution. All of the phenomena interact and each part affects the other. So are we going to deal with these problems before they intensify?

8494

CSO: 4504/522

AMERICAN PENETRATION DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 716, 4 Oct 82 pp 13-20

[Article by Mustafa Imam, Jamal Ziyadah and Nabil 'Abd-al-Fattah: "The Second Penetration of Egypt; Egypt Described in American Terms; Political, Security Dimensions of the Phenomenon"]

[Text] The Reasons for this Report

This is for Egypt whose political, economic and social security is being subjected today to a grave process of penetration from abroad. This penetration is being effected under the guise of joint scientific cooperation coming under the numerous names of research and joint research centers. This dangerous penetration illustrates the second time Egypt is being penetrated after almost 2 centuries, that is, since the French campaign against Egypt early in the 18th century. At that time Napoleon had come to Egypt with many scientists who surveyed all of Egypt's resources and conducted studies about Egyptian life and about Egypt's political, economic and social systems. These studies were included in one of the most momentous books to come out of the printing presses in Egypt. This book was called "The Description of Egypt."

This volume was used to plunder Egypt's resources and then to colonize and occupy the country. Today, Egypt is being penetrated for the second time in the modern age, and this penetration is being carried out by Americans, by Europeans and unfortunately by a few Egyptians who are masquerading as scholars and researchers.

The methods of penetration are numerous: there are joint research centers, and there are research groups headed by an Egyptian university professor under the leadership of an American scholar. This new wave [of research activity] has also encouraged many scholars who claim to be radicals to cooperate with the Americans in return for lucrative material rewards without which [they discover] they cannot live, once they become accustomed to them. Thus, research contractors emerged in our midst; they work for scholars and for foreign research centers. In addition, foreign exploratory missions have emerged. These are given full freedom of action, and they obtain complete surveys about Egypt's resources and the secrets of its territories.

This is a grave matter, and what is even more grave than all this is the fact that this penetration seeks to reshape our lives according to specific notions which may not be compatible with the interests of the vast majority of the

people. This is taking place by means of linking the joint research centers with ministries and government agencies which approve of, assist in and sometimes request these studies which give decision makers specific alternatives from which they would have to choose. This is particularly true since there is a prevailing belief that what foreign experts say is "sacred" and definitive.

The phenomenon is a grave one, and what is even more grave is the fact that foreign scholars and those who participate in joint research projects are allowed to gather the information they want freely. Much of this information is not used and has nothing to do with the subject of the research. There is almost unanimous agreement among observers about this phenomenon of foreign research projects in Egypt. Most certainly this unrestricted freedom for foreigners presents a threat to the country's security, if there are those who still believe that there is information that deserves to be protected from the hands and minds of others. For this reason, for Egypt's security and because the phenomenon of foreign research projects and joint research centers is a grave phenomenon, AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI is reporting on this serious question which is taking place within the sight of many responsible organizations. Sometimes, there is not enough power to resist its cancer-like growth.

Many centuries have elapsed in Egypt's modern history since French occupation forces entered Egypt. Egyptians had bravely resisted these forces, and numerous elements of Egypt's traditional elite [class] were able to grasp with awareness the truth and the dimensions of the cultural clash that were behind the occupation and the defeat. The French campaign [eventually] left Egyptian territory, leaving Egypt in a state other than that in which it was in before the campaign. However, the most important object that the campaign got out of Egypt was that huge volume in which French scientists and experts in all disciplines had described Egypt.

The description of Egypt was by all standards a great study. It contained information and surveys of all the aspects of the material world in Egypt in light of the direct contact with the eastern and backward Egyptian reality. The description of Egypt may have had considerable benefits, imparting to the modern European mind knowledge of the great pearl of the East. In the western perspective this knowledge was shifted from the realm of fantasy to that of research, and knowledge about Egypt became the theme of social, political, cultural and economic science in Europe. The theme of orientalism became linked with European colonialism.

After the descriptive account of Egypt [was completed], the western colonialist and imperialist mind was able to know the different possibilities for any operation to invade and occupy Egypt's blessed territory. Thus, backward and mysterious Ottoman Egypt, with its people, its land, its social forces, its political and cultural vitality and its various economic resources, was turned into a society that was accessible to foreigners, a society where Egypt's material capabilities were observed.

Hence, the descriptive account of Egypt, with regard to information, turned into a major tool that helped the West confront the first attempt that was made to build a modern state in Egypt during the days of Muhammad 'Ali. The descriptive account helped the West penetrate the structures of the state, and it helped

Great Britain occupy our country. It was then that the phase of plundering Egypt began. This was accompanied by a process in which the cultural mode of the modern Egyptian elite was formulated and directed so as to steer it ultimately toward the West and its exciting cultural dreams.

If we were to leave this stage which began with the occupation and plunder of Egypt [and which continued] till the 1952 July regime came, we will notice that most of the men of the July regime were intellectually and emotionally inclined to the European and American West and that they had naive dreams about affiliating and cooperating with the West. However, political dreams are one thing and the reality of international life another. It was soon discovered that the West wanted to keep the society and the state in Egypt in a position of subordination and that it would not accept any other alternative.

[Proponents of] Nasirism tried to cooperate with western Europe and with the United States, and they failed many times. But in the minds of Nasirist leaders the West continued to be one of [their] major dreams.

The devastating defeat of June 1967 was a prominent mark as far as research, information centers and also U.S. and western intelligence agencies were concerned. These centers and agencies found it necessary to conduct research projects and numerous surveys in all disciplines in Arab societies and in Egypt in particular. They were to do so by creating relationships and loyalties with Egyptian and Arab scholars so as to gain a greater understanding of intentions and of operations [that would be undertaken] to overcome the defeat. The purpose of all this research was to contain the Soviet role in the area and to make America's ugly face more attractive to citizens, even before making it attractive to statesmen in Egypt and in Arab countries.

Because of the absence of a wise scientific and cultural policy in our country, Egyptian and Arab intellectuals became an easy prey to an American invasion that manifested itself in radio broadcasts, books, movies and television programs. The propaganda content of these programs praised the American mentality, the American political system, America's multi-national economic institutions and the American way of life.

This was significant: the fact that the American dream was presented reflected a desire for reshaping the political elite and their consumer way of life so that a consumer pattern for Egyptian society can be formulated and that would firmly establish Egypt's subordination.

In this regard the United States, U.S. security organizations and the research organizations that are affiliated with them, as well as western societies, devoted increasing interest to the rediscovery and description of Egypt so that that process can be directed in a manner that was based on science. Furthermore, the ultimate intention of utilizing these sociological, economic and cultural surveys was to gain political and economic control in a region in which the United States is genuinely interested and where it has strategic interests. It is no secret that Israel, our basic regional enemy, has benefited considerably from these research projects.

The Beginning

The American descriptive account of Egypt began with the scholarships that were granted to Egyptian and Arab students. In 1967 the budget for the Middle East was 13,700,000 dollars. These funds were distributed among 2,463 students studying various disciplines.

Nevertheless, the process of setting up research projects, surveys and studies was the primary focus of attention. Traditional methods of gathering information were used; that is, information was gathered through the U.S. intelligence network. But because of the complex nature of conditions in Egypt and in the region and because of the mysterious aspects and characteristics of the country and the region, cooperation with local scholars had to be relied upon, and they were employed to carry out this function so that conditions can be understood.

Agents came into the region and operated publicly. They made periodic visits to the countries of the Middle East as university professors, experts in the affairs of the region, political commentators for press agencies or as newspaper correspondents for major newspapers.

It was the well-known Rand Corporation document that revealed the close ties between these phenomena, activities whose outward appearance was innocent and "scientific" and U.S. intelligence. In 1968 about 70 American agents stationed in Beirut at a center affiliated with U.S. intelligence met and received clear instructions asking them to compile information that would provide a full picture of the political and partisan situation in the region. A network of educational communications was set up with scholars, university professors and journalists through the American embassies. This network was set up under the statement that it would be possible to influence the formulation of U.S. policy in the region.

Research Institutions

American efforts to describe Egypt and the region began with American professors and local research professors. This descriptive account of Egypt was compiled [by people in] numerous disciplines other than those in traditional intelligence gathering methods. It was also done through research projects that were carried out by organizations that have very close ties with intelligence, with the Ford Foundation, with the Rand Corporation and with other organizations.

Actually, research projects that are carried out by these organizations have to be analyzed. These organizations fund a large number of social, economic and political research projects on the basis of making individual contact with university professors in Egypt and in Arab countries, with scholars at research centers and with newspaper investigators without letting them know the full dimensions of the subject that is being investigated. Research projects are also funded through meetings that are held between American professors and scholars and officials of parties and political organizations, businessmen and technocrats.

The American Rand Corporation Document and the Scandals of American Research

The well-known Rand Corporation document reveals this mode for conducting surveys and American analyses of Egypt and the Middle East. The Rand Corporation (R.F.F.) is in an organization that has close ties with the Pentagon. The document [in question]

revolves around a study of the economic and political appearance of the Middle East. Some people have called this study the backbone of the CIA's efforts in the Middle East.

The preface to the Rand Corporation's scandalous document states that, "The proposed research program will ensure an understanding of economic and political facts that are tied to life in the Middle East. Such an understanding would be enough to ensure that serious judgments of politics in the area are made. In addition to devoting special attention to economic matters, it is also being proposed that the political and economic advantages of the area and of other areas in the world that are related to it, be distinguished and evaluated. [These areas] control [the Middle East] with the effectiveness of the economic reality and, accordingly, separate themselves from it.

In defining and controlling objectives the scandalous document--and we will see more dangerous statements later--holds the view that, "As far as the current objective is concerned, reforming the Middle East can be utilized to define the core of the region from Egypt to Iraq. This can sometimes be used to define a larger area, from Morocco to Iran. We are basically interested in the countries that are involved in the Arab-Israeli struggle. Nevertheless, as far as certain subjects are concerned, attention must be turned to neighboring countries like Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, Iran and other countries of the world.

"Profound research that would single out the questions of economic development--housing, water, agriculture and oil--as the four most important economic questions and would be tied to the essential facts that would serve an enlightened policy for the United States or for any other country is not required. It is one's duty to give these questions their due as questions that exist among the social and economic forces in the region."

Then the following research groups are defined.

1. Political and social dimensions.
2. Economic development.
3. Population.
4. Agriculture, soil and water.
5. Oil.

The first [research] group--political and social dimensions in the area--was to be undertaken by political scientists, sociologists and historians who are not from the area but who specialize in the area's affairs. The agenda for the first group--political and social dimensions--[is as follows]:

1. Short-term political forces.
2. Long-term political, social and economic forces.
3. The interests and conduct of foreign forces regarding the area.

- A. The United States
- B. The Soviet Union
- C. Britain and France
- D. The non-aligned countries
- E. A policy to stop pumping oil
- F. The refugee problem.

For the short term the scandalous document holds the opinion that the forces which steer political conduct in the countries in question and the methods these forces use to influence conditions and the outcome of various economic questions must be defined. For the long term it is essential that the latent forces which would transform the total social and economic structure be defined and analyzed.

The purpose of this action is "to evaluate the latent political facts in each country of the Middle East. This evaluation would then constitute a principle according to which [that country's] possible conduct vis a vis various happenings can be assessed. These happenings may include a housing project for refugees, a water development project, the possibility of offering assistance for economic development, the possibility of entering into a cooperative arrangement with a former enemy (!!), an appeal to boycott another country and an explicit or implicit proposal to establish closer relations with major foreign powers."

Actually, in the formulation of the document we cannot ignore Israel's interest in its problems and struggles with the Arab countries and in the separate settlement that later took place with Egypt. We will notice that political studies for Egypt in the eighties are being carried out by some Egyptians in co-operation with the Ford Foundation. We will shed light on this matter later.

Let us consider the document further. It holds the view that "[The process of] recording basic facts will ensure principles in whose light definitions rather than reactions to such problems can be made."

Furthermore, the document called for "studies of the political forces in each country in the Middle East as well as evaluations of their present and anticipated power so that conclusions can be drawn about the nature of their interests." This would be done by "intellectuals who would devote themselves to studying these matters. All these studies collectively would ensure an understanding of basic political trends in the area." The future and effects of these trends would also be understood in light of the events of 5 June 1967.

Among the proposed research models in each country are the following:

1. The role of the military.
2. The value of al-Ba'th ideology.
3. The attitude toward Israel. (Note the studies on cultural and psychological normalization in the eighties).
4. The military forces of parties.
5. Arab relations--relations with foreign powers and attitudes toward socialism, etc.

[The selections] we've presented from this document are important ones because these studies cannot be separated from the graver ones that were carried out in the seventies and those that are being carried out in the eighties.

What is required in light of analyzing this document is action to set up cooperative research projects between American professors and Egyptian and Arab professors and experts. The purpose of these research projects would be to conduct surveys, carry out analyses and confirm information about Egypt and the Arab world under claims of setting U.S. policies toward the area on the right track and ensuring a better understanding of [the area's] problems, etc.

Some people tried to expose this kind of research projects, whereas others, with good or bad intentions, joined them. To a large extent, however, the numbers and categories of research projects that were carried out did not actually become widespread.

However, the political and social changes that led up to the October war with Israel made Egyptian society appear to be moving toward the search for the gripping American dream. Egyptian leaders and intellectuals began promoting fanciful American and western dreams. They gradually began separating themselves from the Arab-Israeli struggle to achieve a separate formula for a regional settlement that would firmly establish [the power of] U.S. -Israeli weapons.

It was in this regard that the second phase of compiling a descriptive account of Egypt in American terms began.

This was a new phase, an altogether [different] category. Actually, it is a very dangerous phase, and under no circumstances whatsoever can we remain quiet about it.

The Attempt To Americanize Egypt

The aim of the new phase of compiling a descriptive account of Egypt in American terms was to have Egyptian scholars conduct research projects and documented surveys or to have Egyptian scholars cooperating with American scholars in various disciplines conduct this research. The matter was no longer directed only to agriculture or industry. [These research projects] covered all sectors of society and its fundamental and social structures in a manner that will be made evident by a study of a sample of the political studies.

Actually, the phenomenon of compiling a descriptive account of Egypt in the seventies was not confined to the United States. We found [similar] studies that were being carried out by other western organizations.

Although these studies reflect an Egyptian view of foreigners and their roles--a view which tends to see their capabilities and abilities to solve problems in exaggerated, mythical-like terms--these studies [also] reveal the identities of those Egyptians who are looking for wealth and fame with American organizations. They reveal the identities of those who entertain political dreams in Egypt in their dealings with Americans.

Matters have developed in a way that warns against numerous dangers to Egypt's

national security, if we were to consider the various disciplines of these American studies and surveys that are being carried out by American organizations which have ties to American security agencies or those that have ties with American AID programs in Egypt.

The purpose of these studies that are being carried out is not to tighten political control on decision makers as was the case with the studies that were made in the seventies. Instead, information has become the equivalent of economic power, and multi-national corporations strive to obtain accurate and documented information. Hence [lies the rationale behind studies about] the trends of political forces in Egypt and their views of the West, of the political regime and of subsidies. There are studies about views of Americans, religious groups, Muslim Brothers, and the al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah [Renunciation and Repudiation] Society. Some people were able to obtain information behind the backs of the agencies in question, and they sent this information to the United States as research papers about Islamic groups.

These research projects include studies on birth control; the creation, renovation and paving of road systems; setting up a model for analyzing the national economy; reports about the crops that make up Egyptian agriculture; a political study of Egypt in the eighties; studies about employment; about income distribution; about the wealthy; about the pilgrimage; and about changing public taste. All this information and all these surveys have not only become dangerous from the standpoint of national security, but Egyptians cannot obtain copies of them, and some of this raw data goes abroad directly and is not analyzed by Egyptians. Studies by Egyptian radicals and those like them are demanded for themselves to determine political trends and attitudes.

These data have been turned into economic commodities: they determine investment trends; they reformulate consumer modes; and they determine control of the markets, not only in Egypt, the great pearl of the East, but also in other Arab countries.

The question manifests itself in the fact that the danger to Egypt's national security is imminent and looming, no matter how varied the justifications and reasons are for carrying out these research projects and no matter how many claims are made to defend the fact that these studies are being carried out without controls or restrictions, regardless of the good or evil intentions of the researchers or the patriotic feelings they may or may not have.

The mere fact that the agencies which are authorized to issue permits for these research projects, like the Central Agency for Mobilization and the Census, do not know what research projects are underway in Egypt indicates several matters about the responsibility [of those who] conduct such research projects without the knowledge of authorized agencies.

One of the blatant examples circulating among many researchers is that while a study about income distribution in Egypt was underway it was discovered in an Egyptian organization that an Egyptian-American scholar had offered researchers who were filling out a research form larger sums of money as a reward if they were to adapt to the study a form he had devised--without obtaining approval and in secret--while applying the form of the Egyptian scientific organization.

There are stories of this kind, and we will present them one by one.

What are the reasons for this phenomenon?

One cannot ignore the ambitions that the West and the United States have for controlling Egyptian society, decision makers and various organizations.

There may be reasons for the eagerness well-intentioned Egyptian scholars have for involvement in such studies. These reasons may have to do with the fact that the income of Egyptian scholars is low. More importantly, these reasons may have to do with the absence of a wise scientific policy in Egypt. This is something that cannot be overlooked. It is the responsibility of successive governments in Egypt and hence, universities. The independence of research centers and universities from any political or economic influences that would limit their independence is an important matter. For when they are independent, they can formulate a research and scientific policy whose purpose would be to conduct studies about the material world in Egypt and to develop and change that material reality to create more progressive prospects for it. Actually, the phenomenon of creating a group of scholars and professors who are related to these studies and to the United States is one that we cannot at all ignore. It is a relationship in which these scholars and professors cannot do without the United States, so they promote models for partial solutions that are corrective in nature but that maintain the country's backwardness and subordination to the West and to the United States. These partial solutions they promote do [not] lead to national independence. There are numerous manifestations of the danger, and these are illustrated in the use of a set of courses that are designed to lead one to a partial diagnosis of the problems. They are also designed to lure Egyptian decision makers into this mode of western studies.

These studies corrupt morals and scientific and research values which are supposed to be based on the principles of democratic dialogue and on knowledge. Instead of creating scientific disciplines, they create cliquish modes with all their corrupt values.

There is [of course] the mode of Egyptian research contractors who are U.S. citizens.

This matter cannot be left without controls. People who have more than one citizenship and those with divided loyalties are not to be allowed to ruin national values in their attempts to achieve their political ambitions.

Setting forth the problem of foreign research in Egypt and raising questions about information security do not mean that the investigating team is opposing any joint research project that is undertaken. This thought had never occurred to any individual [member of the investigating team]. Quite the contrary, we are considering the negative and grave aspects of the question, and this necessarily means that there would have to be a basic Egyptian scientific policy characterized by stability so that Egypt's scientific and research capabilities can be mobilized and Egypt can take part in studying the problems of Egyptian society.

The process of setting forth a scientific policy is not an esoteric process. The scholar would have to realize that Egyptian society which contributed to his upbringing and paid the bills until he obtained his highest academic degrees and

experiences has several claims on him. Accordingly, any conjectures about the need for obtaining funds are unacceptable. It is unacceptable to make comparisons with other parasitic groups to justify the reluctance to undertake national research projects with national agencies. It is unacceptable to make moral and self-serving excuses for taking part in the game of American and western research [endeavors]. The importance of foreign research lies in those cases where foreign expertise is urgently and critically needed. This is because Egyptian phenomena can only be understood by Egyptians.

Before we conclude this analysis we must indicate that this series of reports and interviews is an attempt to report the discussions that are quietly taking place among Egyptian intellectuals and scholars as well as those that are taking place publicly. We wish to make Egyptians who are the subject of these studies participate in the discussion. It is their duty to participate in these discussions by sharing their opinions about the danger these studies present to the security of Egyptian society. They are not to participate with their opinions in studies and surveys that are conducted on them without the approval of authorized agencies in Egypt.

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AMERICAN AID AS SECURITY THREAT DISCUSSED

Appeal To Reveal Details

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 717, 11 Oct 82 p 10

[Report prepared by Mustafa Imam, Jamal Ziyadah and Nabil 'Abd-al-Fattah]

[Text] When we in the magazine's management were making plans for this report, we imagined for a moment that the information we had and the cases of America's penetration of Egypt [that we knew about] would be considered serious details. We thought we would be exaggerating when we referred to this process as "a descriptive account of Egypt in American terms"--an analogy to "a descriptive account of Egypt in French terms."

However, after the first installment was published, we received numerous telephone calls, and many intellectuals and Egyptian officials who were moved by their earnest concern for Egypt's destiny and for its political, economic, social and perhaps military security sent letters expressing their opinions. We were surprised by their assertions that the matter was more serious than we had stated. They said that American penetration of Egypt had spread into the details of Egyptian life and that it had gripped the core of Egypt's structures. They said that details of this penetration had to be revealed so that Egyptians would know what was happening in Egypt. The question needed the earnest concern of many people who were needed to reveal the details they knew about this penetration that has been taking place in a dangerous phase of Egypt's history.

Our response to all those who spoke to us was this: "It is your turn. Tell us those details." This is everyone's question.

In this installment some Egyptian professors reveal to us the grave dimensions of the penetration process. Some people think that the U.S. AID Agency in Cairo is the tool by means of which this penetration is effected. AID funds the largest percentage of joint research projects, and AID has established departments that are comparable to Egypt's ministries. It has become the equivalent of an American shadow government, superceding the lawful government in Egypt with its tremendous material resources and with the moral support it has been getting from Egyptian leaders since 1974.

The dialogue also reveals that the American University in Cairo is playing a

grave role in the penetration of Egyptian society. Instead of being under the supervision and direction of the Egyptian government, the American University in Cairo has turned into a dangerous American center that is to be approached with caution.

The dialogue also reveals further details and numerous opinions about "the research contractor" phenomenon which has accompanied the American penetration experience. This phenomenon which is described by some people as hateful, hurts the image of university professors. It turns them into labor contractors or parasitic contractors in society, promoting corruption and opportunism among scholars and academics. This phenomenon ruins the value of knowledge as an effort that is made to develop society. It projects an image of a scholar as a mercenary who would sell anything, even his country, for [a few] dollars.

The dialogue with Egyptian officials also reveals that although present agencies are aware of the gravity of the problem, their hands are tied in view of the support that American scholars have been getting from some senior officials ever since the open-door policy was instituted. These officials function under "the foreigner's complex," which has turned into a state of mind that controls all their conduct. And this is happening at a time when Egyptian scholars and the Egyptian Research Center need the support of officials because this support is the only means by which national development can be achieved by Egyptian minds and labor. If the assistance of foreign experts is sought in development efforts, Egyptian development is to be achieved according to our own views and our own plans and not according to American plans in the area.

Lack of Strategy Discussed

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 717, 11 Oct 82 pp 15-18

[Interview with Dr Mukhtar Halludah, Chief of the Mobilization and Census Agency]

[Text] President of Mobilization Agency says, "The fact that we lack a clear strategy is behind foreign penetration."
"We lack the machinery that would analyze the projects that are presented to Egypt by U.S. AID."

We had to conduct this expanded dialogue with the man who heads the information agency in Egypt. We had to talk with him about the question that we raised in the last issue, "The Penetration of Foreign Research into Egypt," particularly since the Mobilization and Census Agency has a large number of experts, scholars and capabilities. If these were put to greater use, they would do away with many of the shortcomings that we are suffering from in the area of information and data, and those who have ulterior motives behind the research work they are doing in Egypt would not be given the opportunity [to realize their objectives]. Dr Halludah presented a point of view that is worthy of interest. His point of view is based on the fact that the economic and social backwardness of Egyptian society is due to the imbalance that exists in a set of systems in Egypt. These systems created numerous problems. Dr Halludah said, "We have an urgent need for the creation of new economic, social and other systems according to which society would clearly operate." He said, "We need a political decree establishing high-level groups of experts who would set up these systems."

Dr Halludah answered a set of questions we raised. These questions had to do with the role of the Central Agency for Mobilization and the Census in supervising the research activities of foreign centers and organizations as well as foreign individuals. We asked why a large number of those experts were moving freely within Egyptian society without supervision by any government agency. We asked what role the Census Agency was playing to confront foreign penetration operations. Dr Halludah also expressed his point of view about the gravity of the political studies that those experts were presently carrying out in Egypt.

We began the interview by asking Dr Halludah, "What are the boundaries within which we can seek the assistance of foreign experts?"

[Answer] We need foreign expertise, but it is not useful to us in all cases and for all problems from which Egyptian society is suffering. The problems of Egyptian society can only be observed by Egyptian experts. They are the only ones who can understand the general climate of the environment where projects are implemented. Egyptian experts are to stand alongside foreign experts, and they must have a comprehensive view. Otherwise, we will find ourselves encountering many problems when we put the studies that were completed by foreign experts into application. Sometimes these projects are implemented in accordance with the studies, but we are suddenly faced with the fact that problems have not been solved. This is due to the fact that problems which affect [a particular] problem have not been solved. [The foreign expert] carries out his job as though he were laying cables, for example. After a while, however, we find that a project was not successful, and this is due to the fact that the foreign expert did not take the Egyptian climate into account. For example, he did not take negligence, the control system and other [factors] into account.

Consequently, if we wish to take corrective action, we have to consider the remaining factors that affect a project. A foreign expert who is preparing a study about turning the economic open-door policy into a production boom cannot imagine that this open-door policy will turn into a growth in consumerism because he cannot imagine that in many cases decisions are not carried out. This is sometimes due to poor communications, to misunderstanding or to the absence of controls.

Seeking the aid of foreign experts in developing systems cannot be helpful at all. Therefore, one must begin with Egyptian groups who would then define those areas where we need the expertise of foreigners. Foreign experts are to be carefully selected because they will not prepare the studies from an Egyptian perspective. If Egyptians do not make up the foundation of the work, supplemented in some aspects by foreign experts in specific areas, the participation of these foreign experts will be disjointed.

The question then is how do we benefit from the expertise of foreigners when we have a group of Egyptian experts with high academic standards who may have some practical experience as well?

Foreigners and the Magic Solution

[Question] To a large number of officials in Egypt foreign experts appear to bring magic solutions to Egypt's problems despite the fact that a large portion

of the solutions to these problems is known only to Egyptians because of the fact that they have close ties with their problems.

[Answer] It seems to me that problems in Egypt take on different appearances: they appear; they disappear; and then reappear. Problems may also develop and get worse, and decisions about them are made but not carried out. [Sometimes] problems are focused on for a while and then abandoned. [Sometimes] when we focus on a problem, we find that its edge has been taken off, and then we find that it gets worse again. We have many examples of this, such as the problem of congestion in the port. We find that congestion appears and then it disappears when a task force is formed. Then the problem is abandoned and it reappears once again.

The first time, [when we had congestion in the past], a committee was formed by the chairman of the port authority. Then that committee was disbanded. The second time a committee was formed by the minister of transportation, and it was disbanded. Then a committee was formed by the deputy prime minister, by the prime minister and by the vice president. Each time the problem was solved. While they were looking into the situation as a whole and finding the real solution to the problem, the problem had been solved. This is the result of the fact that the system is defective. When the aid of foreign experts is sought, the foreign experts usually do not imagine that the system is defective. They rather think that there is a partial problem that we are trying to solve. Sometimes the problem stems from a defect in the system and not from the fact that there is a problem in that system or that a problem had developed as a result of a previous or a lateral problem. It is here that we have problems none of which can be solved separately. All three problems have to be solved together.

A major part of our problems in Egypt lies in the absence of integrated systems.

Government Agencies and Foreign Expertise

[Question] A large number of organizations and establishments are currently seeking the aid of foreign experts without taking into account what their urgent needs for these experts are. What actually happens is that any number of foreign experts in any discipline are sought outside the context of an integrated system. Countries that offer Egypt grants also stipulate that a large portion of the grant be earmarked for studies, and consulting offices from that country which is offering the grant carry out these studies.

[Answer] I believe that it is possible to seek the assistance of the experts that we need and not those that are imposed by the foreign party.

We do not have professional experts who would study and analyze the projects that are proposed to Egypt by U.S. AID. This is due to the fact that we work unilaterally and not in an integrated fashion. Every ministry has its view, but I do not have an idea if all parts of this view are related to other activities and to the future. This [fragmented view] stems from the fact that the domestic structure is technologically weak.

Supervising Research

[Question] Doesn't the Central Agency for Mobilization and the Census play a

role in laying down the general principles according to which foreign experts are utilized? Our human resource capabilities are in the agency which knows what our needs for foreign experts are. Why doesn't the agency come up with a comprehensive framework under which the assistance of foreign experts can be sought?

[Answer] This is not my responsibility, but we can help [in this area]. As far as our projects are concerned, we take these principles into account, and we observe these conditions with all those who work with us on joint projects. For example, there was an information agency project with a foreign agency, and it was suggested to us that we work with them on this project. But we told them that we would do the work without foreign experts. This experience made me feel that these agencies will not object [when we turn down their services]. What matters is that we know what our capabilities and abilities are in carrying out these studies. We do not want to be merely boasting about something that we are not able to do. It seems to me that we have to devise a plan, and we have to determine what our specific needs are for the expertise of foreigners. The present situation allows some agencies to seek the assistance of foreign experts in areas where they are not needed. Also foreign experts put Egyptians to work on those studies, and then take the credit for them.

What is more important than this is training the personnel who would have the ability to manage a large team.

Egyptians and Task Forces

[Question] To justify the process of seeking the assistance of foreign experts it is being said that Egyptians lack the ability to manage a large task force but that foreigners can do that well.

[Answer] We need an extensive academic background [in this matter] in addition to some practical experience. Any Egyptian who starts out with just an academic background and manages a project which involves people with different experiences will face difficulties. For the foreigner, however, two factors help him succeed in managing a task force. First, those who work with him accept him easily, and he will not encounter the obstacles that an Egyptian will encounter. An Egyptian will not be accepted unless he has both an academic and a practical background.

The solution to this problem lies in giving those people with academic backgrounds a taste of management and organization, even at the expense of carefully calculated delays, so they can control task forces involved in the preparation of studies. This can only come about by devising the required plans.

[Question] What role does the Central Agency for the Census play in confronting the operations by which foreigners are penetrating Egypt, particularly since there is a law forbidding any agency or individual from collecting data without getting the agency's permission and notifying it? There is a large number of foreign scholars working in Egypt; they are conducting surveys and gathering information without permits.

[Answer] We usually discuss all permit applications that we get. The fact that some individuals are gathering information without permits is true because controlling this activity requires awareness among the people. This means that

any person who notices those scholars conducting research would have to ask them about the permit they have.

We sit down with any person who applies to us for a permit to conduct research, and we discuss this matter with him. We ask him to give us a copy of his study.

[Question] There is a serious aspect of the foreign penetration of Egypt which manifests itself in the fact that on the surface these studies appear to be useful to decision makers, but when one carefully looks at the application forms for the research and the data and when one analyzes them carefully, it becomes evident that they contain information that would have serious consequences on the security of Egyptian society. A clear example of this is in the study that was made about communications in rural areas. A large sample was used; it was an Egyptian village. The questions began with one about how many telegrams and letters did Egyptian farmers send to the city. There were questions about the number of tractors, heads of cattle and popular leaders, etc. There are also other examples of studies about subsidies and communications in Egypt.

[Answer] The process of using modern methods to make comprehensive strategic information inaccessible is very difficult. The United States, for example, has information about the quantities of wheat the Soviet Union needs. It gets this information by satellite photography. But other operations, such as investigating telephones, cannot be known. If such information becomes known, [Americans] will study how Egyptians use communications and the extent to which they use transportation in lieu of communications. These studies enable them to analyze the extent to which the standard of living has developed, and they thus have an idea of the structure and systems Egyptians use to build themselves.

I do not believe that this is inconsistent with the information they have, but in the beginning we must determine what we will declare publicly and what we will not. This is to be done through long-term plans. We must have a comprehensive view [of what we want to accomplish], but hiding the methods of cultivating an industrial, civilian product with which we will compete in the world market is something that cannot be done.

The Responsibilities of Agencies

[Question] What is the agency's role in supervising the studies and research projects that are carried out by foreigners in Egypt?

[Answer] These individuals supposedly came to Egypt through Egyptian organizations and agencies, and these agencies are supposed to notify the Census Agency about the activities of those individuals. This is in accordance with the law. Any agency that is conducting research in Egypt is supposed to report its activities to the Census Agency and to obtain a permit for this research. It is to present the results of this research to the agency.

[Question] Does the law regulate the process of conducting research, requiring government agencies and organizations to report to the Census Agency?

[Answer] What the agency does in such cases is to turn all those who gather data without a permit to the state security prosecution.

Decision Makers and Studies

[Question] You said that research centers which carry out these studies are not satisfied with carrying out these studies and research projects. [You said] that they link the results of these research projects with government agencies that have the problem which is the subject of the inquiry. This creates a possibility for influencing Egyptian decision makers and creating a kind of subordination to the economies of another state, [doesn't it]?

[Answer] This would depend on the Egyptian side. Any foreign scholar who comes from abroad thinks from his own personal point of view, and as long as the agency or organization [with which he is affiliated] turns over to him the subject matter of this research so he can study it and come up with recommendations, it is inevitable that there be subordination. But if the Egyptian agency or organization were to take over the project and to utilize the scholar's experience, there would be no subordination. What is more important than all this is that an Egyptian group that is working on a project have some kind of idea of how decisions are made and evaluated according to a comprehensive strategy. If we had a strategic view, for example, of the development and transfer of technology to Egypt so that technological standards would develop in a set number of years, we would accordingly, set up projects and we would be able to see whether or not [our efforts] were going in the direction set by the strategy.

If we were designing our strategy and our policy so that our actions would not be mere reactions, these studies will not have a negative effect on us. But if our decisions are reactive, we will be affected by these studies.

If we have an early preliminary view [of our strategy], those foreign scholars will help us. But if we do not have this early view, our actions will be reactions, and, accordingly, we will carry out what foreign experts tell us even if we had the opportunity to make choices. Foreign expertise in these areas is tarnished by shortcomings because present foreign experts have learned from the experiences of previous experts. The present generation of foreign experts will not be able to make the required shift for Egypt as a developing country because they are not knowledgeable about our conditions.

They can help us formulate the required preliminary view, but they cannot formulate [for us] a fully defined view.

And here we ask a question: Are there in Egypt those who can do this job? Task forces are required for this job. If we had started with these task forces 20 years ago, we would have achieved significant progress. The idea is that we think that this matter is equivalent to a prescription, but there is nothing like a prescription here. The foundations for work that is required to build technology in a developing country were laid, and this needs a tremendous amount of effort. With the experience they have, Egyptians will know exactly where we are. Because they know our priorities, Egyptians have to do the basic work of conducting the inquiries and studies. They can get assistance from modern courses such as special decision making methods. In using such methods one must know the Egyptian mode of conduct and the Egyptian mode of response. The process of bringing systems under control needs time, and the process of setting up systems is not glamorous; but the process of proclaiming slogans affects people rather quickly.

Therefore, the development of an integrated system is a difficult and a delicate process that requires task forces.

Political Research

[Question] A new mode of research into new and dangerous areas has emerged. For example, the Ford Foundation is conducting research into "The Egyptian Political System in the Eighties." This research deals with details such as the expectations of Egyptian political conduct, and generous amounts of money are spent on it. What do you think about this research?

[Answer] I do not approve of such research. The superpowers are trying to find out how to deal with the developing countries and what are the changes that are expected.

Consequently, multi-national corporations in the United States are seeking the assistance of former secretaries of state, like Kissinger, who serve them as consultants. They carry out studies and they attempt to find out whether there is a possibility for another Khomeyni-like revolution in Egypt or not.

[Question] On this basis can we say that the security of information in Egypt is in jeopardy?

[Answer] It is not the function of the agency [to determine this matter], but it is that of general intelligence. However, I believe that studies of this kind will not give them knowledge of any real details such as methods of perception and other methods.

Research Contractors Criticized

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic no 717, 11 Oct 82 p 16

[Interview with Dr Alphonse 'Aziz, consultant at Institute of National Planning]

[Text] Dr Alphonse 'Aziz, consultant at the Institute of National Planning thinks that initially we are not to be uncompromising in dealing with the question of joint scientific research with foreign research agencies. Details of Egypt's economy are known to many agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund, which has more documented information about Egypt's economy than any other scientific organization in Egypt.

This does not mean that matters are to be allowed to run their own course. We must be cautious: there are scientific agencies that have contacts with suspect agencies which have an interest in finding out certain details about the Egyptian economy and about life in Egypt. Therefore, a state agency can be established to warn scientific research organizations against suspect foreign elements who have contacts with foreign intelligence.

[Question] Do you believe that scholars who are cooperating with foreign research centers are aware of the danger to Egypt that may result from their actions?

[Answer] This depends on the scholars' awareness and understanding. There has to

be a clear policy for scientific research, and this policy would define what it wants to get out of international cooperation in scientific research.

I wish there were a monitoring agency that would assume the task of enlightening scholars and setting them straight about foreign agencies and scholars with whom they work without having that agency turn into a tool for prohibiting scientific research or imposing restrictions on it. It is not the job of many of these scholars to look into the scope of a foreign professor's mission and to find out whether or not he has relations with the Pentagon, for example. I believe that national parties can alert scholars about this matter also.

[Question] There is a phenomenon that is presently becoming widespread; it is that of the research contractor. What do you think about this phenomenon and how dangerous do you think it is?

[Answer] This is a hateful phenomenon, and it has to be despised by scholars. Such a contractor has to be spurned by all scientific associations; his name must be made known, and he must be denounced in the media.

We must also call attention to the fact that this phenomenon has affected the values of scientific research at universities. It has created groups of beneficiaries and opportunists among junior scholars who flock around a number of university professors who may accept more research assignments than they can handle.

This phenomenon raises a question: why does an Egyptian scholar take part in such research?

The answer to that question is that the country is not interested in scientific research. Financial resources which are set aside for scientific research are limited if compared, for example, with foreign funding. Accordingly, the financial condition of scholars in Egypt must be reconsidered, and they must obtain rewards from their country for their efforts.

[Question] How do you explain the phenomenon of widespread American research in the seventies?

[Answer] This phenomenon has been linked with the economic open-door policy which ultimately benefits U.S. capital.

[Question] What are your suggestions for stopping this penetration?

[Answer] The solution lies in the presence of a national scientific policy designed by research institutes and universities. A scientific research policy would stem from this national policy, and it would create a national administration for scientific research. This administration would provide the guarantee that there would be no gaps through which foreign research may infiltrate.

Political Research Model Discussed

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 717, 11 Oct 82 p 18

[Text] Among the significant political research projects that are underway at this time is a research project about Egypt in the eighties. This research is being carried out by some professors, scholars, assistant professors and instructors at the College of Economics and Political Science and the Ford Foundation. The research revolves around the following topics.

1. Arab-Egyptian relations. It is being said that efforts are being made to look for a legal way to bring the Arab League back to Egypt and to restore Egypt to the Arabs without abrogating the Camp David accords.
2. Internal changes in the Egyptian political system; the attitude of parties toward democracy; the struggle between Arabism and Ancient Egypt; and capabilities for economic development.
3. The international framework for Egyptian society; Egypt's relations with the two superpowers; and Egypt's attitude toward both of them.
4. Political development in Egypt and capabilities for change.
5. Egypt's foreign policy.

Dr Hasan Fa'iq, Dr Ikram 'Abd-al-Qadir Badr al-Din, Dr 'Abd-al-Ghaffar Rashad, Dr Ahmad Yusuf Ahmad, Dr Mustafa 'Alawi and a number of instructors are participating in this research project whose general coordinator is Dr 'Ali al-Din Hilal Disuqi.

This research illustrates a model application of statements made in the Rand Corporation document. It seems that the events of the Iranian Revolution and the failure of most U.S. scholars to predict that revolution or to offer analyses about the Iranian regime and the role and power of the religious movement and its relationship with the Iranian people and with Iran's broad masses as well as its impact on the fall of the Shah's regime have forced the United States into a position of having to pay considerable interest to research projects in Arab societies that would be carried out by Arab scholars who can offer a more realistic view of the course of political events in their country through the contacts and the knowledge they have of their societies.

Research in American University Discussed

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 717, 11 Oct 82 pp 19-21

[Article by Hasan Abu Talib]

[Text] In one of the most famous and most provocative books that appeared in the sixties--"The Game of Nations" by Miles Copeland--this statement was made: "The American University in Beirut and its counterparts in Istanbul--Robert Coolidge [College]--and in Cairo have been exercising direct and primary influence over the area with regard to U.S. interests. They have influence with the U.S.

government with regard to the problems of the Middle East. The purpose of these educational institutions, which in one way or another are affiliated with the U.S. administration, is not to impart knowledge as it is presumed their role is, but there are rather other objectives behind their existence." If such a description, which was made by one of the Americans who held advisory positions in the U.S. State Department in the forties and fifties, applies to the role of U.S. universities--and the American University in Cairo [AUC] is one of them--in the Middle East in the fifties, has this role been changed in the seventies? Or have American universities in the Middle East continued to play a dual role, a role that goes beyond educational considerations to involvement in political problems and questions?

Before we answer this question, it seems necessary to refer to an experience that the author of these lines had late in 1979. To be specific, this was in December. I was approached about participating in one of the research projects that was to be conducted at the Social Research Center which is affiliated with the American University in Cairo. The research was going to be about "The Social Effects of Agricultural Mechanization in Egypt's Rural Areas." The principal idea of the study may be summarized [as follows]: studying social relations in a number of villages--15 villages in Sawhaj and Asyut--after the introduction of agricultural machinery. A new kind of multi-purpose threshing machines was introduced and tried out in these villages. The research project was to be supervised by an American professor in the Department of Sociology at the American University and by an Egyptian female scholar who is employed at the Social Research Center. The duration of the study was to be 1 full year, and it was to last till the end of 1980. There was nothing in the basic idea of the research project to arouse suspicion or caution. On the surface we had a scientific investigation whose aim was to study the social effects that agricultural machinery would have on work relations in Egypt's rural areas and the effects this agricultural machinery would have on eliminating the shortage in farm workers since farm workers have been migrating to urban areas in the years of the economic open-door policy. The aim of the research was to study the economic benefits of agricultural machinery in so far as setting the expenditures of the agricultural process on the right track and providing the Egyptian farmer with time which he can use in developing local environmental industries. All these are factors scholars would be encouraged to deal with on proper research and scientific principles.

Suspect Objectives

As soon as serious preparations for the field investigation began, a set of provocative facts began to appear. Not all these facts were related to this research project in particular, but they did illustrate a general pattern that applied to all other research projects that were being carried out by the Social Research Center of the American University. A high percentage of the research projects of this center tend to deal with agricultural, health and family planning questions in Egypt's rural areas.

The first one of these facts had to do with the funding for the research project. In order for scholars of the forementioned center to continue their research, they have to submit their proposals to U.S. institutions which agree to fund some of these proposed research projects. In most cases the Americans make some changes in these proposals as a necessary condition to funding them, and usually

the researchers of the Social Research Center accept these changes without question. It is no secret that these changes do not seek to bring about scientific benefits and objectives that were unknown to Egyptian scholars. These changes rather go beyond these scientific considerations to more dangerous ones. They have to do with obtaining certain and specific data according to what the proposed research project will allow. As far as the forementioned research project is concerned, I found out that the Ford Foundation was funding it. The Ford Foundation is an American research organization specializing in [research about] Egypt's agricultural sector and everything that has to do with it: economic, social and even technical questions.

During the first field visit that the three of us made--the American professor, the Egyptian scholar and I--early in November of 1980 to some of the villages of the governorates of Sawhaj and Asyut, we had a discussion [about the project]. The discussion revealed that we had to obtain certain data such as the limits on ownership of farm land in Egypt's rural areas. Other data we had to obtain would indicate the boundaries of the relationship between ownership of farm land and ownership of agricultural machinery and the problems that Egyptian farmers have in owning, operating and marketing the services of these machines. These data may seem to be scientifically related to the objective of the research, but what was truly provocative was the insistence that [eventually] became evident that we obtain detailed data on principal and secondary roads in the villages that were being studied.

We had to obtain data about the means of communication between villages. We had to obtain data about the feelings farmers had about owning agricultural machinery. We had to obtain data about crop rotation; about farmers' feelings about it; and about the degree to which they adhered to it. We had to obtain data about the similarities and differences between buildings in the villages under study. In addition, we had to obtain detailed information about the people who owned these machines and those who utilized them by leasing them. This information went as far as writing brief biographies on each of these people. I objected to this information because it had absolutely nothing to do with the basic scientific objectives of the research as these were stated to me when we made the agreement. The explanation that was given to me then was that the funding organization was interested in this information. Then the doubts were no longer suspicions: [I realized that] we were faced with an instance of interference and control by the funding agency for the purpose of getting data of a very special nature under the guise of scientific research.

The Role of the Social Research Center

The second of these facts has to do with the relationship between the Social Research Center, which is affiliated with the American University, and other Egyptian scientific institutions and data organizations. From a theoretical standpoint there is nothing better than cooperation and information exchange between scientific centers. However, this matter does not seem to apply to the American Social Research Center and other Egyptian data organizations. When preparations were being made for the first field trip to some villages in Asyut that were in the study, it became necessary to obtain some detailed maps of these villages. When I went to one of my old colleagues at the center to get these maps, "I was advised" not to state my true identity--the fact that I was a

scholar with the AUC Research Center. It was stressed to me that we were to mention that we were affiliated with any one of the national research centers so as to mislead [others]. Fortunately, these maps that were required were not available at that time, but the incident indicated to me that there was some kind of mystery surrounding the role and the true affiliations of scholars at the AUC Social Research Center.

Secret Research?

The third one of these facts is that we are faced with a unique kind of scientific research that must be surrounded with the greatest measure of secrecy. My knowledge of scientific research indicates to me that this research has to be published, or at least copies of these research papers are to be deposited in libraries to maximize the use that can be made of these research efforts which otherwise would be wasted. However, this principle does not seem to apply to these scientific research efforts since most of them are not publishable. They are circulated in the smallest possible way, and the few copies that exist soon disappear. In addition, all their materials and preliminary drafts disappear as well. One can swear that only the organization funding the research can explain the disappearance of these copies.

A Boss's View

The fourth one of these facts has to do with the view that Americans who fund the research have of Egyptian scholars. This relationship is analogous to that between a boss and his hired help who have to do what is asked of them enthusiastically and obediently. What is curious is that a number of Egyptian scholars accept that American view or overlook it.

A Monopolistic Policy

The fifth one of these facts has to do with the real objective of the research project. We had a discussion that was not prepared in advance during our second field visit early in March 1980; the discussion took place in the building of the Agricultural Credit Bank in Asyut. Taking part in that discussion were the director of the forementioned bank, since the bank was regulating the process of conferring ownership of the machine in question and making the payments, which it collected from farmers for the machine; the Egyptian engineer who had invented the threshing machine; the director of the U.S. AID office in Cairo, since U.S. AID was funding the process of manufacturing the machine and supervising its sale and distribution; the female Egyptian scholar and the author of this article. After a discussion about regulating ownership of the machine, I mentioned the fact that the owner of one of these machines was monopolizing its use and charging high fees for leasing it in one of the areas where corn cultivation was improving, on the side opposite Asyut. It was proposed that there would have to be another machine owner in the same region so that they would compete with each other and their competition would reduce the cost of leasing the machine. Thus, the interests of the majority of farmers in the area would be realized. But suddenly the director of the AID office stated that it was necessary that this step not be taken--that is, having another machine owner. He stated that their own distribution policy for this machine takes into account the need to establish such monopolistic ownership. When some of us appeared surprised at what he said,

he explained his remark by saying that the number of machines that was manufactured was limited. He said they wanted to expand the ownership terrain for this machine over numerous areas so as to spread the benefits. The justification was not logical at all. His first statement explained the real purport of the aid: through the distribution policy of a machine it would be possible to contribute to the creation and establishment of certain values. Here these values glorify individual values and ownership, and they allow for monopolistic ownership that is controlled by the American establishment itself. This discussion that was not prepared in advance thus showed that the work of the scientific scholar and the work of U.S. AID are basically directed towards finding out about the social principles of Egypt's rural areas and working to effect radical changes that would be consistent with the American system of values.

Research with the Israelis

Furthermore, when we returned to Cairo it was stated at the AUC center that preparations for another research project in the same mode were underway and that a number of Israeli researchers would participate in it. The area of application for that research project would be Sinai, and preliminary information indicated that this research will pertain to Bedouins and settling them.

With all these provocative facts [coming to light] there was only one patriotic choice to make: not to continue in this unscientific work. I stopped working on the project. It was less than 2 months since I had signed the contract to participate in the forementioned research project, and when I stopped working for the project the center decided to terminate my contract because I had violated its terms, and notice of that decision was sent to me.

And now, if we were to answer the question that we raised early in this article, a question that has to do with the extent of the change that befell the role of the American University between the fifties and the seventies, we will find people who say that the role of the American University and the research centers that are related to it is a fundamental role. To those people this institution is like an advanced oasis in a desert of scientific research in Egypt. Consequently, it is necessary and inescapable that the university and its research centers stay. In light of the facts we mentioned which are based on actual experience, we tell those people or others, "Enough! Don't fool yourselves! This scientific organization is only a bridgehead for further U.S. penetration into Egypt. This is what no Egyptian who loves this country can accept."

Controls for Joint Projects Proposed

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 717, 11 Oct 82 p 21

[Text] President Muhammad Husni Mubarak has issued a presidential decree which includes controls and rules for joint research projects that are carried out with foreign or international agencies.

This decree--Decree Number 48 for 1982--was issued following the outcry about the absence of rules or controls for disbursing foreign monetary grants that are earmarked for joint research projects in Egyptian research centers. [It was feared] that this may lead to some misappropriation of funds in government organizations.

The decree included nine basic articles which are:

First, the rules and controls were to be applied in cases of joint research projects that take place in the state's administrative machinery, in universities, in public organizations, in local government units or in other agencies that take part in research projects with foreign or international agencies.

Second, before any agreement about any joint research with a foreign or international organization is reached, the approval of the ministry or the agency where the research will be conducted must be obtained. The same applies to ministries or other agencies where research is conducted.

Third, the chief of the agency where research is being carried out assumes responsibility for following up on and supervising the implementation of research projects that are carried out with foreign agencies.

Fourth, at the suggestion of the chief of the Egyptian agency, the authorized minister is to issue a decree including the financial and administrative schedules for the research project. These schedules are to include the general rules that apply to projects so as to ensure the necessary flexibility for speedy measures. The schedules include the method of managing the project, [a record of] its financial resources and its expenditures, project records and documents that must be kept and the set date for completing the research project.

Fifth, furnishings and equipment that came for the project are to be earmarked for the project throughout its duration. Ownership of this equipment reverts to the state or to the Egyptian agency after the project is completed. That is, if the funding agency relinquishes ownership of this equipment.

Sixth, a special account for the project is to be opened in a bank designated by the Egyptian agency. Funds are disbursed from that account by checks signed by the chief of the agency in question or by his deputy and the project supervisor.

Seventh, the maximum monthly compensation granted to employees of research projects throughout the duration of a research project is as follows:

--In case a person is employed in one research project: 200 percent of the scholar's original salary.

--In case a person is employed in more than one research project: 300 percent of the scholar's original salary.

Eighth, all monies earned by scholars in excess of the forementioned maximum amount are to be deposited in existing funds or in funds that will be set up everywhere to develop research. Disbursements are to be made from the proceeds of these funds for research projects that are determined by the Egyptian agency.

Ninth, research project funds are subject to the control of the agency supervising this research. These funds are also subject to the control of the Central Accounting Agency. A final financial statement for the project is also to be prepared, and the Central Accounting Agency is to be informed of it no later than 2 months after the research project is completed. All documents, records or authorized copies are to be attached thereto.

AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI has learned that the Central Accounting Agency has actually begun following up on joint research projects in various Egyptian ministries, agencies and organizations, and that it is carrying out this follow-up in financial and supervisory areas.

We think, however, that despite the importance of this decision to put controls on disbursement, the problem is more serious than its financial aspects. The problem has to do with a policy on scientific research in Egypt. It has to do with a policy on cooperation with foreign research centers. It has to do with protecting Egypt's political, economic and social security from foreign penetration.

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AMERICAN SHADOW GOVERNMENT DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 717, 11 Oct 82 pp 11-14

[Report on Interview with Dr Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim, Professor of Political Science at the American University in Cairo: "American Shadow Government in Cairo;" date and place of interview not given]

[Text] The objective of U.S. policy is to tie Egypt to the course of U.S. policy.
Subordination has become a state of mind in Egypt.
Penetration takes place by means of creating interest groups with ties to the United States.

Dr Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim, professor of political sociology at the American University in Cairo presents here an important and a serious view. He reveals the extent to which the United States has penetrated Egypt's political, economic and cultural security under the guise of joint scientific cooperation. The significance of this view comes from the fact that its proponent is one of the Egyptian professors who have close ties with many U.S. universities and research centers. Dr Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim wrote his master's thesis and doctoral dissertation at U.S. universities. He also taught in many U.S. universities and worked with a number of research centers in the United States. Hence lies the importance of his viewpoint: he is a good observer of U.S. strategic thought.

Dr Ibrahim reveals here clearly and boldly the dimensions of this strategic thinking. He thinks that the U.S. aid agency in Cairo is the tool by means of which this U.S. penetration is achieved. Because of its large size he thinks that the agency is considered tantamount to "an American shadow government in Cairo." Divisions that are comparable to the ministries of the sovereign government and to important agencies of the Egyptian government have been set up in the agency for the purpose of monitoring the agency's considerable activities which are scattered in administrative, scientific and cultural organizations in Egypt.

This notion supports the thought that U.S. penetration of Egypt is not taking place in a haphazard fashion but rather according to previously determined strategic notions. As the Egyptian professor of sociology says, "Stopping this penetration requires a specific national policy. The problem is a serious one."

The Headlong Rush into Subordination

Dr Sa'd al-Din begins talking about the phenomenon of joint scientific cooperation and says that it is a world-wide phenomenon which is not confined to Egypt. "However, the basis of this cooperation between countries is that which each team offers the other to complement the other team's work. Hence, cooperation is being required. But whether that cooperation has positive or negative effects depends on whether or not one of the two parties has a general policy for developing society and scientific research and bringing about technological development. There are, for example, joint research projects between Soviets and Americans, between European countries that are members of the European Common Market and also between Japanese and Americans. Scientific cooperation then is not a harmful phenomenon, but it does become harmful if it is not part of a general plan and an unambiguous overall philosophy of the country that takes part in such research. It is evident that Egypt has not had such a comprehensive policy for scientific research. Joint activities in scientific research between Egyptians and others have been taking place in a haphazard manner, and their effects in the intermediate or long range remain unknown. Although Egypt has competent international scientists, their capabilities are wasted because of the absence of such a comprehensive policy. Sometimes, unfortunately, we seek the aid of foreign experts who are less qualified than Egyptian experts.

"I'm afraid that what is happening on the research scene in Egypt these days may become an inseparable part of 'the headlong rush into subordination' to the United States. One newspaper, for example, published a statement by the minister of agriculture in which he stated that Egypt would seek the aid of U.S. experts in studying diseases that afflict mango trees. This is a curious course of action! How can we who have been growing mangoes in Egypt for a long time seek the aid of a country like the United States which does not grow mangoes? Behind this matter is a 'feeling of inferiority,' a feeling that we 'lack something' or that we need a foreign expert. This is a painful feeling, and it is related to the absence of a general philosophy that emphasizes national independence even in scientific research. If a general national objective is lacking, cooperation with foreigners becomes a kind of subordination, even if most of the scientific research is carried out by Egyptian experts and researchers. This is because ultimately, this research is planned and overseen by a foreign country, and this firmly establishes subordination. It firmly establishes a feeling of inferiority or what is called 'the foreigner's complex.' We thought we had largely rid ourselves of that complex in the fifties and sixties, but that problem has returned once again."

Ties to the Course of U.S. Policy

[Question] On the other side of the coin, does the United States have a strategy for penetrating Egypt?

[Answer] Ever since 1974 the objective of U.S. policy has been to tie Egypt politically, economically, militarily, strategically and in research activities to the course of U.S. policy. I am saying that the information Americans have about Egypt in all fields, and what they have compiled in the last 8 years is tremendous. No Egyptian agency has such information.

[Question] Some people are saying that Americans have this information, and that it is easy to get this information without penetrating the country.

[Answer] Some of this information is available and some of it became available in the past 6 years. However, some of this information presents a threat to Egypt's national security. I do not wish to be one of those who over-emphasize the feeling that a conspiracy exists, but the more information a foreign power has about one, the more it can use this information in any way it chooses. It may not necessarily use it to harm one, but if it wishes to do so, [it can] because it has the information. There is a serious example of that. A study was conducted by the Center for Technological Growth and Development at Cairo University about "The Modes of Communication in Rural Egypt." At first, the form and purpose of the study appeared innocent, but the manner in which the study was carried out was astonishing. In the process of carrying out their research, the research team compiled a tremendous amount of information about local leaders in about 400 Egyptian villages. They collected information about the class structure and about the power structure in Egyptian villages. They collected information about the weak points and the strong points in the social makeup of villages and the lines [of communication] here. This information can be used to serve Egypt or to hurt it.

Indirect Planning

[Question] What are the subjects that Americans are proposing to Egyptian researchers, particularly since it is American researchers who propose the subject and form of research projects?

[Answer] The subjects that are proposed for research by Americans are those that are the product of considerable indirect planning. In other words an American researcher, whether he is an individual, a university or a research center, must obtain funding in order to conduct [his] research. At the present time the largest agency funding research in Egypt is the U.S. Agency for International Development [AID]. This agency lets researchers know what research fields and subjects it can fund, according to what it thinks are priorities. When a research proposal is approved, an American researcher selects his Egyptian partners. This process takes place in the light of a strategy that is designed primarily by the U.S. AID; American research organizations come second in the process of designing that strategy; and the Egyptian party which carries out the research, collects the data and assists in analyzing the data comes third. This is how things are done in general, but there may be exceptions.

[Question] Do you believe that Egyptian researchers are aware of this fact?

[Answer] Some of them are, but some of them lack the political consciousness [that would enable them to become aware of this]. I took part in these research efforts, and I recall that in one of these research projects--it was about income distribution in Egypt--the American research team was from Princeton University. The research plan which was presented by the American team was considered biased from our point of view. That plan sought to utilize a particular philosophy that would not serve the Egyptian character of the research. Our condition for participating in the research project was to reformulate the design of the study in a manner that would serve national objectives. Unless a researcher is politically aware, he cannot exercise that kind of influence. Unfortunately, a person with such political awareness is an exception.

U.S. Strategy

[Question] A document prepared by the Rand Corporation about the proposed U.S. strategy in the Middle East states that one of the proposed methods of penetration is that of attracting researchers and intellectuals in Egypt and imparting to them an American character. What do you think of that?

[Answer] I have not seen this Rand Corporation document, but I know that the Rand Corporation fully coordinates its activities with all the agencies that make U.S. policy all over the world, including the Middle East. Some of these agencies are the Central Intelligence Agency--the CIA--and the Defense Department [or] the Pentagon.

[Question] What about the Ford Foundation? What is its role in this game?

[Answer] The Ford Foundation is an independent organization: it does not have a vast amount of information, [nor] does it have a direct relationship with the decision making centers in the United States. However, its research is utilized in [the process of] designing U.S. policies. The Rand Corporation, however, is a cooperating organization, and it works publicly with the ruling establishment. Initially, it was basically created as part of the Research Division of the U.S. navy; then it became administratively independent. However, as far as its organic relationships, its cooperation and its objectives are concerned, it serves the purposes of long-term U.S. strategy.

Interests and National Culture

[Question] What in your views are the notions or foundations upon which U.S. strategy for penetrating the Middle East area are based?

[Answer] The two superpowers utilize a strategy that is based on creating foundations of support in the countries of the world. This strategy relies on several methods.

First, [they use the method of] creating a network of interests and groups whose interests are organically tied with the superpowers.

Second, they penetrate the national culture and attempt to reshape that culture to ensure a climate that would be sympathetic to these two superpowers. Both of the superpowers are doing this, and anyone who believes otherwise is naive.

These objectives are known and recognized. The problem is how do we face this? In my opinion, we must not blame the Americans for wanting to penetrate [our country] on all levels. I also do not blame the Soviet Union for wanting to penetrate Egypt, but I do blame the ruling national government because it did not anticipate this and did not come up with a counter strategy that would firmly establish its national independence and self-reliance.

Not a Justification

[Question] Let us go back to the Egyptian researcher. Research centers in Egypt are behind the times, and capabilities for scientific research in Egypt are weak. Does this justify seeking the aid of foreign experts in this manner?

[Answer] No. This does not justify seeking the aid of foreign experts. If one wants to establish national independence on a firm foundation, even if this diagnosis [of the situation] were accurate, there are other means [that may be used] to solve the problem without seeking the aid of foreign experts. For example, laboratories and books may be purchased, and scholars may be sent abroad to study. Foreign experts who come to Egypt cost between 100,000 and 150,000 dollars each in personal salaries a year. A large part of U.S. aid goes to these experts. However, sending one Egyptian abroad will not cost us all this. But what happens is that we rely on foreign experts, and we do not develop Egyptian researchers.

[Question] Once again, how can an Egyptian researcher with his present financial standard resist the financial temptations that are thrust upon him? And how can he resist this penetration after he becomes accustomed to a certain financial standard?

[Answer] As I said, one of the methods used for effecting that penetration is that by which the superpowers create groups of people whose interests are tied to theirs. Despite the international political awareness that some researchers may have, they may find themselves going along in joint research projects with foreigners to realize their own financial and scientific ambitions. In my opinion, this problem can only be solved by a national course and a national plan to counter the present penetration. Quite frankly, If I were to resist, for example, Americans will find others [who will not].

You will have to answer the following question: Who was sending Mr Brown, the director of U.S. AID, to the ministries to obtain from senior officials the information he wanted? Now U.S. AID has become the equivalent of a shadow government in Cairo. It has divisions that are comparable to Egypt's ministries. It has, for example, a division for agriculture, for education and others. This shadow government has financial capabilities that it brought from the United States. It also exercises tremendous moral and political influence inside Egypt. It can get the information it wants from the highest levels of leadership if researchers or others decline to provide that information.

Research Contractor

[Question] There is a phenomenon that has been linked with the surge in joint research [projects]; it is that of the research contractor, if one may use that term. How can this phenomenon be explained?

[Answer] The research contractor, entrepreneur or in-house contractor is one who deals with the offices of foreign consultants, with research agencies or with universities. He prepares studies for them, or he works with them on the preparation of these studies. But because he cannot carry out all the research by himself, he assigns parts of these research projects to others so they can be completed quickly. This research usually lacks the required scientific integrity because a researcher would plagiarize from here and there, and this is one of the characteristics of a contractor. There is also another fact: the contractor is not concerned with the long-term objective of the research. He also does not scrutinize it because he is like a mercenary soldier who fights only for money.

[Question] How extensive is this phenomenon?

[Answer] It is difficult to estimate how extensive it is, but it continues to grow.

Private Offices

[Question] What kinds of agencies do you deal with?

[Answer] Most of them are private consulting offices because the kinds of research that are carried out with U.S. universities or research centers require a certain professional standard, and this requirement may not be abandoned because these studies may be evaluated by other universities and research centers. However, the main purpose of consulting offices is profit, not scientific truth. These offices obtain contracts from the U.S. government, from U.S. AID or from the Egyptian government and commit themselves to present a study at a certain time. These centers carry out sociological, political and economic studies that are called social impact studies or Raskies Studies. Thus, research contractors will do anything they are asked to do.

The Absence of Controls

[Question] Are there controls on such activities in Egypt?

[Answer] This process largely lacks controls. This is because in the fifties and sixties we had created a situation that was highly restrictive of research conducted by more than one individual. Approval for such research had to be obtained from the Mobilization and Census Agency. Now in the seventies the situation [has changed], controls have been relaxed and mismanagement has occurred. What is required now are equilibrium and rationality so we would have controls that are not restrictive. We want to prevent mismanagement, and each one of us wants to penetrate Egyptian society. This can be done by having the Mobilization and Census Agency play its role: no research is to be carried out without the approval of this agency. The present bylaws of the agency give it this right, and what is required is to have this law revived and put into practice.

The Role of the Census Agency

[Question] Dr Halludah said that it was not the function of the agency to monitor what researchers do because this was the function of general intelligence. What do you think about that?

[Answer] Quite the contrary: monitoring is also one of the agency's roles. The agency receives periodic reports from researchers, and in the end it receives copies of their final research projects. Before a research project leaves the country, the approval of the agency must be obtained. The agency's ability to play its role depends on its ability to settle matters expeditiously. The administrative measures that are required to obtain a permit from the agency to conduct research require about 3 months, and this turns off researchers whether they are natives or foreigners. This is because researchers are tied to a budget, and they have to complete their research in a certain period of time. Accordingly, researchers resort to their own methods to obtain the information and data [they need]. In my opinion granting or denying permission to conduct

research should be linked with a scientific research plan which determines the required research priorities of an annual plan or a 5-year plan.

The Role of the Honor Agreement

[Question] In your opinion, as far as research contractors are concerned, what are the measures that can be taken against them?

[Answer] The professional associations they belong to are to set standards or a code of ethics. Those who violate those standards or that code are to be denied [their right] to practice the profession. A coordinating office may also be established where the subjects of research projects that are being carried out would be recorded. This office can also monitor scientific research and accounting. The Academy of Scientific Research as well as professional associations can also play this role, which would be based on the fact that accounting and social control are among their functions.

[Question] One of the serious effects of joint research projects is the effect they have on the peculiarities of decisions that are made in Egypt. What do you think about that?

[Answer] Decision makers think that foreigners are superior. They believe that foreign experts will come up with solutions. The evidence for this lies in the fact that we seek the help of American experts in solving some problems like housing. Our top level leaders appear alongside American experts explaining the problem even though Egypt is full of experts some of whom have spent over 30 years living with this problem and studying it. Will Americans come up with something better than what native scientific experts will come up with?

Subordination Is a State of Mind

Subordination or dependency, however, has become a state of mind. Some people are afraid of making decisions that would anger the Americans who would withhold aid from us. But I am saying that if U.S. aid to Egypt were about 1 billion dollars a year, the actual figure that comes into Egypt is about 500 million dollars, that is, about 15 percent of Egypt's foreign currency receipts. And as I said, if we were to talk with some officials about Egypt taking a hardline position on Israel's actions, those officials would tell us, "The Americans would let us starve." This fear complex exists even though the problem can be solved and the required sum collected if every Egyptian travelling abroad to work were required to pay 100 dollars. However, subordination has become a psychological state, and the Egyptian decision maker has wittingly or unwittingly placed himself in the position of one who is incapable of thinking independently.

This is an extremely serious matter, but resisting it requires an appeal that would begin with political guidance on the highest level.

[Question] I don't know how a group that is benefiting from something can call for the end of that which realizes its financial interests?

[Answer] It is known that a patriotic individual, although he is like any other person in having material and professional needs, is one who is prepared occasionally to sacrifice his personal interests for the interests of the public.

This cannot be achieved unless there is a general movement, that is, a tide moving in that direction and led by the state. This would enable us to keep our feet on the ground and not to fly away in the realm of abstract ideals. What is happening now is that so far cases of researchers who are patriots and who refuse to participate in research projects that would hurt national interests remain individual cases that do not affect the general sweeping trend which is supported by the leadership of the state. This is the tragedy [we have] because if the leadership of the state were neutral, a popular organization of these researchers could confront this trend. Patriotic researchers who are aware are fighting on two fronts: first, they are trying to stem this foreign tide, and second, they are trying to make people aware of what is going on, or they are trying to prevent the government on the highest level from nurturing this trend. Researchers are being asked to organize themselves and to sacrifice some of [their] financial interests.

A Policy for Resistance

[Question] In your opinion, what are the features of a policy for resisting such penetration?

[Answer] First, the state is to restore its subsidy of national research. This subsidy had shrunk in recent years.

Second, researchers are to apply pressure on decision makers so that a general policy can be adopted that would firmly establish national independence and reduce subordination on all levels, not only in research [activities]. What is required is an independent philosophy for development that would increase self-reliance and a plan for research that would set forth research [projects] in accordance with the priorities that are being proposed for development.

Other Agencies

[Question] It is evident so far that U.S. penetration represents the most extensive kind of penetration. One wonders if there are countries other than the United States trying to do that!

[Answer] The largest funding for joint research projects in Egypt is provided by U.S. AID. However, there are less important, albeit more independent agencies, like the Canadian Aid Agency and the Canadian Development Research Center. These centers tend to lean more towards Third World nations. There are also Scandinavian agencies. In general, not everything that is western is harmful. There are countries that are truthfully striving to serve the Third World. This may stem from a historic sense of guilt towards Third World nations, or it may stem from the fact that their mission is one of spreading [the Christian faith].

There is also the French Research Center, the German Center and also the Ford Foundation. In general, the Ford Foundation's present interest in Egypt is less than it was in the past. This has followed its reorganization in the United States following the appointment of the first black president in the foundation's history, and the process of directing most of the foundation's activities toward deprived people in the United States. Accordingly, the organization's foreign appropriations dropped, and those that still remain have been channeled into

agricultural development, into women's issues and into [services for] those who are denied legal rights. Hence, from my point of view the present activity of the foundation is not like that of an American aid organization. In general, it is the state that defines the role of any foreign organization in Egyptian society. The Ford Foundation did have a presence in Egypt before and after the revolution, and its role in every stage was different. There is also the American University in Cairo: its role and the extent to which it plays that role in society will differ according to what is determined by the state. Ultimately, the matter depends on the extent of national independence.

8592

CSO: 4504/33

IRANIAN MILITARY 'DEMANDS' COMMAND CHANGES

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 91, 30 Sep 82 pp 1-2

[Text] Iranian military commanders have told their turbanned overlords that unless there is a radical change in the command structure, manpower training and logistics, the army will not be able to carry out an effective campaign inside Iraqi territory, exile sources in Turkey told IPS last week.

The commanders have also stressed the need for much better coordination between the activities of the regular soldiers and the revolutionary guards, as well as less interference by politicians in day-to-day running of the army. This is a direct reference to young mullahs' interference.

Exile sources in Turkey who are in regular contact with Iranians inside the country told IPS last week that the mullahs have now settled down to a state of no war, no peace.

The military commanders believe such a stand-off situation suits the mullahs who can benefit from the state of war. However, the military say that a war of attrition will drain it of its strength, sap morale and destroy the organisation of the armed forces from within. That is why they have been impressing on the mullahs the need for full mobilisation for an all-out attack. And to launch such an attack the army commanders have insisted on replenishing of the weapons stocks and other necessary equipment. This may explain why the expected offensive by Iran has not taken place.

The commanders have also told the mullahs that the command structure leaves much to be desired. For instance, they have referred to the way in which unqualified politicians, often Friday prayer leaders, announce war plans in the pulpit and then insist on the army carrying out its operations exactly according to details spelled out openly at Friday prayer sermons.

The changes in the command structure also involve coordination of operations between commanders of various divisions, as well as between the army units and the revolutionary militia in the field.

Iranian exile sources say that there is good cooperation between the ground forces commander Col. Sayyad Shirazi and revolutionary militia chief Mohsen Rezai. But there is no cooperation between the air force and the ground

forces on the one hand, and air force and the navy on the other. According to information reaching abroad the Iranian navy has been subject to inter-departmental feuding and unnecessary purges recently. Navy chief Bahram Afzali, a favourite of President Ali Khamenei, has shown that he is a docile yes-man when it comes to dealing with the political overlords but a tyrant when it comes to dealing with subordinates. He is, however, vulnerable to pressures from bearded NCO's and Islamic associations.

Information coming out also suggests that chief of the joint staff, General Ghassem-Ali Zahirnejad, lacks sufficient professional experience as a top staff officer, and as a result he cannot satisfactorily coordinate military affairs between the forces and the irregulars.

The top military brass in Iran believes that the original decisions to push into the Iraqi territory was a sound military move because the victories in the Bostan and Khorramshahr areas had to be followed by a quick mopping-up operation to avert the possibility of an Iraqi counter-attack. However, the military top brass believes that the political management of the push into Iraq was poor. They also complain of inefficient supply services.

The military is also unhappy over the political chaos which has led to Iran's isolation and her inability to restock its weapons systems. On the other hand the Iraqis seem to have done well on the political front, as they have received arms from France, West Germany and Russia.

The Iraqis' ability to acquire sophisticated arms has clearly angered the top military brass in Iran but they are afraid to risk their lives by making their anger public. At staff meetings, however, the commanders often criticise the war management and call for improvements. Meanwhile, the mullahs' policy is a mystery to exile sources who closely monitor military developments inside Iran. They had expected some sort of military activity on the eve of the third anniversary of the war. Instead, the mullahs organised a War Week which included such activities as rallies to condemn Israel and America, remembrance of martyrs, declaration of war against international economic heathens and similar events.

Speeches by the top figures of the regime also emphasised such worn out themes as the Islamic ethics of the Iranian armed forces being the reason for not pushing towards Iraqi towns. Khomeini, Khamenei and Rafsanjani were among speakers during the War Week who said that Iran did not push forcefully towards Basra because its armed forces did not wish to use their superior fire power to inflict casualties against the Iraqi civilians. Such excuses were believed by some hezbollahis when they were spelled out for the first time but it is doubtful if many can really accept this again. Lately Khamenei has said that Iran would like to end the current stalemate war. He has also said that Iran would welcome the Islamic peace mission led by Guinean President Ahmad Sokou Toure. But he stressed that Iran's conditions for negotiating had not changed. Many exile analysts feel the mullahs have driven themselves into an impossible situation. They fear more repressive measures at home and possibly more dangerous adventures abroad as possible results.

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PLAN FOR REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS TO TAKE OVER POLICE, GENDARMERIE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 91, 30 Sep 82 p 11

[Text] Minister of Interior Mullah Nateq-Nouri has told the Tehran daily Kayhan that under a new plan police precincts will be brought under the supervision of a mullah who will be appointed as the deputy chief of the precinct.

"Eventually every office, unit and department of the police force will have a deputy director designated by the revolutionary guards' offices and committees," he said.

Nateq-Nouri also said that the gendarmerie was now cooperating fully with the revolutionary militia, thanks to its new commander Col. Kuchekzadeh. In the west of the country gendarmes were fighting shoulder to shoulder with revolutionary guards against counter-revolutionaries, he claimed.

An exile publication, Ghiam Iran, which represents jointly the views of a military group of nationalists and Shahpour Bakhtiar's National Movement of Iranian Resistance (NAMIR) has warned Iran's police chief Col. Ebrahim Hejazi that he will be branded as an unforgivable traitor if he cooperates with Nateq-Nouri in placing revolutionary guards in the police force. It anticipates unrest if this is done.

CSO: 4600/58

BAKHTIAR GROUP ASSAILS SHARON

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 91, 30 Sep 82 pp 7-8

[Text] Nehzat, which is the official mouthpiece of the National Movement of Iranian Resistance, has called on Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon to stop supporting the Khomeini regime in Iran.

Addressing Sharon, and not the Israeli Government, Nehzat warns Iranians would never forget, nor forgive, those who have been instrumental in bringing Khomeini to power and helping him remain in power.

"Your logic, Mr. Sharon, in helping the Khomeini regime is that in this way you are enabling Iran to weaken Iraq, which is your enemy; but in the process it is Iranian lives and resources which are being wasted and that is why we cannot remain silent," it says. "We have reliable information that your assistance to Khomeini far exceeds that which has so far been revealed," Nehzat claims. "We also have accurate information from inside Iran about how the people resent Israeli's cynical support for Khomeini."

Nehzat stressed that the Iranians were generally opposed to the armed Palestinians who were involved in bringing Khomeini to power and in killing so many Iranian military men in the first days of Khomeini's rule. "It is true that Iranians will never forget the Palestinian armed elements' connection with Khomeini," it said "but it does not give you, Mr. Sharon, an excuse to cynically manipulate Khomeini's love for power and thirst for blood to give him assistance to plunge Iran deeper in bloodshed."

Nehzat advised Sharon to widen his vision and see the future. It said the various countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia and Iraq would be able to play the role which is due to them in the politics of the area, as would Israel herself. But Israel could not and would not emerge as the sole power in the region dictating its will to others.

"Think of that day," the paper said. "Think also of the day Iran succeeds in playing its rightful role in the region. The future Iranian government will be realistic, it will place the interests of Iran above all other considerations, it will be able to contribute to the peace and stability of the region in proportion to its regional interests, population and strength. Because of its distinct national aspirations and identity the future Iranian government will be the right power to contribute to peace and stability. But that government will base its relations with other countries on the basis of their record during these dark days now."

ARRESTED COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES RECANT PAST MISTAKES

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 2 Oct 82 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN, Oct. 2 (IRNA) — Part two of a debate by 29 arrested members and activists of counterrevolutionary and terrorists groups was aired on Iranian television Friday afternoon.

These arrested terrorists comprised members of the Munafiqeen Khalq Organization (MKO), the Marxist-Leninist wing of the MKO "Paykar", the hardline Marxist-Leninist Fedayeen Khalq Organization, the rightist National Front Party and a number of top advisers of deposed President Banisadr.

One of the speakers at the debate, Hussein Ahmadi Ruhani, who had been a member of MKO before co-founding his own Marxist faction of the "Paykar" group, said that the Islamic Revolution of Iran with its anti-imperialist characteristics had stood against both the superpowers of the east and the west, while fighting off all internal and external conspiracies. He added that this was unlike all other revolutions which had fallen under the sway of one of the superpowers.

Ruhani, who was arrested with a number of other top members of Paykar last winter, had participated in a television program in which he expressed regret over his past activities.

A few years earlier he had left the "religious" wing of the MKO. In the early 1970's he had been commissioned by the group to meet with Imam Khomeini, then

in exile in Iraq, in order to get the approval of the Imam for the group. However, after some 20 sessions with the Imam, briefing him on the group's ideology, Imam Khomeini had refused to endorse the group.

Another speaker in the debate, Ata'ollah Nuriyan, the financial affairs writer of the hardline Marxist Fedayeen Khalq Organization's publication Kar, said that prior to the revolution, the U.S. had tried to use Iran for its own interests. He added that the U.S. imperialists had used Iran as one of its agent regimes. He said this status had now been passed on to Saudi Arabia.

Concerning Iran's "neither east nor west" policy, Nuriyan stressed that the Islamic Republic had established this slogan as its official policy despite the vain efforts of some Soviet-inspired elements to impose east bloc policies on the country.

"We had not been fair concerning the shortcomings of the revolution and its realities, because in our publications we portrayed the government as responsible for all of the problems, whereas we knew that the government had brought down inflation and was solving the economic crisis through the establishment of the economic mobilization headquarters," he said, adding that "each of our conspiracies by themselves were enough to abort a revolution."

Former Majlis Deputy Speaks

Also, former Majlis Deputy and Adviser to ousted President Banisadr, Ahmad Ghazanfarpur, said that he was honored to participate in the debate and confess his mistakes. He said that the reason the participants agreed to take part in the debate was because of the humanitarian manner of the prison officials.

Ghazanfarpur said that those who had been deceived by the imperialists and were continuing their opposition against the Islamic Republic should see where their moves were being directed and which groups of the society were benefitting.

Masud Hejazi, one of the main members of the National Front Party spoke about the conspiracy of the counterrevolutionary groups during the first year of the war and said that they had in fact tried to show a totally incorrect picture of the Iraqi aggression. He also harshly criticized the western news agencies for their bias towards the blind actions carried out by the counterrevolutionaries which had led to the martyrdom of innocent poor people.

The last speaker in the debate, Mohammad Moghadam, a member of the command council of MKO's terrorist activities, said that the martyring of Muslim men, women and children only because they supported the Islamic Republic was not an indication of strength. He said that this was in fact parallel with the interests of the U.S.

IDEOLOGICAL CONDITIONS FOR PEACE WITH IRAQ EXPOUNDED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 2 Oct 82 p 2

[Editorial: "War and Islamic Revolution in Iraq"]

[Text]

In order to study the effect of the war in strengthening the positive points of the Islamic Revolution of the Iraqi nation, we should first have a clear idea of this revolution before us.

It is evident that there is no existence absolutely positive except the Exalted Lord. There are always weak and strong points seen in every issue. And our approach towards these issues originates from the duty and mission that we consider for ourselves. Should we observe the issue impartially and just describe its characteristics? Or should we approach every event with a definite aim and in case of finding it positive in general, feel duty-bound to strengthen its positive points and attempt to eliminate the negative ones? With regard to this it should be said that the Islamic Revolution of the people of Iraq is not alien to this rule. We see positive and bright points in the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The reality of the imposed war is an exceptional opportunity for the Islamic Revolutionary movement of the Iraqi people.

On the whole, every revolution is based upon two main pillars, namely: leadership and the people's preparedness. Of course the people's presence is a relative issue. On the other hand the factor of the ruling regime's bayonets, which prevents the real reflection of the people's preparedness should also be taken into account in studying the society. The Imam's well-known statement namely "If the bayonets be removed, all the nations will be with us," illustrates that we should not see only the outward and superficial aspects of the issue in studying the people's readiness.

The Ba'athist regime ruling over Iraq has come to power as a result of a coup d'etat and the Iraqi nation played no role in its emergence. From the beginning of its rule this regime has managed to survive by repressing all opposition. The people of Iraq see no harmony and integrity between their own culture and the values that the Iraqi Ba'ath Party projects. The

liberation struggles of the Iraqi nation against the British government under the ulema's leadership are a clear proof of the religious motives for their peoples' movement. The successive coups that followed those struggles firstly are a proof of the instability of those regimes and their lack of popular support. Secondly, they highlight the fact that they have not been able to involve the people in their own affairs.

The people, only respond to trends having clear links with Islam and participate accordingly. The various regimes, with apparently different systems from Marxist to Ba'athist, have not been able to inspire a popular movement in the society, for they have not been harmonious with the nation's nature and spirits.

On the other hand, due to their collaboration with Saddam's regime the other political persuasions existing in Iraq have lost their influence with the people and have no base in the society. We can conclude that firstly the situation of the Ba'athist regime is unstable in Iraq and one of the reasons of Saddam's imposing the war upon Iran was to transfer the internal crisis of Iraq beyond its borders. Secondly, the other political trends in Iraq have no base in the people's hearts because of their collaboration with Saddam.

On the one hand, due to the existence of one of the greatest Islamic centers (Najaf theological center) and the sacred shrines (which play an effective role in inciting the society in Iraq and the victory of the Islamic Revolution in neighboring Iran, there are positive prospects for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. But on the other hand we see Saddam has killed any person who has the slightest potential for leading the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The martyrdom of Ayatollah Sadr is remarkable in this connection, for Saddam knew if he remained alive, he would be the leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

But let us see what role the war plays in this regard. Firstly, Saddam's fighting against an Islamic and popular regime is in itself a criterion for the people of Iraq to know Saddam better.

Secondly, the Islamic spirits and culture of our warriors in the face of Iraq's army has further awakened the God-seeking conscience of the Iraqi nation.

Thirdly, the existence of the Islamic Republic versus Saddam's regime brings the struggle of the people of Iraq within a definite Islam-anti-Islam framework.

Fourthly, the Imam's leadership will be established in Iraq with the continuation of the war and the difficulties which were referred to in connection with the question of leadership in Iraq will be compensated, Insha Allah.

It is natural that from the beginning of the war up to now we have repelled the aggressors with the incentive of defending the Islamic homeland and the ideals of the Islamic Revolution. Iran's conditions for ending the war have been definite and clearly enunciated to the world several times. We have announced that we have no longing to annex Iraq's soil but will struggle for the fulfilment of the conditions that we have forwarded.

In the meantime we know that conditions are nothing more than contracts and agreements between parties. In this chaotic worldwide market wherein Israel massacres thousands of innocent people disregarding the most evident human laws and Saddam launches aggression against our soil, there is no guarantee for the execution of such contracts. What is important in this regard is the guarantee for the fulfillment of conditions. Otherwise, a contract or promise is nothing more than a worthless peace of paper.

Now let us see what reference can be accepted as a competent authority which will guarantee Iran's conditions for ending the war. The Security Council? What other international organizations?

While we announce our conditions, we are well aware that no peace (for which we fight) can be settled in the region with the existence of Saddam. That is why our practical method is to launch military attacks and then wait for Saddam and his supporters to think wisely. If Ba'athist wisdom is not forthcoming we will launch yet another attack, but before starting any new operations, first we give the necessary warnings to the enemy.

In Qur'an, when God orders Moses to go to Pharaoh, He immediately informs that prophet of Pharaoh's nature and says that he has transgressed. But in the meantime we see when Moses is prepared to fight against the Pharaonic rule, he is ordered to tell Pharaoh he should want to be guided and purified. This means that in the course of his advance, Moses first waits and warns. And if Pharaoh does not refer to his wisdom, the next step will be taken more quickly and harshly.

On the other hand Iran has tolerated two years of Saddam's aggression and crimes. It has sustained heavy damages and offered valuable martyrs in this way. It is natural for any regime which will rule Iraq to have open and brotherly relations with Iran. While the future government of Iraq is clearly dependent on the will of the nation of Iraq, it cannot ignore the just and legitimate demands of the revolution and government of Iran. Such a government will effect the Islamic Republic to the same extent that it will effect the nation of Iraq, since the Islamic Republic and the Iraqi nation are not separate from each other.

In conclusion, it should be restated that we have entered Iraq's soil in order to defend ourselves and fight to get our rights. This fighting is not aimless, but it has definite conditions that are all based upon the daily realities of the war.

We know that the execution of these conditions needs a guarantee. Under the present circumstances where no legitimate body exists on the international level and all global organizations, associations and the Western governments are intent on destroying the Islamic Revolution, Saddam's existence is the biggest obstacle against the fulfillment of our conditions.

This fact gives us the right to have direct participation in the struggles of the people of Iraq against Saddam, for today there is a deep relation between the equitable defense of the Iranian

nation and the freedom-seeking struggles of the people of Iraq. This relation should grow deeper and more cohesive in the future with the elimination of Saddam as the greatest impediment.

In short, the conditions of the society of Iraq and whatever its strong and weak points be, the future of events and developments there is in direct relation with the role that the combatant forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran will play.

CSO: 4600/38

SAUDIS RIDICULE PRO-KHOMEYNI PILGRIM DEMONSTRATORS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 91, 30 Sep 82 pp 8-9

[Text] Saudi Arabian authorities have denied reports by the Tehran media that pilgrims from various nationalities had joined Iranian pilgrims to stage political demonstrations against Israel and the United States.

According to Saudi officials, demonstrations held by the Iranians were small affairs, often "ridiculous stunts," staged simply to attract attention and made headlines.

"But the only headline they made was in the Tehran media, who blew up the incidents out of all proportion," a Saudi spokesman told pressmen last week. He was openly contemptuous of the behaviour of Iranian pilgrims.

Meanwhile, Iranian exile sources in West Germany told IPS that at least a dozen young Iranians sent by the Khomeini regime as pilgrims to Mecca have asked the Saudis to help them defect to Western countries.

The same sources said those defecting were all members of revolutionary guards who were sent on Mecca pilgrimage because of bravery in combat. Their defection provides evidence that morale is low among the revolutionary guards.

Already a number of revolutionary guards are known to have fled Iran with money and valuables they have obtained by robbing victims of the revolution, exile sources in West Germany said. Those guards who have defected in Saudi Arabia were planning to join their friends in Turkey and West Germany.

CSO: 4600/58

CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN IRAN 'COULD COME QUICKLY'

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 91, 30 Sep 82 pp 3-7

[Text] A change of government in Iran could come quickly, James E. Akins, former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and long involved in Middle East affairs, forecast when he addressed the recent International Herald Tribune and Oil Daily conference on Oil and Money in The Eighties.

Akins, who spoke on the Persian Gulf in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, said the war could almost certainly not be ended without a change of government in Baghdad or Tehran. Saddam Hussein seemed secure, so it was to Iran that one looked for the change, he insisted.

This could come quickly, for with the disillusionment setting in over the progress of the war, with the continued economic hardships and now with new restrictions on oil shipments, there could be a quick move against the mullahs, Akins said. "Many Persians long for a return to their old culture, to the relatively comfortable life and the sure economic progress made in the past," he continued. "Although a return to the monarchy is unlikely and a return to the House of Pahlavi seems almost impossible, a new military dictator converted into a new Shah is not inconceivable."

Explaining why it was felt Saddam Hussein is secure Akins said: "The Iranians have long urged the Iraqi Shi'a to rise up against their Sunni overlords and it was not irrational of them to think that this could happen. Iraq has effectively been ruled for the past 600 years by Sunnis: the Turks, then the Hashimites. But the Ba'ath Party leadership of Iraq, although initially drawn heavily from among the Sunni Arab population, is resolutely secular. There are today large numbers of Shi'a and Christians in the government. Furthermore, for the last decade the Iraqi central government has made considerable effort to bring about the economic development of the south, that is, the Shi'a areas.

"The industrialization of the country especially in the south has been impressive. The recent decollectivization of the farms has been as popular in the south as in the rest of the country. The holy Shi'a sites are being transformed from rather dreary, dusty, backward provincial towns into attractive garden cities. The grand mosques are set off to far greater

advantage than has been the case in the last 1,000 years. Most important, the Iraqi Shi'a are Arabs and they have few illusions about their role as secondary citizens in an "Islamic republic" dominated by Persian ayatollahs.

On Iran, Akins said, "Khomeini now says he will live to be 100. If he does, we may have another 18 years of his reign. Even many anti-regime Persians think a change in government is not possible as long as he is alive. But that pessimism too may fade. Shi'as could turn against Khomeini himself. He is not the hidden Imam; he has not miraculously appeared from the side of the mountain; his parents and grandparents were known. Nor is he a descendent of the Prophet. His use of the title "Imam" is close to heresy in Shi'a Islam. This was not important as long as the victories against the Shah and imperialism glittered. They are now growing duller. And there are enough close relatives and friends of victims of Khomeini's terror to provide at least one successful assassin of the "Imam." A bloodbath would then ensue but the war with Iraq could quickly end. Earlier Iranian victories in the war with Iraq were attributed to the great leader. Now he could just as easily be held responsible for the Iranian defeats.

"In the first days of the Iraq-Iran war much of the fighting was carried on by the irregular Iranian religious forces," Akins continued. "Although the traditional army has played an increasing part in the fighting, the war has been conducted in an unconventional fashion; there has been a remarkable disregard for the lives of their own fighters. In case after case, Iraqi soldiers tell of being faced with mobs of fanatics--frequently children--holding high their arms, brandishing daggers and shouting "Allahu Akbar" and then throwing themselves into the Iraqi positions. Human waves were used to explode Iraqi mine fields. This action was demoralizing to the Iraqis, who found such slaughter morally repugnant. The Iranian losses were staggering but they did make significant progress.

"I asked a senior Iraqi official early this year how many of these fanatics he thought the Iranians still had. He replied that this was the main question concerning the Iraqis. If there were 100,000, then the war was almost over and Iraq had won for Iran would lose that many men in a short time. If there were 5,000,000 of them, it would be quite another story. He thought, as do I, that the figure was closer to 100,000 than to 5,000,000.

"On July 13, the Iranians crossed the border into Iraq. They have subsequently launched at least three other major attacks in the region near Basra. Each time they were repulsed by the Iraqis who this time fought very well. On August 23, the states of the Persian Gulf braced for what they thought would be the biggest offensive of all at the point nearest Baghdad. Then nothing happened. It is far from clear what caused the Iranians to back off--fear of Iraqi counter-attacks or disintegration of the Persian force or merely re-grouping for a new offensive.

"Iranian fanaticism could fade quickly. It is easier to encourage children and ignorant old peasants to go into battle with the promise of instant transport to paradise if their deaths will also serve the motherland. This was the case when Iraq was on Iranian territory. It is also much easier to

promise paradise when the "forces of God" are advancing; the leaders then can plausibly argue that there is visible proof that God is with them. But when waves of young people are slaughtered and when the religious armies are repulsed, the inescapable conclusion is that God really has not willed the action. Whenever the common soldiers question the mullahs' guarantee of entry into paradise for the "martyrs" of this war their fanaticism will be transformed into a violent reaction against the "religious" leaders.

"Most western observers of Iran believe that the government of the mullahs is supported by no more than 15 percent of the population but that minority is well organized and highly fanatic. They point out (correctly) that many governments are ruled with minorities smaller than 15 percent. I think this is unduly pessimistic; in most such cases the ruling minority has at least the tolerance of the majority. There are increasing signs that the majority opinion in Iran is growing restive at the economic deprivations and at the increased domestic terrorism. Iranians fought against the Shah to end the corruption and the depredations of the secret police. While Iranian corruption is presumably not--and indeed cannot be--on the same scale now as it was under the Shah (not as much money is available), the human rights record of the Islamic republic is no better (and is arguably much worse) than that of the Shah. Most Iranians hoped to improve their lot, not to destroy their society, when they rose against the Shah. Under the mullahs as under the Shah there is a growing body of Iranians whose friends, brothers and sons have been killed by the government and who now swear revenge."

Akins warned the Soviet Union had clear interests in Iran. He said, "The constellation of the supporters of Iran in the war is interesting. They include the Soviet Union and Communist countries of East Asia; North Korea and Vietnam. They also include the Arab countries most closely tied to the Soviet Union: Syria, Libya and South Yemen. The Soviet Union has allowed overflights of planes bringing material support to Iran. The Soviet Union also apparently provides the Iranians with aerial photography of the front. None of this is surprising. Saddam Hussein of Iraq is one of the most implacable enemies of Communism in the Middle East; the Soviet Union would like to be rid of him.

"Iran is also an enticing goal for the U.S.S.R. There is no reason to assume that the Soviet Union has given up the 300 year old Russian dream of warm-water port in Iran. Russian interest has been increased through their prospective needs for the hydrocarbons of Iran, probably by the end of this decade. Appearing as the protector of Iran, the Russians ingratiate themselves with the mullahs. They also work with leftist religious leaders and may control many of them.

"The Communists will be in a good position when Khomeini dies or is killed. If the anti-mullah reaction is strong enough, the Russians could work through the Tudeh Party, i.e., the Communist Party of Iran, although the lessons of Afghanistan will probably assure that the Soviet Union will use indigenous nominally-nationalist forces rather than a puppet party. Either could ask for Soviet military intervention. In any case, the Russians have

clear interests in Iran and it would be folly to assume either that they will not try to advance them or that the inherent religiosity of the Iranians will forever exclude them from the country. Four years ago, most Iranians said "Better the mosque than the monster." Today, many of the same Iranians—including especially educated women—say ""Better the Communists than the mullahs.""

Akins said the position of the Islamic republic vis-a-vis the Arab world "could not have been more to Israel's liking if it had been planned by Israeli intelligence itself."

"In this strange collective bed of backers of the Iranian mullahs we also find Israel," he said. "Whether the Israelis have been secretly working with the Iranians from the beginning or had infiltrated the ranks of the mullahs, as many Arabs now believe, cannot be demonstrated. But it is clear that the Iranian provocation of the war with Iraq was to Israel's interests, as is the prolongation of the war. When the Iraq-Iran war started, although hostages were still being held, Israeli spokesmen in the United States (e.g., Amos Perlmutter) argued that the United States should help Iran. This was not well received by the American people.

"The Israelis by their own admission have supplied spare parts for the Iranian air force, they have flown chartered planes to Iran, one of which was shot down. The report of Israeli technical personnel in Iran has not been substantiated, although it is widely believed by Arabs. The Israeli excuse is that they intend to ingratiate themselves with those Iranians who will replace the Khomeini government. This argument does not hold water; it is not the anti-mullah revolutionaries they are supporting but the mullahs themselves. The real Israeli motive is surely the destruction of the Iraqi army—or at least its immobilization. An Iranian victory would scarcely be in the interest of NATO or Japan.

"Should the Iranians defeat the Iraqis—and presumably this is what those who aid Iran hope—an Iranian-imposed Shi'a government in Baghdad would quickly make an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Even if Saddam Hussein is overthrown by indigenous forces and a new nominally-independent Arab government is in control in Baghdad, it seems highly probable that one of its first actions would be to mend relations with the Soviet Union. In either case, there would then be a tier of states from Tehran through Baghdad to Damascus hostile to the west and most probably under Soviet influence, if not domination. The countries to the south (Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula) would quickly have to adjust to this new reality."

Akins said it was possible that the Iranians were merely accepting aid from Israel and from the Communists without being influenced by either. It was possible that if they were victorious in the war, they would indeed turn to the liberation of Islam's holy cities: Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina. If there were ever a united Muslim front led by fanatic Shi'as, Israelis might regret their earlier support of Khomeini and his men.

Akins said that "Iran's foreign exchange position was disastrous until oil exports were resumed a few months ago. The new Iraqi effort to destroy the Iranian loading terminal at Kharg Island or at least to interdict it to foreign shipping, if successful, will have severe effects on the economy and will add to domestic unrest and hasten Khomeini's downfall. The threat to retaliate against Iraq's financial backers Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf state will probably not hurt Iraq much even if successful. But the loss of Arab oil from the Gulf would have a substantial effect on world oil supplies and prices.

"The mullahs want the war to continue. They may really believe victory is within their grasp. More probably they are aware that as long as the Iranian army is engaged in fighting a foreign enemy it will be difficult for it to turn against the mullahs and send them to join the young idealogues whom they have so cavalierly dispatched to paradise. Arabs in the Gulf would welcome a military corp in Tehran but belief in it is waning; the consensus is that the longer it is delayed the more probable it becomes that the ultimate victory will be communist.

"Whether they say it or not the Americans, the Russians and the Israelis would probably all prefer a stalemate with both sides gradually exhausting themselves. If the war ends with a decisive victory for either side, the complexion of the Gulf will be changed--probably permanently. The Arab states of the Gulf certainly fear an Iranian victory but they are realistic enough to know that fine tuning a major war is beyond their--or our--capability. There should be no doubt that they are sincere when they say they pray for an Iraqi victory. But I suspect that in their secret prayers they suggest that God need not make it too big a victory.

"The Gulf Co-operation Council was set up by the Arab states of the Gulf after the war started. It did not include Iraq which considered the move basically hostile to its interests. Saudi Arabia is now the most important country in the GCC as it has been in OPEC. With the end of the war, whichever side is victorious will be the dominant power in the Gulf. If Iran wins, it would work through the Shi'a populations of Arabia to manipulate and even control the area, if not actually to absorb it in the Islamic republic. The Arab governments of the south (exclusively Sunni) would make accommodation, probably by paying tribute in some form or another. In the case of an Iraqi victory the fate of the GCC would be questionable. If it continued to exist, it would include Iraq and would likely become an extension of Iraqi power although Saddam Hussein has been somewhat chastened by the war and could not play the same internal subversive role in the states of the Gulf that a victorious Iran could.

"Whoever wins will also be the major power in OPEC. It has been stated frequently that when the war ends, both Iraq and Iran will need additional oil production to pay for the war damage and that this will exacerbate the world oil "glut." The first part of the analysis is only partially correct; they will need more income--not necessarily more oil production. The second part is wholly false. Neither Iraq nor Iran would be interested in winning new markets through decreasing their oil prices. Either side--or both,

should there be a compromise or a stalemate--would insist that Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC, which had massive increases in production as a result of the Iranian revolution and the Iraq-Iran war, take cuts in production needed to maintain oil prices.

In the May OPEC meeting the Iranian oil minister said that Iran intended to put an end forever to "Saudi arrogance." Subsequently, he said that it was intolerable that Saudi Arabia "with a population one-tenth that of Iran's" should export more oil than Iran. One remembers that from the late 1950's to the early 1970's there was a constant struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia on oil production levels. The compromise was that the two countries should export roughly the same amounts.

"Iran clearly intends to return to this position; the statement of its oil minister can lead to no other conclusion. If Saudi Arabia were forced to cut back another 3 million barrels/day to reach the Iranian capacity of 2.5 million barrels/day, there is no doubt that Saudi Arabia could survive and prosper particularly after development of non-associated gas fields. It is not at all certain, however, that the world could easily absorb the loss of this much additional oil, even with other OPEC countries increasing production substantially. There would be no "shortage" of oil; demand would come back into balance with supply as it has in the past, either through effective consumer rationing and self-restraint or, more probably, through substantial increases in oil prices. And the idiot economists who write regularly for our business journals would claim again that OPEC had been (defeated) and the energy crisis solved.

"Such pressure on Saudi Arabia and others in the Gulf to reduce production may never be applied or needed. It is unlikely that Iran for some time to come will be able to export more than 2.5 million barrels/day of oil; any increase beyond that would require considerable investment and probably foreign expertise which the Iranians have been unwilling to bring in. Iraq could probably export 2.5 million barrels/day relatively quickly and perhaps could increase that by another million barrels/day in a year. Before the Iranian July offensive, the two countries together were exporting 2.5 million barrels/day. If their current combined export capacity is only 5 million, it would mean that complete peace would put only an additional 2.5 million barrels/day of oil on the world market, less than recent draw-down of stocks of OPEC oil. The additional production could be absorbed quite easily if other OPEC countries keep production at current levels and if the world economy improves even more oil would be needed. Those who now look for the end of the Iraq-Iran war to drive down oil prices will have to look elsewhere for support for their fanciful but comforting views."

CSO: 4600/58

MOJAHEDIN PAPER VIEWS PROSPECTS FOR UPRISING

London IRAN LIBERATION in English No 41, 18 Oct 82 p 7

[Text]

When the Mojahedin's appraisal of the year-long Resistance against Khomeini's regime began to be circulated around Iran, hardly anyone could have expected the repercussions to follow so soon afterwards. According to all reports from Iran, Resistance operations have sharply increased since the widespread circulation of this appraisal throughout the country. Terrified of the obvious consequences, Khomeini's regime has stepped up its propaganda war against the Mojahedin.

The appraisal is based on reports submitted to the leadership body of the Mojahedin by Resistance commanders across the country. After careful deliberations, the leadership's conclusions were sent to Massoud Rajavi, the leading member of the Mojahedin, for a final analysis.

Parts of the appraisal on the Khomeini regime, its characteristics and future possibilities appeared in past issues of Iran Liberation (I.L. Sept. 6, Oct. 4.). This week, parts on the general state of the Iranian society are published. Future issues will contain further excerpts from the appraisal.

**On the readiness
of Iranian society
at present**

The first point to talk about when considering the general state of our society is its revolutionary readiness. We do not doubt that the society's revolutionary readiness and the move which originally began against the Shah have not, fortunately, subsided. They are going on and escalating despite all the crimes Khomeini committed and the

lack of trust he generated. There were certain issues at stake which had to be settled; but they were not. Khomeini got on top of the wave, but this tormenting wave will bring him down, too, as it brought down the Shah.

We also do not in any way accept outdated ideas about "the people not trusting anyone," such as ourselves (the Mojahedin). We do not believe that there is a "lack of trust". Everyone saw that on June 20, 1981, despite all the preparations Khomeini had made (to

suppress popular protests), the Mojahedin succeeded in bringing 500,000 Tehran residents into the streets, without prior notification and merely through unofficial channels, thus vindicating their tactics. This historic turning-point, which stands out as the origin of the new history and revolution of Iran, was brought about through the Mojahedin's sacrifices. So our society is not dead; it is in captivity.

Astonishing rise in public awareness

The second point about our society is that in comparison with the early days of the (1979) Revolution, the awareness of the masses has risen astonishingly; a rise that has come about through the daily and direct experiences of the masses themselves. This is of great value. Under Khomeini's regime, our society has not been at a standstill; it has been learning and gaining in experience. The change of events has been going on at the highest possible rate; the highest in the entire history of Iran, one might say. What proves this remark is that compromising, traitorous and incompetent groups and all the pseudo-champions of the primary stage have been repelled. In other words, we now know that the hotch-potch primordial soup comprising the original groups no longer exists; its demarcations have been well drawn out, its poles specified and its boundaries made clear and all these are active, each one having its specific attractions and repulsions. This is a sign of the progress of the Revolution.

On the movement's organised character

The ability to be organised comes next. One point about the popular movement that overthrew the Shah was its self-arising and spontaneous nature. It was a very great and admirable one, too. But like all other spontaneous

movements, described by Franz Fanoune in his famous essay on the greatness and weakness of self-arising movements, it had its weakness and lacked form. It was not too much connected with awareness and, consequently, with organisation. As a result, it easily provided or could provide the chance for Khomeini to get on top of it.

Now the situation is different, however. Under present conditions, the era of extensive spontaneous movements has elapsed. Of course the people still play their part and always will do so, but their movement and action will not go on in simple, elementary and spontaneous primitive forms. They will advance on the basis of the same spontaneity, but will have the ability to be organised. To make this matter more lucid, let us consider the practical implications of it. Unlike some opportunist tendencies present in some groups, one must not wait for the masses to turn up themselves. The masses will rally around their vanguard organisation once the grip of repression is loosened. In the experiences of the past three and a half years we have seen with our own eyes that whenever we demand and organise the masses turn up. Now if someone has not organised, then he has no right to say "the masses are not turning up!" He is the one who is lagging behind, even though he may be churning out pseudo-leftist rhetorics. I have heard that one of these groups has said or written that the Mojahedin have been engaged in "terrorism unrelated to the masses!" At face value, this remark seems quite an eye-catching one, but looked at deeply, it represents a great veer to the right. In other words, the person or the group who utter these words are lagging behind by quite a distance. They assume that as in the primitive stage, under the present circumstances, too, the people (who, they seem to think, are not yet disenchanted enough with Khomeini) will wake up one early morning and will rally around them in their masses. This is not the case! To sleep all night and then

wake up the next morning to see all the people have come to rally around you is an impossible notion. No group can expect to be "invited" to lead the "masses awaiting it".

Those who do expect such things can be certain that this time, too, the masses will eventually turn up and many of these groups will be left behind.

We must also note that the spontaneous movement which led to the Shah's downfall was essentially and altogether a peaceful and unarmed one. The masses who demonstrated were not armed. But the advancement of forms, methods and content of the struggle - which essentially leaves no room for any struggle but an armed one at present - will itself go on in step with awareness and organisability. Failure to take heed of these points, can result in our falling behind the time. ■

CSO: 4600/59

BRIEFS

MISSION TO U.S.--Iran's mission to the United Nations does not need, like other representatives there do, to consult the government in Tehran on what to say or what action to take, the head of the mission has told the Tehran press. Since they had a Qoranic base and spoke on that basis the issues which the mission brought up could be brought up by anyone in their place, he said. "This line of action and this independent thinking has brought a special and exceptional standing to the Islamic republic's representative mission to the U.N., and it is the speedy decision-making and freedom in thinking which are based upon the principles that the Qoran, Sunnah, the line of the Imam and the revolutionary council gave to us," he added. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 91, 30 Sep 82 p 12]

TEHRAN, ALGIERS RELATIONS DECLINE--Relations between Tehran and Algiers continue to deteriorate, say sources in Tehran. While Syria's President Hafez Assad has sent a special emissary to explain his actions at the Fez summit, Algeria has not concerned itself with Tehran's bitter reaction to the agreement made there and its own role in supporting it. Assad is said to have told the Iranians he spent three hours at the summit defending their position. Relations between Algiers and the Iranians began to worsen after the shooting down of the Algerian foreign minister's plane, with fatal consequences for him, near Iran's border with Turkey some months ago. No explanation has yet arisen for the incident. The mullahs and officials thought to be closer to the communist bloc are said to be pushing anti-Algerian feeling in Tehran. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 91, 30 Sep 82 p 12]

EXILES LOOK FOR CHANGE--The abrupt downturn of support for Khomeini and the regime inside Iran and the growing awareness that there is now a majority seeking a change has brought new life and activity to many of the exile communities in Europe and the United States. Latest community to form a new cultural and social organisation is that of London, where several hundred people responded to an invitation to a meeting for setting up a society. A committee will plan its further activities. More newspapers in both Persian and foreign languages are also being launched on the already cluttered scene by exile groups and individuals. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 91, 30 Sep 82 p 12]

CSO: 4600/58

'MA'ARIV' COMMENTATOR DETAILS 'IMAGINARY' CABINET SESSION

TA191646 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Oct 82 p 12 (Supplement)

["Imaginary Report" by Amnon Abramovitch]

[Text] In the autumn, 4 October 1922, the Polish cabinet was called urgently to an extraordinary session. The ministers were summoned in a panic, over the telephone.

Those days the Polish army was holding large stretches of territory in Byelorussia, the Ukraine and the approaches to Kiev. The Russian army was dug in facing it. Terrorists who infiltrated across the lines were attacking soldiers of the Polish army and killing some of them.

The panicky session was opened by Ben-Ze'ev Paderewski: "My teachers and gentlemen [Begin's traditional opening words], my ministerial colleagues, the Russians have committed an abominable crime. They have killed our soldiers from ambush. I want to put to the vote the proposal of War Minister Marshal Leon Pilsudski. Our war minister is proposing a frontal attack against the Russians, on land and from the air, along the front line. Let it be known that I support the proposal by our minister of war."

The ministers were shocked. They were weary of the war, being conducted somewhere far from the borders of the homeland; a war that had begun as a retaliation action of a day or two, and lasted for many months. This was all the more so since they had lost patience with Marshal Pilsudski. He had become repugnant to them. The man who had made himself hated by the top ranks of the army also aroused revolution and nausea among his colleagues in the cabinet. His bad name had spread far. A liar. A lover of war. A man of blood who had been brought up from earliest childhood to hate people in general and Russians in particular.

Prime Minister Paderewski was a leader strong in expressing himself, a virtuoso speaker. He knew how to get the masses worked up, as though he was playing them a Polish fantasia. Be-ze'ev Paderewski gave the appearance of ruling his cabinet high-handedly. Only the appearance. Historians claim that in fact he was in Marshal Pilsudski's back pocket.

The marshal's proposal, to attack Russia, was put to the ministers by the prime minister and even supported by him. I would like to ask you, Paderewski said, to get down to the vote.

Who is in favor? Thank you. Lower hands.

Who is against?

That moment, as the sports commentator put it, the atmosphere could have been cut with a knife. Very slowly one hand rose and then another and another. The proposal by the prime minister and the minister of war was turned down. The ministers looked at each other, scared, not believing their own eyes.

The minister of finance, (Yorn Liondor), voted against the proposal; that is to say, against the prime minister. The young minister--a son of one of the old guard of the movement and his comrade in belief and Paderewski's path--had fired at the prime minister. He squirmed before him. This time he could no longer take it. A few days earlier he had returned from abroad, where he had learned of the extent of the damage done by the invasion of Byelorussia and the Ukraine.

Pilsudski's traditional opponents, reserve General Motek [play on Hebrew word for 'sweetie'] and Minister (Damovski) voted against. At the end of the session (Damovski) told one of his aides: "I will no longer raise my hand in favor of another adventure. No more."

The orthodox ministers also voted against. They were sick to their souls of killing. The one who aroused surprise, or maybe not, by his vote in favor of the warlike action was the liberal minister, Patovski.

At the end of the session the ministers thanked God for the mercy. By one vote a terrible and unnecessary bloodshed had been averted. They knew that they had been spared another war. At least until the next cabinet session.

CSO: 4400/46

REPORT ON JORDAN PUBLICIZING CONFEDERATION

JN191144 Jerusalem AT-TALI'AH in Arabic 14 Oct 82 pp 1, 11

[Excerpt] Reports from various parts of the West Bank and Gaza say that scores of representatives of the Jordanian regime have recently poured into the occupied territory and began publicizing the confederation plan which the Jordanian regime proposed between those parts of the West Bank and Gaza to be retrieved under the Reagan initiative and Jordan. The reports also say that these representatives hope to exploit the suitable atmosphere which might be created by the frequent talk about what the Jordanian side terms the positive results of the Jordanian-Palestinian talks.

The reports add that these representatives are talking about promises to grant loans and financial aid to certain individuals and groups as well as facilities to market their agricultural products, especially olives and citrus which are abundant this season, in Jordan and elsewhere. By making such promises, the representatives hope to secure the peasants' support for the Jordanian plan.

The reports point out that these representatives and circles in Amman are working hard to get the support of this social group, on which the Israeli authorities and other parties are also concentrating, but which has proved unable and unqualified to represent the masses in the occupied territory.

In the context of this political propaganda campaign, the representatives and former members of the Jordanian regime are trying, with the connivance of the Israeli military administration, to reap maximum benefit of the media's talk about the positive and cordial atmosphere of the Jordanian-Palestinian talks in Amman and what the Jordanian side terms the positive results of these talks. The Jordanian side presents these talks as having been completely in favor of King Husayn's plan. Furthermore, certain parties in the national movement have exploited their criticism of the Syrian information minister's recent statements to launch a campaign of support for Yasir 'Arafat. They are, thus, involving themselves in the Arab polarization game and inadvertently supporting the King Husayn plan. Local observers say these parties hope that their campaign will create a split and a clash within the national movement in the interest of the Jordanian regime, if ever Israeli greed leaves it anything at all.

However, these observers point out that results of the Jordanian-Palestinian talks in Amman have not actually enhanced the optimism of the Jordanian regime and the media sympathizing with it. They note that the Palestinian side has stressed more than once through Yasir 'Arafat and other PLO spokesman that Palestinian national struggle adheres to its demands for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the right to self-determination after the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territory before any talk about confederation or anything else.

CSO: 4400/46

BRIEFS

ANTI-'ARAFAT CAMPAIGNS--During the past few days there have been increasing media campaigns and suspect moves against PLO executive committee chairman Yasir 'Arafat, who visited Amman to discuss the possibility of Palestinian-Jordanian coordination in future efforts to solve the [Palestinian] issue. It is clear that the visit alone stirred the resentment of certain quarters against the PLO chairman. These quarters spoke of some factions' objection to the decisions adopted at the Amman meeting, although 'Arafat asserted that these decisions are not final and are completely subject to the approval of the Palestine National Council. What is important is that triggering discord and division inside the unified Palestinian ranks is unforgivable. The issue is first and foremost related to the Palestinian people. Therefore, creating fabricated contradictions by some quarters in the interest of these quarters is rejected by the Palestinians. No side whatsoever has the right to dictate its opinion or impose certain stands. The Palestinian people will never be party to the policies of axes, for the simple reason that they are preoccupied with healing their successive wounds and catastrophes which are largely caused by axes and divisions. [Editorial] [Text] [JN182027 Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 14 Oct 82 p 1]

CSO: 4400/46

KUWAITI DEFENSE MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON GULF SECURITY

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 711, 28 Jul-3 Aug 82 pp 28-30

[Interview with Shaykh Salim al-Sabah by Sami al-'Uthman: "The Security Vacuum in the Gulf...Is a Lie"; date and place not specified]

[Text] When this talk is about the Arabian Gulf, its security and its future, under the current circumstances, this significance becomes increasingly important, especially if the interview is given by a man who is directly responsible for the defense and security of his country.

In this exclusive interview with this newspaper, AL-YAMAMAH, His Excellency Shaykh Salim al-Sabah, the defense minister of Kuwait, dealt with the current issues in the Gulf area, in particular, and the Arab arena in general. He discussed this subject with the usual frankness for which Kuwaiti officials are known. The interview began as follows.

Armaments and Their Sources

[Question] Diversification of arms sources has been a subject of discussion for a long time now. Therefore, what is new about this subject, Your Excellency? And what steps have been taken with respect to the policy of arms diversification in Kuwait and other Gulf countries who are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]?

[Answer] The policy of diversification of the sources of arms is considered by Kuwait and other members of the GCC an extremely important and basic matter for many reasons, all of which stem from purely technical and military considerations, which have nothing to do with ideologies and politics. Weapons are the basic need for any army in the world. The most important thing is that the varied armaments should fit your needs and that you should be able to obtain them and use them under terms which do not endanger your sovereignty or your existence.

For example, you may obtain a Soviet-made weapon which can be effectively used for a specific military objective. You may also have an American-made

weapon which has a different objective than the Soviet, or another country's weapon. From this the importance of diversification becomes apparent because it achieves the requirements for defense of the country and its security, for which you are responsible.

To emphasize this point and make it more clear, let me tell you that although Britain is a country that manufactures weapons, it bought a French-made rocket which proved effective in the Falklands War. Therefore, one can say that the defense of the country requires the state to adopt the policy of diversification of weapons sources, in order to obtain the best and most sophisticated weaponry in all military spheres.

There is another point that might be even more significant, namely, that the policy of diversification of the sources of weapons saves you from limiting yourself to, and becoming dependent on, one source. As you know policies change from time to time according to interests. It is possible that the country producing arms may abruptly withhold arms shipments to the purchasing nation, which depends solely upon the producer. In this case the purchasing country would be at the mercy of this single source.

[Question] Your Excellency, what about military cooperation between the Gulf states after the establishment of the GCC?

[Answer] The fundamentals of military service are the same the world over. Likewise, the fundamentals of war are the same. But military plans differ from one country to another. This point is self-evident.

The most important thing, in my view, is that we should seek to prepare and equip our military so that our soldiers would be able under any circumstances, to conceive and execute any plan. Consequently, we will not encounter any great difficulty in coordination between the Gulf armies or in tasking them with joint missions.

Allow me to make an observation regarding the Kuwaiti military brigade which was dispatched during the 1973 war to fight alongside its Egyptian counterparts. The brigade did not find any difficulty in taking part in the battle: it entered the combat zones and committed itself to the orders of the Egyptian commander. This situation has occurred more than once.

In like manner Saudi soldiers were dispatched to Kuwait to fight alongside their Kuwaiti brothers, to repel the advances of Abd-al-Karim Qasim in the 1960's. The Saudi soldiers were easily able to carry out the Kuwaiti plan of action, which was designed to protect Kuwait.

History has already recorded incidents that have demonstrated and confirmed cooperation and coordination between us. The reason for this is that we are all members in the Arab League, whose charter stipulates the importance of military cooperation and coordination among member countries. The GCC also strongly encourages this cooperation.

Joint Exercises

[Question] Are there any plans to conduct joint exercises among the armies of the Gulf Cooperation Council?

[Answer] Some time ago here in Kuwait we conducted a military exercise, during which live ammunition was used. All Kuwaiti military forces took part in the exercises. We had invited all the chiefs of staff of the GCC to observe this exercise.

I met with them before and after the exercise and received from them constructive and important observations. They also praised the ability of the Kuwaiti soldiers and officers to execute their plans. We are prepared to participate in any military exercise organized by the Cooperation Council.

[Question] Your Excellency, how do you regard the issue of compulsory military service?

[Answer] The draft is a fundamental matter and should apply to all Gulf area countries. I know that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is seriously considering legislation for the draft. Many Gulf countries have asked us to brief them on our experience in the field of compulsory military service.

A draft has many merits, the most important of which is the preparation of youth for the time of need, for serious military life, and the development of their ability to take things seriously and evaluate them correctly.

Integration in Military Training

[Question] Cooperation between the Gulf states covers everything, and naturally it includes the military sphere. Has anything been done with respect to the establishment of a Gulf military academy?

[Answer] The idea of establishing a Gulf military academy will soon be implemented, because the goal of the GCC is to lay the foundation for the creation, ultimately, but gradually, of the united states of the Gulf.

This is the sound approach which the people of this region believe in and approve. Accordingly, military and civilian colleges must be established in the region. The council of Gulf defense ministers has discussed the idea of concentrating on integration and avoidance of the duplication of projects.

If there is to be a first rate Air Force training college in Saudi Arabia, then air force training should be restricted to that college. Likewise, a smaller staff college would be established in Kuwait.

A large staff college would be established in Bahrain and thus integration and coordination of military training would be achieved among the countries of the GCC.

American Rapid Deployment Force

[Question] Your Excellency, in your opinion, what are the objectives of the Rapid Deployment Force and what is Kuwait's position regarding it?

[Answer] As you know the United States established this force for its own interests and we have nothing to do with what the government of the United States does. However, we will definitely not permit any force regardless of what it is to land on our territories without our permission. And if any state undertakes to penetrate and traverse our lands, its army will have to walk over our dead bodies.

Let me reiterate that the Rapid Deployment Force does not concern us in the least. Militarily this force has proven its ineffectiveness, as we have seen previously in Iran.

Security Vacuum Is a Lie

[Question] What about what has been said regarding the security vacuum in the Gulf? Does the Rapid Deployment Force have any connection with this issue?

[Answer] Unfortunately some of us believe what the Western media incorrectly reports. The West has spread this fallacy about a security vacuum in the Gulf and expects us to believe it, hoping that fear would lead us to accept Western ideas and plans for the region.

In my estimation the West is aiming to create a justification for intervening and consolidating their position in this region. But their plans have remained unaccomplished, and are merely fallacious rumors that have not deceived the people of the region.

The Gulf area enjoys stability and security. This can be attributed to our moderate, balanced, and non-alliance policy. This policy guarantees permanent political and social stability and security. Therefore, a singular fact becomes apparent, namely the security of the Gulf lies in the hands of its people. The Iraq-Iran war should not be taken as a sign of a security vacuum in the region. This war has its own particular causes.

Shatt Al-'Arab War

[Question] What are your views regarding the Iraq-Iran war, and what is the solution to this crisis?

[Answer] The Iraq-Iran war is part of a hostile foreign conspiracy to undermine Islam and the Muslims. Since the inception of the war Kuwait has endeavored persistently to reconcile the two Muslim countries. We hope that our brothers in Baghdad and Tehran will reach a peaceful settlement because those who stand to lose from this conflict are the people of the Gulf, both Arabs and Iranians.

Source of Danger to the Gulf

[Question] In your opinion, Your Excellency, the danger to the Gulf, is it American or Russian?

[Answer] Talk about danger to the Gulf is coming only from the West. This gives the West a justification either to sell us more weapons or have a presence in the area. This is done in support of Western interests, not in defense of our interests.

The Palestinian Issue

[Question] What is the support which the Arabs can offer to the Palestinian issue?

[Answer] Political support for the Palestinian cause goes hand in hand with financial and military aid to liberate Arab land. War basically is a coordinated effort of military, financial, political and propagandistic endeavors. All these elements must be present for a successful confrontation.

The most important thing is that we define what we want and agree on a common strategy on all levels.

American Bias Toward Israel

[Question] How can the Arab world respond to the complete bias of the United States toward Israel?

[Answer] If we have no respect for ourselves we should not expect respect from others. If we do not define our demands clearly we should not expect support from others. As long as the United States has its interests in the Arab world, we should oblige it and the world at large to accept what we want.

The Arab Situation: Rights and Duties

[Question] What are your views, Your Excellency, regarding the Arab situation, in general, especially after the recent setbacks?

[Answer] I was asked this question 15 years ago by Kuwaiti radio. I stated then the Arab leaders are responsible for our war losses because they want the man on the street to hear only good news so that he would then turn around and applaud his leaders.

However, when defeats and shake-ups occur then the Arab leaders have no firm ground to stand on. For example, Churchill once told his people, "Do not cry today, but save your tears for tomorrow because tomorrow will be a worse day." Unfortunately, we never tell our people that today is an easy day and tomorrow will be more difficult. We always say with arrogance that we are victorious. Since 1948 we have never taken any initiative to achieve our goals.

President Bourguiba once made an observation which we should have followed for the sake of the stability of the Arab situation. But the result was that he was accused of treason. We lost Palestine, parts of Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. When we criticize ourselves for accusing Bourguiba of being a traitor before listening to and examining what he said, we will have taken a good step.

There will be no unified Arab effort until we begin to examine our leaders' proposals objectively. This is what happened to His Royal Highness King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz when he presented a peace proposal to the Arab leaders at the summit conference. He said, "This proposal contains ideas and initiatives. Please examine and discuss them, and then take a decision." Unfortunately, we reacted emotionally and did not discuss the proposal; we shelved it instead.

12188

CSO: 4404/652

STOCK MARKET CRISIS EXAMINED

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 40, Aug-Sep 82 pp 30-31

[Article by Yasir Hilal]

[Text] The crisis that AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL expected to occur in the stock market after the change in market conditions and loss of liquidity (cf. our study in the May issue, "Whither the Stock Market?"). The first signs of the crisis actually began to appear about 2 months ago. Thus far it has been in the form of a large decrease in the volume and prices of shares traded and in the accumulation of checks returned for lack of funds. They amounted to 500 million Kuwaiti dinars at the beginning of August and a further increase is possible in the near future.

This report by our correspondent in the Arab Emirates reviews the latest developments in the Gulf stock market crisis and the efforts being made to cope with any adverse complications that may result from the present situation.

Does what is happening in the Gulf stock market indicate that the "hour of reckoning," which everyone tried to delay, has arrived? Or is it merely a "summer cloud" created by the departure of most of the principal market movers to wind up the summer season in the resorts of Europe? And what is the possibility of emerging from the crisis under all circumstances?

It is difficult to give a precise answer because there are large dark spots in the picture due both to the absence of a minimum of reliable data and to the failure of the Gulf stock market to conform to the laws and principles that prevail in normal stock markets. Despite this, however, it is possible to sketch a picture of the situation without indulging in detailed speculation, a picture that will become clearer in the coming days.

The Crisis

The first manifestations of the crisis, concealed mainly by the nature of the market itself, appeared in May. It soon worsened with the advent of Ramadan and assumed the form of a large drop in the volume of transactions--some 25 percent of the volume recorded in the previous months--and, as a result, a drop in the prices of all shares, especially those of recently

established Gulf companies whose shares do not trade on the Kuwaiti stock exchange. The total volume of Gulf shares traded decreased from 40.1 million last 10 June to 10 million on 7 August. The (daily) volume of shares traded during June and July fluctuated between 15 and 28 million, except on 15 July when it rose to 55 million. The cause was an attempt by small shareholders to stimulate the market apart from the major shareholders, but it did not last more than 2 days. It became clear there was something abnormal afoot that was not thoroughly understood except by the major traders who began to pull out of the market quietly, leaving behind the small shareholders and with them the banking system in Kuwait, the Emirates, and, to some extent, Bahrain and the governments to face later on the "hour of reckoning" without being able to cover the sales transactions on credit. From 25 July on, checks without covering funds written by a number of major market movers began to appear for the first time in the Kuwaiti stock market. Some estimated the value of the "returned" checks by 4 August at about 500 million Kuwaiti dinars. This figure is naturally likely to increase with an increase in the number of checks due or with every attempt made by the check holders to cash them at the banks since Kuwaiti law permits the payment of postdated checks at any time before they become due.

Perhaps the most prominent cause of the rapid worsening of the crisis was the weakening of confidence among the traders. This is the decisive factor on which the stock market and the chain of intertwined obligations rests. The director of a brokerage house in the Emirates believes the sparks that ignited the market were set off by one of the big traders when it became clear that the majority of the checks that he had written were not backed by sufficient funds. The investor who interrupted his vacation and returned to Kuwait justified his position by saying: he wrote one check for 50 million Kuwaiti dinars to an investor who proceeded to cash it at a bank before it was due. This led to exposing the account and the return of the checks of the other investors who, in turn, were unable to cover the checks that they had written, and so on.

The confidence factor was soon affected because some of the traders regarded the incident as adequate justification for evading the payment of their obligations. This weakened confidence further and there appeared for the first time a precedent for the non-transfer of share ownership from seller to buyer unless the latter deposited a check in the amount of the transaction with the broker and the seller proceeded to deliver it in exchange for a receipt of transfer of ownership.

"They Removed the Thorn Themselves"

The occurrence of the crisis made it clear that the intervention of the region's governments, that of Kuwait in particular, as a savior, as happened in 1977, will not take place with the speed or ease that many investors counted on, for the Kuwaiti government hastened, for example, when the returned checks phenomenon worsened, to send a special airplane to bring back more or less officially big stock market traders from their vacation resorts in Europe. It was understood at the same time that it was up to

these investors to "remove the thorn themselves." As for the banking system, it soon became clear that its final decision was not to "plunge" into the game of financing the delayed transactions. The banks refused to cover the uncovered accounts no matter how small the amounts were. This was followed by a meeting between Minister of Trade Jasim al-Marzuq and the big market traders. The minister is understood to have asked them to meet their obligations.

The Search for a Solution

The investors themselves then began to look for a solution to the problem that they had shared in creating. The proposed solutions were based on two main approaches:

(1) The first solution (most of the effort was expended on it) represented an attempt on the part of leading market traders, both from the Emirates and from Kuwait, to delay "the hour of reckoning." It assumed many forms, the most important being methods of "rushing forward," which some investors adopted by announcing their intention to buy any number of shares offered for sale, sometimes at very high prices. For example, there was the purchase of a share in the Gulf financial center--(al-Muzayyini)--for 25 dirhams for a year at a time when its price was no more than 4 dirhams cash. Moreover, trading activity at the beginning of this month was surprisingly brisk. It subsequently turned out that the purpose was to provide liquidity for the big traders. The interest rate in transactions that were aimed mainly at achieving this is said to have been 165 percent.

Furthermore, some tried to convince the holders of checks payable to their account to delay asking for payment and "reschedule," at higher interest rates or accept shares in lieu of a request for payment in cash.

(2) The second approach to overcoming the crisis was to try to find a radical solution to the problem regardless of the resulting sacrifices or losses that some players in the game would have to suffer. This approach became apparent from a number of indications, the most obvious being the intense meetings held mainly between the "kings of the market," chiefly Kuwaitis, with the participation--it assumes varied forms such as daily contacts--of major stockholders in the Emirates and Bahrain. The discussion focuses on the creation of adequate liquidity to cover the obligations by withdrawing some funds from the world markets or by selling immovable property, specifically land.

But more important than all this is the fact that every investor (or speculator) has undertaken to provide an accurate audit of his accounts and reschedule his obligations and debts as a prelude to carrying out operations to settle accounts between the important individuals, if only partially, including a pledge to provide an accurate picture of the sums that have to be raised. This will eventually result in a strengthening of the financial position of the possessors of exposed accounts.

Observations

What is hoped for, at any rate, is that the crisis will produce swift action to restore the stock markets to a reasonable condition and reorganize them on a sound basis as a large number of experts and Kuwaiti officials and indeed some big market traders (themselves) requested and insisted upon in the past. As for coping with the current situation, it will most likely take the form of compromises and an attempt at distributing the losses among the largest number of individuals possible, although it is clear the small shareholders will ultimately be the principal victims or, as one trader put it, "one who gets burned." From the standpoint of the corporations themselves, it seems that some of them will pay the price, particularly, perhaps, the newly formed companies which did not permit their shares to be traded on the official Kuwaiti stock exchange. This depressed the prices of the shares, some of them at one time below the initial offering prices, and eliminated the demand for them.

As for intervention by the government or by some big traders who did not play "the stock game," it may be premature, in their view, because it is necessary to wait for the "shock" to run its course and for the actual volume of transactions payable (after the settlement of accounts) to become completely clear. The initial estimates indicated it might amount to about 3.5 million Kuwaiti dinars, but the experts assert it will not exceed 600 million dinars after the settlement. This factor alone raises hopes that the crisis can be surmounted with minimum losses and maximum lessons.

5214

CSO: 4404/40

JUNBLATT WANTS EXPANDED UN PRESENCE

PM200833 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 16-22 Oct 82 pp 20-22

[Interview with Walid Junblatt, leader of the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party and the Lebanese Nationalist Movement, by Jamal al-Rawi in Paris; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] One of the surprises of the Israeli invasion was the fact that the invasion forces entered the ash-Shuf area, which was under your control, without even symbolic military resistance, and this contributed to the tightening of the siege of west Beirut. How do you explain this?

[Answer] The explanation is simple: Ash-Shuf was the third line of defense. The real question is: Why did the first and then the second lines of defense fall so quickly? Why did ash-Shaqif Castle not resist longer, and why was there not greater resistance in Jazzin and ar-Rayhan? As early as 6 June, that is, just hours after the Israeli attack began, the Palestinian and nationalist forces initiated large-scale withdrawals on the Jazzin-al-Baruk axis in the direction of Beirut and al-Biqah. As a result, a general state of alarm and collapse set in. As far as I was concerned I only had a few pieces of heavy military hardware, and it was obvious that my forces would in no way be able to confront the Israeli advance. This is why I withdrew whatever equipment I had to 'Alayh.

[Question] Lack of resistance in ash-Shuf was not the only criticism directed at you in the early stages of the Israeli advance. How, for example, can you justify agreeing to meet Israeli opposition leader Shimon Peres at your own palace in al-Mukhtarrah?

[Answer] One day before I left al-Mukhtarrah for Beirut, I was sitting at my home when an Israeli jeep arrived at my door. Two military men and one civilian alighted from it. The civilian approached the entrance and introduced himself to me as Shimon Peres and said that he had been instructed by the Socialist International to contact me.

[Question] But the Socialist International has denied having assigned such a task to Peres.

[Answer] I did not know this fact then. He said that he was acting on behalf of the Socialist International, and I believed him.

[Question] What did you talk about?

[Answer] He asked how I was personally. Then we had a brief discussion about the aims of the Israeli military operation in Lebanon. He said the Israeli forces would not occupy Beirut. His position at the time was in general close to that of the Begin government. He said that in his opinion the Palestinian military machines must be destroyed. This being his position, it was natural that we disagreed on everything. The only thing we agreed on was that the International Red Cross should assess the damage caused by the Israeli attack. I told him that I was surprised that Israel, which claimed to be civilized and democratic, killed innocent people.

[Question] Do you have any preconditions for cooperation with the new president, Amin al-Jumayyil?

[Answer] My preconditions are clear, obvious and irrevocable. They are:

1. Rejection of all forms and dimensions of Israeli occupation. This means refusal to sign a peace or reconciliation treaty.
2. Maintaining a minimum level of democracy and freedom. We are somewhat cautious when it comes to the new president because he represents a certain political line, the Phalangist line. We do not want that line to govern the state.
3. Insistence on the international forces' presence and on the expansion of the area under their control, with an increase in those forces' numbers because in their present state they cannot accomplish the mission which we hope they will accomplish. This is particularly so because we have no confidence whatever in the Lebanese army in its present state and structure.

[Question] Who, in your opinion, is responsible for the Sabra and Shatila massacre?

[Answer] The Phalangists, Sa'd Haddad and Israel.

[Question] How do you view the deployment of the multinational force in Lebanon?

[Answer] We support it and in fact want its mission to be expanded, but I do want to point out that the force's task is still not clear. This lack of clarity could lead to a catastrophe.

[Question] Since your arrival in the French capital you have met with several French officials. How do you assess their position on Lebanon?

[Answer] Their position is good and it agrees with our view that Washington is the obstacle in the way of any solution. On the question of the

multinational force we--and they--would have preferred this force to have a UN mandate so that it would no longer be subject to Washington's hesitation, as in the case of the withdrawal of the first multinational force.

[Question] Will you return to al-Mukhtarah in the near future?

[Answer] I will not return to live under occupation. I do not want to be a prisoner in my own home.

[Question] The Lebanese Nationalist Movement which you lead and which consists of several organizations and parties is passing through a very difficult phase, indeed it does not even seem to exist any more.

[Answer] The Lebanese Nationalist Movement is undoubtedly going through a difficult transition after the setback it has suffered. This difficult phase will continue until a new formula is arrived at for the operation of a new front in which participation will be confined to only some of the sides involved under the present formula.

[Question] As part of the self-criticism process, how do you view the alliance between the Lebanese Nationalist Movement and the Palestinian resistance?

[Answer] The Lebanese nationalists have since 1967 been devoting the main part of their struggle to the Palestinian cause. Although our alliance with the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon was unconditional on our part, it did not develop into a strategic alliance based on a common political interest. One day we are bound to review the phase of joint struggle by us and the Palestinian resistance, and when we do we will definitely find some unforgivable gaps and mistakes committed in the course of this cooperation. The Lebanese nationalist line suffered major setbacks because the so-called allies were not always allies. We never abandoned the Palestinian resistance under any circumstances, but it abandoned us more than once. The responsibility for what has happened to us must be shared. Part of the responsibility falls on the Palestinian resistance.

CSO: 4400/41

IHDIN RADIO COMMENTS ON AL-JUMAYYIL'S TOUR

NC160959 Ihdin Radio of Free and Unified Lebanon in Arabic to Lebanon
0730 GMT 16 Oct 82

[Unattributed commentary: "The President's Tour"]

[Text] It is scheduled that the president of the republic will tomorrow begin a tour of the United States and some European states. The reasons for this tour and its goals are well known. This tour also comes in the first month of this presidency, which indicates its importance.

Of course, what has been and is inflicted on Lebanon comes from outside. Its source is the conspiracy tailored by Henry Kissinger with the cooperation of Israel against Lebanon. They have been and are still implementing it with the help of local tools sometimes or through their own forces at other times. Therefore, it is appropriate to tackle the Lebanese crisis through the outside, since its causes are from the outside.

What remains is the manner to tackle it. The states are not benevolent societies. They have interests--political, economic, cultural and moral--in this area and in the rest of the world. The president today faces the presidents of the states he will visit, carrying with him considerable capital: the popular support from all the national factions rallying round him today; a free and democratic country, which has done many favors for the human civilization and provided an example of tolerance among the sects and a democratic and free experience in the area; a bridge between the East and West over which the civilizations of the Eastern and Western worlds cross. Finally, the president carries with him the biggest capital--he is defending a right.

From these premises President al-Jumayyil can address everyone, strongly and frankly. He can tell the U.S. President: What you have done to Lebanon is enough--conspiracies in service to Israel. What has been done to this state, which carries the banner of freedom, democracy and human rights which the United States is advocating, is enough--destruction, ruination, killing and expatriation. [He can tell the U.S. President] that the United States should apply pressure to its pampered child, Israel, so that it might also refrain from conducting aggression against Lebanon, destroying it, expatriating its children and fanning discord in it. And

thus, it has to withdraw its forces from all of Lebanon as soon as possible and pay damages for the destruction and ruination inflicted on Lebanon.

President al-Jumayyil can say to French President Francois Mitterrand that Lebanon has been embodying the French culture and language in this area of the world for more than half a century. Lebanon is also France's gateway to the Middle East area--culturally, economically and linguistically. These debts France owes to Lebanon must be paid so that matters will not change in the future.

President al-Jumayyil can say to his holiness the pope that more than half of Lebanon's citizens are Christian, and that it, moreover, is the hope of more than 20 million Christian Arabs in this area and, thus, the task of rescuing it and rebuilding it is, before any other side, the responsibility of the Vatican. Also, the master of the Vatican enjoys a strong and an effective moral authority over more than 50 million Catholics in the United States of America, whose votes can tip the balance in favor of any candidate. Thus, his holiness the pope, from this strong position, can apply pressure on President Reagan so that he in turn can apply pressure on Israel and use his influence in the area to put an end to Lebanon's crisis and to salvage it.

This is the language and the method that are recommended to the Lebanese president when he meets with the leaders in his coming tour. The important thing is faith. If the Lebanese president believes that his cause is right and if he believes that he is asking for fairness not pity, the results of this tour will be absolutely positive. The Lebanese can, thus, expect only good from it.

CSO: 4400/41

MERIDOR COMMENTS ON REHABILITATION OF REFUGEES IN LEBANON

TA131250 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1105 GMT 13 Oct 82

[Remarks made by Minister Ya'akov Meridor on the problem of refugees in Lebanon following the cabinet meeting on 13 October; place not given, recorded]

[Text] Most of the homeless refugees have now been moved into temporary shelters, UNRWA schools, Lebanese schools, public institutions, abandoned shops, and buildings that are still under construction but which have a roof. There is an agreement between UNRWA and the IDF not to touch these refugees, not to remove them before a proper shelter has been provided, namely, not before tents are erected for them.

Next week, God willing, namely on Tuesday, the first tents will be set up. UNRWA agreed with our proposal that the refugees not be removed. They wanted to evacuate the refugees from one of the schools and put the refugees in tents now. We forbade this since we first want those who are not in schools, who are still scattered in the area and have nothing next to their skin as far as shelter goes, to be put in the tents. They should be taken care of first. They should have priority and preference over others.

The work is proceeding at an accelerated pace. The IDF has increased its efforts to clear the area of duds. Work is being carried out very rapidly. A meeting was held with a delegation of Palestinian refugees in my presence. They expressed several demands. One of the demands was that when the tents are set up they be allowed to build their own houses near the tents, in the area where the tents are to be set up. As you know, this runs counter to the Lebanese Government's practice up till now. The Lebanese Government forbids solid structures. At any rate, we decided--I undertook the responsibility--and today the cabinet heard about this, that we will not prevent the refugees from building solid structures.

CSO: 4400/41

SHI'ITE LEADER CALLS FOR END TO PERSONAL FEUDS

NC171932 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 17 Oct 82

[Excerpts] On the anniversary of 'Ashura', His Eminence Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, deputy chairman of the Higher Islamic Shi'ite Council, addressed a message to the citizens, in which he said: The 'Ashura' anniversary comes this year while all Lebanon is on the verge of turning into a large-scale Karbala' [Iraqi town where Shi'ite Imams Al-Hasan and Al-Husayn were killed by antagonists], because of the calamities and pain that have befallen Lebanon's residents as a result of the Israeli invasion, because of the occupation that has ensued from this invasion and because of the interactions that have been produced, and that are still being produced by this occupation. These interactions pose the greatest dangers to [Lebanon's] identity and fate.

In his message on the 'Ashura' anniversary, His Eminence Shaykh Shams al-Din said: These glorious days bring to us the spirit of real martyrdom that stems from giving of one's own self as well as one's own life for the public well-being only. We require a visible and luminous lamp of this spirit to light the alleys of our life at this phase and to fuel our will to confront Israel's occupation and schemes, to forebear with all the harm done to us because of this confrontation and to surmount all the ordeals that our steadfastness requires us to endure patiently.

His eminence added: We remember those of our sons who are held in Israel's prisons and concentration camps. We also remember the captive land in the south in Jabal 'Amil. We had warned everybody in Lebanon and abroad that this land might fall captive. However, this land has fallen captive as a result of a conspiracy whose dimensions and creators are known only to God. Therefore, we appeal to all men of goodwill in the world and to the international, humanitarian and political establishments to act to free these brothers and sons who have been unjustly and vindictively arrested by Israel. We call for raising loud voices to condemn Israel for all the atrocities it has perpetrated--both in Lebanon and against its people and sons.

His Eminence Shaykh Shams al-Din said: We exhort all the Lebanese to discard all their sensitivities and their personal feuds to mobilize all efforts and potential to confront the Israeli enemy in all domains for the

purpose of liberating that part of Lebanon occupied by Israel in a manner devoid of the strings and conditions which this occupation wants to attach and to impose on this country.

Concerning the incidents that have occurred in the mountain area, His Eminence Shaykh Shams al-Din has addressed an appeal to all to rise above sensitivities and grudges. He also called on everybody to discard all the legacies and leftovers of the past with a national will pervaded with love, openness and loyalty to the future of this homeland and to the destiny of all its sons and to deny the enemy the opportunity to exploit this sedition and this internecine to style itself as the protector of this or that party, while it is everybody's enemy. This enemy does not want any good for anybody. All it wants is evil for everybody.

He said: Israel wants to bring Lebanon's destiny under its control and to hamstring its freedom, to dominate its interests and, consequently, to distort Lebanon's spirit and meaning and to impair Lebanon's role so it will remain a mere figure devoid of a concept and a structure, without meaning; that is, the state would experience an independence devoid of any reality.

CSO: 4400/41

HOUSING OBJECTIVES OF 1981-85 TRANSFORMATION PLAN UNDERLINED

Tripoli AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic 1 Sep 82 pp 13-14

[Article: "We Have Planted Housing Forests"]

[Excerpts] Despite the concerted efforts exerted by the great 1 September revolution in the housing sector over the past 10 years, the immensity of the housing problem facing the Jamahiriyah is still evident and requires concerted planning and implementation. Therefore, the 1981-85 transformation plan for the housing sector seeks to build 146,200 housing units, in addition to completing the unfinished part of the 1976-80 housing plan.

Thus, the total number targeted during the 1981-85 plan is 206,152 housing units, distributed as follows:

<u>Implementing Agency</u>	<u>Completing 1976-80 Housing</u>	<u>New Housing</u>	<u>Total houses in 1981-85 plan</u>
Executive direct Construction agencies	(44,683)	(43,700)	88,383
Savings, Investment and Cooperative Housing Bank	(11,237)	(65,000)	76,237
National Investment Council	(4,032)	(37,500)	41,532

Housing is an essential human need. This makes it necessary to meet this need and to free it of all exploitation and domination so that man can live securely in a climate that enables him to produce and to participate in realizing the aspirations of all.

This has been the great 1 September revolution's goal since its onset. Great and unprecedented attention has been devoted to this sector--attention crowned with the statement that a "house belongs to its inhabitants," a statement contained in chapter 2 of the "Green Book."

The 1973-75 3-year plan and the 1976-80 5-year transformation plan devoted special attention to the housing sector, both in terms of financial appropriations and in terms of implementation capabilities, with the aim of meeting the shortage that accumulated over recent years and of facing new needs. This important sector's accomplishments have been hampered by some obstacles that cropped up at times and that inevitably emerged upon the implementation

of such an ambitious housing program. However, tens of thousands of housing units and complete villages have been built in the brief life of the great 1 September revolution. This underlines the interest devoted to the housing sector in the transformation plans. Moreover, entire slum areas have been eliminated and replaced by new housing and modern villages containing all the conveniences of modern life.

Nearly 200,000 housing units have been built in the period 1969-82, in addition to 86,000 units currently under construction in various parts of the Jamahiriyah.

Moreover, nearly 15 towns and villages with full facilities and public service buildings are currently under construction. Also under construction are 61 headquarters for basic people's congresses, numerous administrative complexes, people's security posts, court complexes and public resthouses. With the immense work it has carried out, the Secretariat of the General People's Housing Committee has been able to finally wipe out the phenomenon of tin shacks, to extend interest-free credit and to exempt people with limited income from repaying the loans advanced to them.

Means of Implementation

1. Direct Implementation

Direct implementation by the Housing Secretariat in the 1981-85 transformation plan is confined to building housing to meet the needs of families incapable of earning an income and to building houses attached to industrial projects and other economic and social sectors.

2. Housing Cooperatives

During the 1981-85 transformation plan, the housing cooperatives will implement complete housing projects embodied in high rises and housing communities, adding a uniform architectural character to the various areas that takes into consideration the social and natural conditions of each area.

In light of this, the Housing Secretariats will build directly 43,700 new housing units representing nearly 29.8 percent of the total number of units in the new plan. The Savings and Real Estate Investment Bank and the housing cooperatives will build 65,000 new units representing nearly 44.4 percent of the total number of units in the new plan. The National Real Estate Investment Council will build 37,500 new units as investment housing. These units represent 25.8 percent of the total number of units in the new 1981-85 plan.

Plan Strategy and Goals

To achieve good results in providing proper housing for the Libyan Arab family, the current situation of the housing sector has demanded reconsideration of the adopted housing policy--a policy that throws on the shoulders of society the full responsibility for securing the necessary number of houses to meet the public's needs. It has been decided to implement a new housing

policy during the 1981-85 transformation plan. This policy seeks to have the citizen contribute a certain share of the costs of building new houses according to the following bases:

Society undertakes to provide free housing to families incapable of earning an income--families whose resources are confined to the financial aid and social assistance they collect.

Otherwise, the citizen must undertake to pay the cost of the house or the value of the loan, provided that soft terms are made available to the borrowers with limited income--terms such as dividing the cost of the house into installments over a long period so that the value of the monthly payment to be made does not exceed 25 percent of the citizen's total [monthly] income.

The Savings and Real Estate Bank is to advance housing loans to (encourage) the citizens to save so as to meet the burden of paying the loan installments.

3. Savings and Real Estate Investment Bank

Considering that the 1981-85 transformation plan focuses mainly on loans and investment for the construction of housing, a specialized bank, namely, the Savings and Real Estate Investment Bank, has been established for the purpose. This bank will plan the sites set aside for housing construction, divide them into suitable plots and advance loans to the citizens and the housing cooperative so that they can build housing on them. These loans will be repayed in monthly installments compatible with the borrower's financial capability.

The housing secretariats will build the necessary housing units attached to the production projects, such as the projects of the Light Industries Secretariat and the Electricity Secretariat, as well as the housing attached to service projects such as educational, health, oil and other projects. The Agriculture and Land Development Secretariat will build the housing projects needed for the agricultural projects.

Social savings assets (the social insurance and security funds) will be channelled for the construction of housing to be rented to non-Libyans in order to meet the needs of the technical and unskilled elements [labor] needed to implement the transformation plans.

All the provisions of the regulations and decrees pertaining to the allocation and ownership of houses, as well as the conditions for the acquisition of home-building loans, will be unified in order to serve the goals of the housing policy.

Housing maintenance should be carried out in order to prolong the usability of houses and reduce annual replacement rates. This requires the creation of specialized light maintenance outfits in all the cities and villages to carry out house maintenance work at set prices and according to a specific system.

Efforts will be made in the direction of collective construction by way of the cooperative associations, instead of individual construction by focusing on the construction of high rises for the members of the cooperatives. The

housing people's committees and the municipalities will supply the lands needed for this purpose. The public utility will be built at the expense of society.

4. National Real Estate Investment Council

The investment housing project in the 1981-85 transformation plan seeks to build nearly 37,500 housing units to be constructed by the National Real Estate Investment Council.

Programs and Projects

First, Housing Construction Projects:

A. Public Housing Project: This project of the plan seeks to provide housing to families unable to earn an income by building proper and healthy housing for such families. The public housing project calls for the completion of 33,962 housing units spread throughout the various parts of the Jamahiriyah, in addition to building nearly 20,000 new units during the plan. Thus, the total number of units to be provided by the project during the plan will amount to 53,962.

B. Agricultural Housing Project:

This project of the plan seeks to build houses for farmers in their farms and in the land reclamation and development projects. This project calls for the construction of 600 new farmhouses, in addition to completing the houses currently under construction in the agricultural projects and estimated at 5,500 houses.

Public Project Houses:

The plan seeks to meet the [housing] needs of the workers at the sites of the industrial, electricity, health and educational projects. This project calls for the construction of [number illegible] during the plan.

Second, Public Utilities:

The 1981-85 plan also calls for the construction of numerous public utility projects, such as water, sewerage, electricity and road projects, at the various residential sites, be they public housing, agricultural housing or other housing sites in public projects. The plan emphasizes the need to conclude contracts for public utilities according to timetables aimed at making use of the housing immediately upon completion.

Third, Program to Build Complete New Towns and Villages:

This program calls for the completion of a number of villages contracts for the construction of which were concluded during the 1976-80 plan. These are the villages of Mazdah with 300 housing units, Nasmah with 400 housing units, Bi'r al-Ghanam with 200 units, al-Shaqiqah with 350 units, Tabaqah with 200 units, al-Qaryah al-Sharqiyah [Eastern Village] with 400 units, al-Qaryah al-Gharbiyah with 100 units, al-Shuwayrif with 400 units, Bani Walid with 1,000 units, al-Hishah al-Jadidah with 251 units and al-Barada with 200 units.

This program also calls for the construction of new towns, such as al-Zintan, al-Wasat and al-Qawarishah al-Jadidah.

During the plan, nearly 1,000 houses will be built in al-Zintan, 500 in al-Wasat and 500 in al-Qawarishah al-Jadidah.

The construction of new housing towns will begin in the industrial concentration areas and other areas--towns such as al-Sarir with 2,000 housing units, al-Burayqah with 2,500 units and Ra's Lanuf with 2,000 units, in addition to the housing town of the iron and steel complex with a total of 1,000 units, of which nearly 3,000 will be built during the first phase of the plan [figures as published].

Fourth, Administrative Buildings Program:

This program seeks to complete the administrative complexes begun during the 1976-80 transformation plan.

This program calls for the completion of 24 administrative complexes in the municipal centers and for some additional work in existing administrative complexes. The program also calls for the construction of numerous headquarters for the basic people's congresses and of other administrative buildings.

The administrative buildings program also seeks to complete the construction of a number of people's security stations and court complexes in some areas.

Fifth, Silo Program:

The plan seeks to complete construction of the silos begun during the 1976-80 plan, in addition to some new silos to provide a wheat storage capacity equal to the total consumption of this commodity up to the year 1985.

The number of silos completed by 1980 were the Tobruk silo with a capacity of 10,000 tons, al-Huwari silo in Benghazi with a capacity of 3,000 tons, the Tripoli silo with a capacity of 100,000 tons, the Sabha silo with a capacity of 10,000 tons, al-Sawani silo with a capacity of 30,000 tons and al-Hashshan silo with a capacity of 30,000 tons.

During the [1981-85] plan, the following silos will be completed: the Tripoli Port silo with a capacity of 40,000 tons, the Misratah Port silo with a capacity of 40,000 tons and al-Jafrah silo with a capacity of 100,000 tons. The contracts for these silos were concluded during the 1976-80 transformation plan. Other new silos will also be built, namely: Al-Fata'ih silo in Darnah with a capacity of 30,000 tons, al-Bayda' silo with a capacity of 30,000 tons, the Darnah Port silo with a capacity of 20,000 tons, the Benghazi Port silo with a capacity of 40,000 tons and the Zuwwarah Port silo with a capacity of 20,000 tons.

INDUSTRIAL PLAN AIMS AT MAJOR PRODUCTION INCREASES BY 1985

Tripoli AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic 1 Sep 82 p 12

[Article: "Revolution Moves Forward on Basis of Its Great Accomplishments; Industry Sector: Advanced Industrial Base To Face Challenges of Age"]

[Text] The great 1 September revolution has devoted full attention to all of the vital sectors leading to the realization of progress and the edifices of civilization, which depend on man as a mainstay for building and development and in their vast application free man's needs from exploitation, monopolization and domination. The full transformation plan for 13 years, i.e., since the onset of the great 1 September revolution in 1969, has sought to achieve progress and aspirations in all spheres of development at various economic, social and cultural levels.

Statistics confirm the revolution's tangible progress and demonstrate the enormous practical revolutionary accomplishments achieved through true scientific ideas imbued with real and tangible proof.

Through the programs of the full transformation plan, we find that the well-studied scientific plans, poured into scientific molds, have been drawn up within a framework that seeks to realize self-sufficiency and aspires to enhance production rates and make exports possible on the basis of giving priority to the vital sectors that are of major importance in enhancing development and achieving progress and prosperity. Thus, the revolutionary train is nearing the 13th anniversary station on the tracks of the enormous revolutionary accomplishments. In an overview, we find that the features of the comprehensive plan are based on the following:

First, it is a production plan in which the production sectors get top priority, not only in the form of financial investments but also in the form of good planning and skillful implementation relying on high production efficiency and on utilization of all capabilities, in addition to giving priority to meeting the managerial and operational needs of these sectors from among Libyan elements.

Second, it is a plan for the massive initiation of strategic industries, led by the oil industry and construction of the iron and steel complex.

Third, it is a plan moving at a rapid pace to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural production and in manufactured consumer goods.

Fourth, it is a plan for transforming Libyan society from a consumer into a producing society, a society that in all its years has seen the new socialist transformations promised by the Third World theory and now witnesses the Libyan citizen's effective and productive participation in the building and developing process.

Fifth, it is a plan strongly using international economic relations by importing the technology needed for the transformation on the one hand and by exporting non-oil goods, in addition to crude oil and petrochemical products, on the other hand.

Sixth, it is a plan marching ceaselessly forward to achieve progress and advancement for the Libyan Arab people and working to realize further accomplishments in the various economic and social spheres of life, with the source for all this being a productive economy in which the citizens participate with their earnest efforts out of their eagerness to achieve the plan's goals and to realize the long-range strategy seeking to create a balanced productive economy with diverse sources of production and capable of growing intrinsically and constantly.

This plan, with its investment program and its ambitious goals, represents a real challenge for the Libyan Arab people, who have always responded to the challenge and who, with God's help and will, are capable of achieving its goals and aspirations for progress and advancement.

A firm base of heavy and light industry has been built in a way that guarantees the masses' needs for various industrial products and ensures exportation of the surplus to the outside world in accordance with scientific bases and programmed plans.

Throughout the 13 years of the great 1 September revolution's life, this sector has recorded great accomplishments that have gained the admiration of world observers. The following are the goals of the industrial development plan, according to the resolutions of the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Planning:

A. Food Industry

In view of the importance of this industry in contributing to realization of the goal of food security by integrating it with the agricultural development sector and by processing the surplus agricultural production, thus enhancing the economics and benefits of this production by regulating supplies in the productive seasons and areas and, additionally, by implementing the strategy of replacement through partial and total self-sufficiency in food commodities--in view of this importance, the plan seeks to have this industry contribute 13.4 percent of all industrial production in 1985. This will be done by raising the added value generated by this industry from 37.6 million dinars in 1980 to 90.6 million dinars in 1985.

It is expected that agricultural product imports will drop from nearly 52 percent to 32 percent.

The plan for this industry seeks to do the following:

1. Achieve total self-sufficiency in grain pulverization by raising the available production capacity from 516,000 tons in 1980 to 724,000 tons in 1985, raising the production efficiency of the existing plants from 52.5 percent in 1980 to 80 percent in 1985, ensuring ideal operation of the Tobruk and Sarman mills, which have a production capacity of 135,000 tons and which entered the stage of production at the end of 1980, building new mills to produce flour and semolina in Tripoli, Benghazi, al-Kufrah and Tobruk, as well as the other major consumption centers, with a capacity of 457,000 tons, and building macaroni plants in Sabha, Zulaytin, Tobruk, Sarman and al-Marj and developing the existing capacity so as to raise this production from nearly 72,000 tons to nearly 103,000 tons in 1985. It is expected that the pulverization capacity will rise to 873,500 tons in 1990 with a counter production [as published] of 742,000 tons, in addition to meeting the local needs for bakery products (biscuits) by building new capacities in Tripoli and Darnah, improving the existing capacity and developing the bread-baking industry by building automatic bakeries compatible with the expected consumption volume in the various major consumption centers.
2. Fully meet local needs for fodder industry products and achieve frontal [amami] integration in the grain pulverization industry and the fish canning industry by manufacturing their byproducts into semiprocessed goods. Insofar as fodders are concerned, the plan seeks to raise the production capacity from nearly 294,000 tons in 1980 to 1,038,000 tons in 1985 and to ensure ideal utilization of the available capacity by maintaining operation rates at high capacity, by completing the capacities currently being built in existing factories in Tripoli, al-Bayda', Tobruk, Benghazi and Sirt totaling 664,000 tons and by introducing further production capacities amounting to 78,000 tons, in addition to the capacities to be built within the framework of the complete agro-industry projects in Tawurgha' and Ghawt Sultan totaling 80,000 tons annually. These plants will raise the production capacity from 271,400 tons in 1980 to nearly 900,000 tons in 1985 while using local raw materials as fundamental components in manufacturing fodders through the utilization of slaughterhouse and oil press leftovers and urea in order to increase the use of local components in this industry.
3. Improve the production efficiency rate in the dairy industry by raising the operational factor from 78 percent in 1980 to 82 percent in 1985, completing construction of the plants currently under construction in al-Bayda' and Suq al-Khamis and building new plants in (al-Qarahbulli) and al-Marj in accordance with the indicators revealed by studies. This is in addition to the pasteurization units in a number of main cattle-breeding areas in Sabha, Darnah and elsewhere. The plan seeks to raise the production capacity from 51,100 to 160,100 tons, in addition to 132,200 tons [as published], in 1985. The production of these capacities will contribute 44 percent of the local needs in 1985. In 1990, the production capacity will rise to nearly 201,000 tons and counter production to 182,000 tons.

4. Enhance utilization of the available sea fish resources and exert efforts to complete the facilities necessary to develop fish production so as to achieve major leaps in production to meet a certain percentage of the immediate consumption and to ensure full utilization of the existing production capabilities in this sphere. The plan seeks to raise the capacity from 2,200 tons in 1980 to 2,750 tons in 1985 by completing plants under construction in Ziwarah, Marsa Zawwaghah, Zulaytin and Zurayq. The national production will help to meet 75 percent of the needs in 1985. The plan seeks to improve the production efficiency rate in this industry from 45 percent in 1980 to 65 percent in 1985.

5. Process the vegetable and fruit surplus left after direct consumption to achieve vertical integration with agricultural production by ensuring the minimum operation rate in the capacity of the [vegetable and] fruit [processing plants] in al-Ma'murah and in the other existing fruit and vegetable canning plants and by raising the operational factor from 27.4 percent in 1980 to 70 percent in 1985, by completing the plants currently under construction in al-Jabal al-Akhdar and Hawn with a capacity of 16,600 tons, by enhancing existing capacities by overcoming the bottlenecks hampering them so as to improve the economics of their operation, by building new plants to produce vinegar, yeast, pickled olives and vegetable fat and by building a food industry complex and a sugar refinery in light of the indicators revealed by the studies on the availability of raw materials. The plan seeks to raise the production capacity in this industry from 54,600 tons in 1980 to nearly 78,900 tons in 1985.

6. Ensure the fulfillment of local needs for carbonated drinks and mineral water by expanding the existing manufacturing capacity in Tripoli and Benghazi, by building new plants in al-Jabal al-Akhdar, al-Jabal al-Gharbi and Misratah to make up for the expected shortage in some areas and by raising the operational factor in the production capacity from 63.2 percent in 1980 to 65 percent in 1985.

B. Yarn, Textile, Clothing and Leather Industry

The plan seeks to utilize the relative advantages found in some local production components, such as raw wool and leather, to produce the basic needs of the citizens, as exemplified by clothing, to fully meet the demand for certain clothing and to achieve full replacement in these goods and partial replacement of other goods in which the local components cannot attain self-sufficiency.

The plan seeks to raise the added value of this industry from 9.9 million Libyan dinars [in 1980] to 18.9 million dinars [in 1985] at an annual growth rate of 13.8 percent. This is in addition to achieving the following quantitative goals:

Raise the production efficiency factor in the textile industry from 51 percent in 1980 to 80 percent in 1985 while diversifying production to meet the various local needs that existing capabilities cannot meet. This is to be done by introducing a new production capacity of 4.8 million square

meters of wide cloth material, by raising the production from 10.8 million meters in 1980 to 20.6 million meters in 1985 and by achieving integration by completing the construction and operation of the medical cotton and gauze plant currently being built in Zanzur with a capacity of 800 tons.

Meet 75 percent of the local demand for shoes, maintain operational efficiency factors in the existing plants, expand the capacity available in the shoe plant in Misratah and construct new plants in Sabha, Benghazi, al-'Ujaylat, Mislatah and Jadu with a capacity of 7.5 million pairs of shoes annually and a plant for the production of light shoes and shoe soles in Misratah with a capacity of 3,750 tons.

Ensure full utilization of locally available raw leathers and integrate them into the shoe industry, raise the leather production capacity from 4.15 million square feet in 1980 to 10 million square feet in 1985 and devote major attention to keeping leathers in good shape through careful handling in the phases preceding the tanning process.

Meet 42 percent of the local demand for rugs and the full local demand for blankets by the year 1985 by raising the available production capacity in the rug industry from nearly 0.5 million square meters in 1980 to nearly 3.14 million square meters in 1985 by completing construction of the rug plant in Bani Walid, which has a capacity of 870[,000] square meters, by ensuring ideal utilization of the existing manufacturing capacity by raising the production efficiency factor from 35 percent in 1980 to 75 percent in 1985, by constructing other plants similar to the one being built in Bani Walid, by raising the operational efficiency factor in al-Marj blanket plant, which has a capacity of 900,000 units, from 50 percent to 82 percent and by building similar plants to ensure that local needs for this commodity are fully met.

Produce national clothing and various inner and outer clothing to meet local needs by improving the production efficiency and expanding the production capacity of the existing ready-made suits plant in Darnah and by building new plants in all municipalities with a production capacity compatible with their population density, with the production requirements of such plants to be supplied by main factories set up in Tripoli and Benghazi so that the municipal plants can complement these factories and integrate with the plants scheduled to be set up by the organizations concerned with producing and marketing clothes. This is in addition to meeting the local needs for cloaks by developing existing plants and setting up new plants in Tripoli and Benghazi.

There are, moreover, the traditional industrial centers targeted to be set up in the various areas to produce national and special attire and tricot products.

The plan also seeks to raise the contribution of cotton textiles to meeting the total local demand from 74.5 percent in 1980 to 93.6 percent in 1985 and the contribution of the shoe industry from 40.5 percent to 75 percent.

CIVIL SERVICE, PRIVATE SECTOR JOB CONDITIONS CONTRASTED

Jiddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 6 Aug 82 pp 10-11

[Article by 'Abdallah Idris, Muhammad Qari 'Adil, Ghalaf al-Ghamidi and Badr al-'Abbasi: "Work in Government Sector Is Desirable...Rejected; Segments of Civil Servants Say: Material Inducement Is What Attracts Employees to Any Place"]

[Text] The number of government jobs has more than tripled in the past 20 years.

On the other hand, there has been the phenomenon of migration from the government sector to the private sector. Why?

The problem has coincided with numerous incidents that, in all cases, were the result of reaction but that ultimately turned into a "losing horse" in the face of the successful precautionary measures by which the state settled the issue.

'UKAZ has addressed the question to various segments of public and government sector employees, to a group that abandoned government employment and turned to the private sector, to others who left the private sector and moved to work in the government, to yet others who proceeded to engage in their own private business and to other individuals who have never worked in the government and who headed for private business from the outset.

The answers to the question have varied. There are those who deny the presence of the "phenomenon." Others have presented solutions and demands and some have compared government work with work in the private sector.

We wonder, is the "phenomenon" still present or did it exist and has the situation now become the opposite?

Is it true that the government sector is now the desired and demanded sector and has this led to the downfall of all the assumptions and expectations that had been predicting that the problem would intensify and would ultimately create a major vacuum in the state sector's national cadres?

Reason Is Economic Upsurge

When the government carefully laid down future guarantees for civil servants and established numerous incentives to create the desire for enrollment in government jobs and to fill the job cadres that were needed to meet the requirements of implementing the development plan, these measures were accompanied by an economic upsurge in various spheres of the kingdom. This upsurge prompted many to turn toward work in the private sector and to engage in private business. As a result of the measures taken by the state to deal with the inflation resulting from the economic upsurge and from the numerous projects presented simultaneously, there developed tendencies to focus on work in the private sector--a sector viewed as a "miracle" where the deal of a lifetime could be made.

This is as far as work in the private sector is concerned--a sector that requires a person to have capital in order to enter the game "with a winning card."

As for the inclination to work in the private sector, meaning the shift by an employee from working in the government to working for companies or establishments, the matter is different. This shift, though boosting other sectors of society, ultimately leads to "an enormous bill" that society itself may have to pay.

Does Phenomenon Exist?

Inasmuch as the state's actions sought to contain the problem, the state was eager to improve the standards of civil servants and to give them numerous benefits, thus keeping the ball in the governmental sector's court. The state's general policy has been able to reverse the phenomenon. Whereas the arrow was pointing in the direction of work in the private sector, movement seems to be just the opposite now, contrary to expectations.

Is this actually happening now?

Was there really a mistake in calculations?

What have some officials said regarding the issue? What have the employees said and what are their proposals and demands?

What is the reason for the so-called phenomenon of "migration toward the private sector"? Is this due to periods of poor administrative organization in the civil service apparatus, even though the system has been enhanced through the improvement of administrative regulations, training and rewards and good planning?

Or are there in the private sector numerous inducements that have opened the door for the civil servant to move from the government sector to the private sector?

Vacant Jobs

This phenomenon has become so worrisome that we fear a decline in the governmental sector's manpower that will cause some job positions to be left vacant, keeping in mind that we need manpower in this particular phase to turn the wheel of development, especially when we learn that there is a large number of vacant jobs, including supervisory jobs at many levels.

Where Is Administrative Organization?

Here emerges the question: Is the government sector's administrative organization, with all the incentives and rewards it contains, adequate to prevent the largest number of civil servants possible from thinking of moving to the private sector?

Does the private sector's administrative organization contain all the fundamental elements of any administrative organization or agency that meet the employee's wishes?

Role of Civil Service Bureau

A statistical report says that the number of the government's civil service jobs has more than tripled in the past 20 years. It is normal that such an increase would accompany the rapid development plans being implemented by the kingdom and which require the creation of more cadres. The state has undertaken to absorb the largest number of workers possible and the Civil Service Bureau plays a fundamental role in employing and distributing manpower throughout the kingdom. One of the bureau's main tasks in this regard is that of establishing and implementing objective procedures, classifying jobs and reducing the number of contract workers and the number of unclassified workers [al-mustakhdamun] and transforming them into civil servants. The development plan states in part that in view of the considerable progress made during the second plan, there are conditions that require further attention, namely: The need to improve the organizational plans, procedural regulations and methods of appointment, the inadequate number of supervisory jobs at some levels, the absence of a large number of approved job positions, the need for a system of incentives and the inadequacy of information concerning the employees. The issue does not stop at underlining the weak points in the civil service apparatus but goes further to devote attention to improving the system's efficiency by reconsidering administrative and organizational aspects and the training of administrators and to study a system of rewards coupled with a qualified administrative apparatus to determine, develop and spread qualitative changes.

A paragraph in the next development plan says:

Development of Saudi manpower is considered the backbone of development in the kingdom. Naturally, this opens the opportunity for capable Saudis to enroll in government jobs, which provide numerous incentives, inducements and guarantees.

Reject Presence of This Phenomenon

Taha 'Atiyah, assistant director of the Civil Service Bureau in Jiddah, denies the existence of the phenomenon, commenting:

"The Civil Service Bureau has not experienced this [employee migration from government sector to private sector]. On the contrary, there are private sector employees who have shifted to the government sector, especially in the wake of the latest raises, not to mention the guarantees and incentives available in the government sector."

This is also affirmed by 'Abd al-Karim al-Shuwayman, general director of customs at King 'Abd al-'Aziz Port in Jiddah, who says that this phenomenon has diminished greatly and is almost nonexistent now thanks to the incentives, rewards and many other inducements given to government sector employees. We can say that the phenomenon did exist previously when the companies established incentives and inducements to attract employees.

The Customs Agency offers many of the rewards and incentives available in most the government departments. This certainly helps to curtail the spread of the migration of government sector workers to the private sector.

Wants To Return to Government Job

A government worker who had left his government job, embarked on a private business and now aspires to return to work in the public sector says that this sector gives man the psychological stability he desires and provides a guarantee of a livelihood in the form of monthly salary, pensions and other benefits.

Telling his story, Muhammad Hamdan 'Id says:

"I worked as a teacher for nearly 12 years. When my salary became inadequate to cover my and my family's expenses, I sought to improve my material and educational standard. So I applied to the Complementary Studies Institute three times, but I was unsuccessful. Consequently, I decided to leave the civil service for good and turned to private business. But I managed to succeed only in the last 2 years because capital is required for whoever wants to engage in private business."

It is 'Id's view that working in the government sector leads to the psychological stability that man seeks and provides a guarantee of livelihood with its salaries, pensions and other benefits.

'Id adds: "I resigned to achieve a better standard of living. But in the wake of the raises introduced to the civil servants wage scale, I wish with all my heart to return to government work. If circumstances allowed and I could get rid of my present commitments, I would hasten back to the civil service because it is much better than free enterprise, which I can describe as entering a field of 'worries' through wide open doors."

Muhammad Hamdan 'Id does not believe that there are people thinking of leaving the civil service, considering the available material benefits and the existing training opportunities for improving the civil servant's educational and job standards.

'Id also advises whoever is at the top of his government job not to think of leaving his work and not to be misled by the deceptive and shiny appearances behind which free enterprise hides, as he says.

He believes that whoever views the businessman as being better [off] than the civil servant is wrong. Suffice it to note that the civil servant enjoys psychological stability and finds time to be with his family and children daily, even if only for a short period.

Private Sector's System Is Different

'Aqil Mahmud 'Anqawi, director of the branch office of the Mass Transportation Company in al-Ta'if and a man who got his B.A. in business administration from King 'Abd al-'Aziz University, says that he has been working for companies since graduating. Previously, he had worked for Saudi Airways and then moved to the Mass Transportation Company. He is comfortable in this company, he says.

It is his opinion that he is at a job level he would certainly not have achieved if he were working in the government sector because the system of promotion and of monetary allowances in the companies is completely different from the system adopted by the Civil Service Bureau for employees under its control in the various sectors. Moreover, the companies offer numerous benefits that public sector employees may not get, the most important being the training and scholarship opportunities available to all employees, be they junior or senior. As for the Mass Transportation Company employees, 'Anqawi says that the company offers them numerous benefits, the most important being a housing allowance amounting to 25 percent and a transportation allowance amounting to 10 percent [of base salary]. This is in addition to free medical care for the employees and their legal dependents. This care is provided through contracts between the company and several private clinics. Moreover, the company, like any other private sector establishment, pays 80 percent of the social insurance and only 5 percent of the employees' salary is deducted for the purpose. The company also pays each employee a month's bonus annually in the month of Ramadan. As for the government worker's migration to the private sector, 'Anqawi says:

Many industrial firms, such as SABIC and Petromin, offer numerous benefits and opportunities that the youth cannot get in the various government sectors. This is why we find youth eager to join these firms and establishments, so that they can improve their educational, job and material standards.

'Anqawi proposes here some benefits that, in his opinion, can attract the youth to work in the government sector, including: Establishing a balance between the government and private sectors so that the government sector

employee does not think of moving to the private sector, since he will find all the benefits available in his work. Moreover, giving the worker the choice to work in the area he prefers is very helpful in attracting large numbers of youth to enroll in government jobs. How many a youth has been compelled to leave his government work because he had been appointed in an area to which he could not go because of private circumstances?

Furthermore, making the employee aware of the value of his job and flexible approach undoubtedly contribute effectively to creating a comfortable psychological climate for the employee and make him refrain from thinking of moving to another place or another job.

Government Sector Redtape

Muhammad al-'Abbasi, a former civil servant who now works in the private sector, comments on this phenomenon, saying: Its presence is due to the fact that the civil servant has not been able to realize his job ambitions. The civil servant views the issue from a narrow angle, considering that he gets promoted only after a long period of work. It is also al-'Abbasi's opinion that the government sector is shackled by redtape. He says: "If a civil servant deserves promotion, there is the Civil Service Bureau to go through at the instruction of the immediate director, then the director in charge, then the general director and, finally, the Civil Service Bureau--and only God knows whether it will approve the promotion or not."

Regarding the private sector, al-'Abbasi says: "In the private sector, the ultimate authority is the establishment board's chairman or the establishment director. If he wants to promote the employee to a higher grade, then he can make his decision speedily. The same applies to salaries, which are attractive in the private sector, in his opinion. Any person working in the private sector can rent a house for 40,000 or 50,000 riyals. Some establishments provide a luxurious apartment, a car and a maid. Other private sector establishments offer the employee all he needs."

It is al-'Abbasi's opinion that incentives can be provided to wipe out this phenomenon by simplifying the administrative procedures, offering high salaries quickly, supplying the proper housing and, if possible, offering bonuses that must be paid regularly.

Happy With Work in Private Sector

Wahib Farid al-Sabban, a man who has never worked in a government job, says that he has a junior high school certificate and is employed in the public relations section of Dr Muhammad 'Arfan's Hospital. This is his first job and he likes it. He says his job is to assist visitors to the hospital patients, adding that he is always at their service. In his words, working in this hospital is his future but he does not refuse to join the government service. However, he likes working here better than anywhere else. He wants to build his future by working here. He had previously worked with his brother in a commercial enterprise. After leaving commercial work, he took up this job, in which he finds benefits that please him and make him more ambitious.

Never Worked in Government Job

He is 21 years old, has a junior high school certificate, has been working as an administrative supervisor in the private sector and has never worked in a government job or any other job. As for the reason for his choosing the private sector, Hasan al-Sahli says that after getting his junior high school certificate, he wanted to work in any job. From the start, his inclination was toward a job with a service establishment. When he applied for the job, he found that the job was suitable and the working hours feasible. His work has enabled him to learn several languages, according to him, because he has colleagues from various nationalities.

University Graduate Looking for Job

It is surprising for a graduate of the Science College to be looking for a government job for a year and a half. The problem of Khalid Amin, a graduate of the Science College, is that he has been looking for a job for a year and a half.

He says: "Since my graduation, I have been checking daily at the Civil Service Bureau branch and the employees have become accustomed to my presence. I found jobs in more than one department--the university, the municipality, the Ministry of Health--but upon checking with the bureau I would find that the classified section had changed the name of the job. This has been going on for 1 and a half years. They told me to 'wait' for the new classification. When this classification was issued, it did me and others an injustice," says Amin.

As for his opinion on work in the private sector, Amin says:

"If I want to work in a private establishment, the system will not let me because I have a commitment to work for the government for at least 1 year."

Inducement Is Material

According to some officials, the government sector is ceaselessly trying to attract youth to join government jobs.

Rabi' Dahlan, general director of the Western Province's automatic telephone service, says that he has in his department more than 150 university graduates. A few years ago, the Civil Service Bureau used to channel employees to the telephone department because it could not find vacant jobs for them in any ministries. But the situation is different now that the telephone department has expanded many of its services and has improved the benefits it gives its employees. An employee of the telephone department now gets numerous services and benefits that exist in almost no other place. Citing an example, the general director of the Western Province's automatic telephone department says:

"In the telephone complex in Jiddah, you find numerous facilities and services, including swimming pools, sports grounds, car parks, clean and

comfortable offices--all for the employee's comfort. This is in addition to giving the employee his full rights." But Dahlan hastens to add: "Despite this, we cannot prevent an employee or an engineer from moving to the private sector. An engineer whom we pay a salary of 5,000 riyals will, of course, leave the job and join a company that will pay him 12,000 riyals." Another aspect that Dahlan notes here is that the employee who works in certain sections of the telephone department does not continue because he considers his work outside the framework of what he aspires to. A central exchange operator is usually either a university student or a student somewhere else who wants to utilize his time outside his studies. Many people may not agree to work in this sphere, for example. The same problem may exist in the traffic police. There are also government agencies that attract university youth and to which these youth transfer.

Better Benefits in Government

The deputy director of personnel affairs in Dallah says: "Government jobs have their benefits, of which the most important is the annual bonus the employee in any government department gets and probably no employee in a private establishment gets. There are the medical services and guarantees, which are extended to all members of the government employee's family whereas we find that the private establishments may provide medical care to the employee and his wife only. There is also the housing allowance. In private establishments and the private sector generally, there is a distinction between the ordinary employee and the officer. Employees with the rank of manager and above are given a 4-month housing allowance whereas the ordinary employee is given only a 3-month allowance. This is almost unheard of in the civil service job system.

"Benefits available in private establishments are limited. The most important of these benefits is the availability of training and scholarship opportunities to improve the linguistic standard or practical production standards, encouraging capabilities and the opportunity to rise to the top levels in a very short time, but only in rare and special cases and not for all people."

There Is no Centralism and no Redtape

Fu'ad Abu al-Khayr, assistant general director of administrative affairs at the Tuhamah Public Relations, Advertising and Marketing Research Establishment, says:

"The benefits of working in private companies and establishments include: The elimination of redtape and centralism, the simplification of financial and fiscal procedures and the speedy execution of measures concerning the employees' rights, including promotions, leave, dismissal and appointment. Moreover, a private sector employee can rise to higher grades and salaries, depending on capability, energy, talent and productivity and without the redtape of government jobs. This enables active capabilities to advance rapidly." Abu al-Khayr believes that there are other benefits, in addition to the ones already mentioned, that make civil servants want to work in the

private sector, including medical care, annual or monthly housing allowances, secured housing, annual or monthly incentive bonuses and loans.

He also notes the benefit of participation in the social insurance system to protect the worker against vocational hazards, disability, old age and death.

He adds: "The private establishments develop the employee's talents in all spheres, broaden his horizon, give him the opportunity to advance and familiarize him with the latest and most advanced systems, and provide opportunities for him to show his work and his awareness of responsibility and to display his capability and efficiency."

Wealth and Material Have Been Reason

Salih al-Ghamidi, an employee at the Raytheon Company controlled by the Air Defense School, says that it is his opinion that the wealth that is available in the hands of many as a result of the economic leap and the upsurge they find in free business is what motivated many to abandon work in the public sector and turn to free enterprise. Moreover, society's opinion of the businessman is much higher than its opinion of the civil servant.

Al-Ghamidi makes some suggestions that he says can attract employees to government jobs. The most important of these proposals: providing comfortable housing to the employee and his family and offering the employee and his family members tickets [air fare] so that he may go abroad for rest and relaxation and then return with greater energy. Moreover, an attempt must be made to establish a balance between the material inducements that he finds in the private sector and those in the government sector, because material gain is the backbone of life and no employee can perform his work in the required manner if he does not have material and moral stability.

Regarding his work, al-Ghamidi says: "I worked for this company some time ago and then turned to free enterprise. But I found out that a man cannot continue in free enterprise if he does not have capital. So I decided to return to this company. I earn a salary of nearly 5,000 riyals [monthly] but we do not have any of the other benefits, such as housing or free medical care."

Guarantees Not Found in Private Sector

Sa'ud al-'Umari, a youth with a high school certificate who had worked in a government job and then moved to the private sector where he started a commercial business, tells his story, saying:

"When I graduated from high school, arts branch, I wanted to continue my studies in one of the kingdom's universities. Unfortunately, I was faced with family problems that demolished all my dreams and led me to work as a clerk in one of the government offices. Even though I encountered no difficulty in performing my duties, I found--after a complete evaluation of the situation of my peers in college and in the private sector and after

pondering all aspects for a long time--that government work would confine my ideas and my dreams and that regardless of how long I served in the government I would get no more than ordinary promotions and job competition incompatible with my dreams, which I am striving hard to realize. I dream of a family and children in a home independent of my family with whom I am now living under the same roof, as well as other dreams. At that point, I thought of leaving the civil service and moving to the private sector. Shortly afterward, a friend of mine invited me to join the foreign firm for which he was working, considering the enormous monthly salary, which I could not even compare with my government salary. After much thought, I turned down the offer and started to contact my friends in an attempt to gather enough capital to start a business. After exhausting efforts, I was actually able to open a business. Though it is modest and still at its beginning, I am optimistic about it."

Al-'Umari believes that government work offers guarantees that do not exist in private or foreign firms, such as pensions, services and other benefits.

He says: "If we want to compare the benefits, disregarding the salary, the benefits of private employment diminish in the face of the benefits that we find in government jobs."

I Will Not Benefit From Promotion

He disagrees with those who say that working for private establishments is better.

Muhammad 'Ali al-Harandah, an employee of Saudi [Airways] who is still studying at King 'Abd al-'Aziz University and who is about to graduate, believes that he will not benefit from promotions if he joins a government job after graduation.

He says: "I am about to graduate, but this will be of no use to me in getting a promotion to a better job because a college degree is equal to experience in the private establishments."

Is Teacher Underprivileged?

Muhammad Zaki Mandurah, a teacher at Badr al-Shamilah High School, believes that government jobs are best but that this does not apply to teachers.

He says that he graduated with a colleague from King Sa'ud University 7 years ago and that he is now in Grade 9 whereas his colleague is in Grade 12. He says that the teacher is deprived of job competition.

Moral Inducement...Material Inducement

Because promotions are available and salaries more attractive, and likely to rise constantly, in the private establishments, he is for turning to the private sector.

Haytham Ruhaym is director of public relations at the Economics and Management College. He does not deny that there are raises in the salaries of government jobs. However, he demands that a psychological inducement, in addition to the material inducement, be established. In his words, this inducement is embodied in decentralization.

On this issue, he says: "I believe that centralism in government work is what makes recently graduated youth shy away. The official in charge does not put confidence in those working with him, and we find that they turn to working in the private establishments where youth has a greater opportunity to prove his ability and competence and to exercise responsibility with the confidence that the establishment or company officials instill in him. In this case, his productivity stems from his faith in proving his ability and competence."

He also says: "A government job is not attractive materially or, at times, psychologically. This is due to the availability in the private establishments of promotion opportunities and an attractive salary, which is likely to rise constantly, depending on the efforts exerted by the employee and taking into consideration the employee's qualifications, experience and competence."

Yes, government sector salaries have risen on numerous occasions and they are still rising in every budget.

Saudi Doctor Finds Greater Inducements in Government Sector

Dr Hamid Matbaqani, the proprietor of Jiddah National Hospital and a surgeon at the hospital, also has his opinion.

He says: "I have worked for the state and I was cultural adviser in Rome for a time during my specialization. On my return to the country, I worked as a specialist doctor with the Ministry of Education. Sixteen months later, I resigned from the civil service and moved to the private sector, establishing my hospital. When the construction, health and economic renaissance spread in the kingdom, I thought of establishing another hospital and I brought in doctors from all parts of the world, in addition to Saudi doctors and a Saudi female doctor.

"My inclination to set up a hospital and engage in free enterprise was due to my being a doctor who wants to serve his country. Moreover, the state has provided private hospitals with all means, including loans and other facilities."

He says that his hospital tries with all possible means to attract Saudi youth to work in it. But insofar as doctors and male and female nurses are concerned, this is an impossibility, especially since issuance of the new decree offering every doctor an annual housing allowance of 100,000 riyals. This is good. He said: "We try to offer doctors attractive salaries and we do have Saudi doctors in our hospital here in Jiddah and in al-Jubayl Hospital, which is controlled by the Royal Council but which is under our management.

"As for doctors and nurses sent to study abroad on scholarships, they can only work in the government sector because their scholarship contracts include a clause requiring them to work in the government for the number of years spent studying on the scholarship. As for administrators, we try to attract them through financial and other benefits. We have six administrators in Jiddah and eight in al-Jubayl, and all of them are Saudis."

These are the details of the issue, which we have reviewed, tackled and discussed to the extent possible within the limits of what some officials and employees of the government and private sectors have said. But what will the reader say?

The finding regarding the presence or absence of this phenomenon requires a study or statistics on the basis of which such a finding can be issued.

When we presented the question regarding the reasons for the government sector employees' shift to the private sector, some officials of the Civil Service Bureau were surprised by the question and said that the opposite is true. If what they have said is actually happening, then this does not represent a phenomenon but, naturally, individual cases of a number of employees who have left the government sector to work in private sector firms or started their own enterprises.

As we have already said, the reason for this migration is not so much a flaw in the administrative systems, the lack of benefits such as bonuses and housing allowances, or low salaries in the government sector as it is the available channels and work opportunities that are present everywhere and that make it easy for any person to utilize them to his benefit.

8494

CSO: 4404/656

DAMASCUS RADIO ON MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT

JN162058 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1215 GMT 16 Oct 82

[Station commentary]

[Text] During the past period and especially after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, there have been active efforts from different sides to persuade the Arabs to accept a political settlement with Israel to end the violent Arab-Israeli conflict which has been raging ceaselessly for the last 34 years. In order to justify the endeavors of this move toward settlement, there have been pretexts and excuses, the most important and dangerous one being the current situation in the Lebanese arena resulting from the Israeli invasion of the territories of the Lebanese republic and the consequences of this invasion particularly the evacuation of the PLO fighters from Beirut as well as what is said about Israel's military superiority over the Arab states. This fact makes it impossible for the Arabs, in the point of view of those sides, to consider any choice but the choice of political bargaining with Israel or those who act on behalf of it, namely the United States.

This means that the Arabs should accept the U.S.-Israeli terms of settlement and that the contacts, consultations, talks and negotiations be confined within the framework of U.S. monopoly of the Arab-Israeli crisis and the region's crisis far from the United Nations and the principles of its charter and the provisions of its resolutions concerning the Middle East and the Palestinian question.

The concept of this logic does not differ from that which led Anwar al-Sadat to visit occupied Jerusalem humiliated, yielding and surrendering, to enter into the Camp David accords, to remove Egypt from the Arab ranks and to subjugate it to the United States and Israel.

The Arab masses had previously rejected, condemned, struggled against and banned this logic in the Arab arena. Anwar al-Sadat paid his life as a price for his departure from the will of the Arab masses and his challenge to the national, pan-Arab and progressive public opinion. All the events which have occurred in the region and the world could not change the stand of the Arab masses on the question of the political settlement and on the delivery of the pan-Arab cause to the United States.

The Lebanese events could not persuade the Arab masses to submit to U.S. political, military and economic subservience and to accept Israeli hegemony over the Arab nation. Instead, these events strengthened the belief of the Arab masses that any just, real and durable peace cannot prevail under the aggressor's control and the upset of balance of power among the parties. A just peace cannot be established between the strong and the weak because such peace, if established, will result in the control and hegemony on the part of the strong and surrender and humiliation on the part of the weak.

This talk is neither directed against the political action nor against the political settlement. The Arabs have shown, on many occasions, their preparedness to cooperate with the United Nations and every sincere international effort to reach a just and comprehensive settlement and establish a just and durable peace in the region. The Arabs are always prepared to cooperate with the United Nations and with every sincere international effort to work out a settlement based on the principles of the UN Charter and its resolutions, which do not reward the aggressor and punish the victim by usurping his land and rights.

The question of superiority and balance is not stable and durable because there are factual and objective realities which govern present and future balance and which are not indefinitely affected by casual factors. Anybody who remembers this fact, will know why Syria adheres to the position of firm rejection of any sort of surrender before the enemy.

CSO: 4400/41

DAMASCUS DAILY ON U.S.-ISRAELI PLANS IN REGION

JN180822 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0445 GMT 18 Oct 82

[From the press review]

[Text] Today's AL-BA'TH writes: The ceaseless Zionist aggression against Syria is a clear-cut feature in the large-scale Zionist scheme. The Zionist invasion, irrespective of the statements made recently by the White House and enemy leaders, is actually aimed at striking at Syria, because, according to the U.S. and Israeli views, Syria is the sole force rejecting every capitulatory plan regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Proceeding from this principle, we find that Israel is absolutely unconcerned with the cease-fire and to attack the Syrian forces. The recent cease-fire violation and the attack on our forces are only a followup of the previous steps. Syria, which is well aware of its militant position, knows that this position makes it a primary target for any attack at present, as has been the case in the past and as will be the case in the future.

Israel believes that Syria is its sole obstacle in the region, because other Arab regimes, whose allegiance to the United States is well known, represent no impediment to the Zionist expansion. Syria, from the Zionist perspective, is a dangerous obstacle and the weight preventing Israel from attaining its expansionist designs and preventing the defeatist Arabs from applying their capitulation. This Syrian position has been confirmed both on the level of confronting the Zionist aggression militarily and in international seminars through Syria's diplomatic moves. This position has also been demonstrated by preventing the Arab defeatists from peddling any U.S.-sponsored project that would not only be a basis for an endless capitulation of the Palestinian issue but also for an all-out Americanization of the Arab region.

Continuing, AL-BA'TH says: At a time when Israel seeks to violate the cease-fire agreement, and we do not rule out a possible major offensive against Syria, we find that the Arabs are merely onlookers. Furthermore, there are several Arab sides which are trying to isolate the PLO, which is supposed to be the most concerned with the issue, from the struggle

arena and to make it pursue the course of the Camp David accords. It can also be said that some Arab theoretical stands which are being made through some diplomatic moves are purely a screen to conceal the real stands and approval of the defeatist plans.

AL-BA'TH goes on to say that had it not been for the Syrian position, the Zionist-U.S. plans would have been implemented.

CSO: 4400/41

DAMASCUS DAILY ATTACKS KING HUSAYN-'ARAFAT TALKS

JN160720 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0445 GMT 16 Oct 82

[From the press review]

[Text] TISHRIN comments on King Husayn's talks with 'Arafat and what the Jordanian king is trying to do by imposing his presence on the Palestinian people and wresting their decision. The paper says: All of us remember the united kingdom project which Husayn proposed in wake of the [1970] Black September massacres, whose toll, as admitted by 'Arafat, was more than 20,000 martyrs. At that time, Husayn imagined that the militant Palestinian body had been irremediably shaken and had become ready to accept any plan that would restore Husayn's control over the militant Palestinian people and end their independent national identity.

The paper adds: Husayn, however, failed at that time, despite Zionist support and enthusiasm for this project and Israel's threats to all those who sought to halt his massacres against the Palestinians.

Reviewing the treacherous Camp David accords, the paper says: Camp David, which is primarily based on the rejection of any Palestinian right to self-determination, was rejected by the PLO. Syria also confronted Camp David, deterred the Jordanians from having a role in it and prevented any encroachments on the PLO's right to represent the Palestinian people.

The paper wonders: Were the Camp David accords and the unilateral treatment of the cause in violation of the PLO's will and desire not the basic reasons for the Arabs' boycott of al-Sadat? Is the Jordanian option not one of the applications of Camp David?

The paper says that the Jordanian option, the negation of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights and letting the martyrs' blood go to waste is a violation of the sacred character of the cause. Therefore, silence is no longer possible and admissible.

CSO: 4400/41

DAMASCUS RADIO CHARGES JORDANIAN MOVES WEAKEN PLO

JN201438 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 20 Oct 82

[From "On the Events" program]

[Text] Israel has praised the moves the Jordanian regime is taking which aim at cancelling the PLO role and replacing it as the representative of the Palestinian people. Israel has also welcomed the Jordanian regime's readiness to join the negotiations that the United States is leading after King Husayn had considered U.S. President Ronald Reagan's peace plan an opportunity that could not be missed.

The Israeli press viewed the Jordanian stands as giving the Jordanian regime an important role in the region and strengthening Jordan's relations with the United States. The Israeli press expressed satisfaction with Washington's stand on the PLO and considered this stand an encouraging sign to King Husayn so that he may proceed and negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. This U.S. stand is one of support for King Husayn with respect to the Arab countries which continue to observe silence on the issue of Jordan's representation of the Palestinians.

The enemy's radio cited Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan al-Qasim's statements yesterday in which he did not deny the Jordanian regime's intentions despite the fact that he had put as condition for Jordan's representing the PLO to have an Arab authorization on this issue. The enemy radio said that Marwan al-Qasim's statements to the Kuwaiti paper AL-QABAS are a serious precedent and demonstrate that Jordan is willing to go back on the Rabat summit resolutions as it had accepted the principle of Arab authorization.

Observers in Amman and Washington mention that Marwan al-Qasim's support for Reagan's plan confirms the true Jordanian stand, not only on the Rabat summit resolutions, but also on the Fes summit statement. This raises suspicions that the Jordanian regime may have a secret role to contain the PLO and perhaps to ask the U.S. administration to refuse meeting with the PLO representative within the seven-member committee stemming from the Fes summit.

Reliable Jordanian sources say that the Jordanian regime currently seeks to weaken the PLO role on the Arab and international level as a first step

toward asking the Arab countries to agree to the Jordanian stands and its intentions of becoming a replacement for the PLO in representing the Palestinian people. These sources link the Jordanian stand with the events currently witnessed by the Arab region which seek to bolster the Jordanian role as evidenced by the direct and indirect visits and contacts and the statements which reveal some Arab countries' intentions to cut the PLO down to size. The same sources added that the United States has a great role to play in bolstering the future steps of the Jordanian regime along two lines: First, by strengthening the Jordanian armed forces in such a manner that will not threaten Israel's security, which Israel had accepted; and second, by supporting the Jordanian regime through diplomatic means by convincing some of the Arab regimes to adopt King Husayn's ideas.

CSO: 4400/41

SYRIAN DAILY ON WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON

JN210830 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0445 GMT 21 Oct 82

[Press review]

[Excerpt] The Damascus newspaper AL-BA'TH asserts in a commentary today that the Syrian forces did not enter Lebanon to stay there forever. Syria has repeatedly emphasized that its forces entered Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese Government and stayed there according to a unanimous Arab decision. These forces continue to enjoy Lebanese and Arab legitimate presence in accordance with the Fes summit resolutions which left the task of terminating the mission of these forces to Syrian-Lebanese negotiations.

AL-BA'TH adds: An agreement was reached on this subject out of a clear and frank consideration stipulating that there should be no link whatsoever between the presence of the Syrian forces, which entered Lebanon on a fraternal and pan-Arab mission, and the presence of the invading Israeli forces, which stormed Lebanon in an attempt to dominate it and cut off its southern part.

By threatening every now and then that its withdrawal from Lebanon is conditional on the Syrian forces' withdrawal, Israel wants first of all to place its invading forces on equal footing with the Syrian forces and delude others into believing that its presence in Lebanon is legitimate. By saying that the Syrian forces and all the Palestinians should first withdraw from Lebanon, Israel aims at expanding and dominating all Lebanese territory.

AL-BA'TH notes that this Israeli stance largely explains why Israel is now stirring sectarian sedition in Lebanon's mountain area and why it is objecting to withdrawal from the mountain, giving the Lebanese army no chance to take up positions there. This also explains why Israel demands Syrian and Palestinian withdrawal from al-Matn before its withdrawal from the mountain. Israel is demanding all this after discovering that its conditions and so-called security arrangements are unacceptable to the Lebanese legitimate authority. It is well known that Israel will not withdraw from Lebanon unless it has achieved all its hostile aims. Israel's game of withdrawal and no withdrawal has become perfectly clear. The complete coordination between Reagan's administration and Israel on the invasion and its subsequent complications has also become perfectly clear. By calling for a simultaneous Syrian-Israeli withdrawal, and by calling for the withdrawal

of all Palestinians from Lebanon and then by announcing that it will not withdraw before the Syrian forces' withdrawal, Israel aims at consecrating its permanent occupation of Lebanon as a prelude to the occupation of other Arab territories in order to achieve the entire Zionist plan at the expense of these territories.

AL-BA'TH adds: If we go back a little we find that among the basic aims of Israel's invasion of Lebanon is the weakening of the Syrian and PLO role to such an extent that Washington and Tel Aviv would be able to liquidate the Palestinian cause at the hands of their agents in the region. It is no secret that the present moves of some Arab regimes, contrary to the Fes summit resolutions and the Baghdad summit resolutions before them, are part of weakening the PLO's role, particularly with regard to confiscating its right to represent the Palestinian people, giving this right to others. Everyone knows that Israel's pressures on Lebanon and the rejected Israeli conditions for withdrawal as announced every now and then are only aimed at influencing the Syrian role and robbing it of its effectiveness so that the role of the real defenders of the Palestinian cause can be cancelled and so that the role of the agents of the U.S.-Zionist scheme in the region can surface. In other words, these pressures and conditions are aimed at achieving coexistence with aggression as an alternative to the struggle for the removal of aggression with all its repercussions.

The newspaper continues: Although the Lebanese and Syrian attitudes are identical on the need for Israel's withdrawal before Syria's withdrawal and although the Lebanese authority stresses that the main problem in Lebanon is the presence of Zionist invaders--as recently announced by the Lebanese president on the highest international rostrum--Israel and the U.S. administration are trying to postpone the Israeli withdrawal through procrastination and various conditions in an attempt to pave the way for the complete liquidation of the Palestinian cause.

AL-BA'TH adds: Under no circumstances will Syria accept any comparison between its presence in Lebanon with that of the Zionist invaders. It is illogical for Syria to abandon its pan-Arab duties toward Lebanon at the time of occupation after it has offered a lot before occupation. Syria asserts that it will not withdraw before the withdrawal of all the Israeli forces.

CSO: 4400/41

DAMASCUS CLAIMS IRAQI REGIME MURDERED AL-BAKR

JN100726 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0415 GMT 10 Oct 82

[Text] Baghdad--Reliable reports mention that former Iraqi President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr did not die a natural death but that he had been poisoned by the butcher of Iraq, Saddam Husayn.

The reports state that the family of late President al-Bakr had revealed this in private talks with those who had offered them condolences. The family of late Iraqi President al-Bakr said that the poisoning operation was prepared by Saddam to shore up the deteriorating situation which he is facing in the wake of his recent defeat in the losing war he is waging against the sons of the Iraqi and Iranian people and in reply to reports disseminated by the Arab and foreign press and by diplomatic circles that a decision had been made by the leading personalities of the regime to renominate President al-Bakr for the presidency. The reports added that al-Bakr had opposed Saddam Husayn's policy, which has led Iraq to the brink of disaster. Al-Bakr, while under house arrest, had tried to make himself heard by several leading personalities of the regime, such as Salah 'Umar al-'Ali, Ziyad al-'Ilkawi, and 'Umar al-Hazza' and had called on them to fend off the dangers to which the sons of Tikrit [home district of al-Bakr and Saddam Husayn] whom Saddam has placed in the forefront of the fighting are subjected.

Press reports in Baghdad also mention that Saddam's position became more stable after the liquidation of al-Bakr, given that al-Bakr had the best chances for succeeding Saddam Husayn. The press reports linked the dismissal of Salah 'Umar al-'Ali, a former Iraqi representative to the United Nations well known for his connections with al-Bakr, with the liquidation of the former Iraqi president.

Unconfirmed press reports in Baghdad mention that the present director of public security was also liquidated by the intelligence service of the regime, and that Fulayyih Hasan al-Jasim, former Revolution Command Council member, was also assassinated because he refused to pass death sentences on several citizens who demonstrated against the regime in 1977.

The reports add that, within the framework of the bloody liquidations carried out by Saddam Husayn against former leading personalities in his

various organizations, the body of Hasan al-Sayyid Jabr, former head of the Iraqi Peasants Association, was found floating in the Tigris. Jabr, who was removed from the command of the Peasants Association, had been summoned along with other officials and asked by Saddam to volunteer in the war against the Islamic revolution in Iran. He, however, refused to participate in the fighting due to old age, which made the butcher order his assassination.

CSO: 4400/41

SITUATION OF EMIGRANT WORKERS EXAMINED

Tunis AL-MUSTAWBAL in Arabic 23 Aug 82 pp 8, 9

[Article by Omar Chettaoui: "Emigration is A Permanent Element in Government Planning; 6.2 Percent of the Population Work Abroad"]

[Text] The sixteenth conference of Tunisian workers abroad was convened at Jarjis on 6, 7, 8 August of the current year. It was attended by around 500 representatives, all of whom were political officials in the various Destourian branches and associations and the social attaches of the embassies and consulates. The conference was supposed to represent the emigre workers concerned with the matter before all, and, in a democratic manner and to strive high to deal with their problems in a serious way, and to present effective solutions to these problems. However, such conferences as these which the Ministry of Social Affairs has been organizing for years have shown, both through the arguments and the internal party problems that erupted during the meetings, and their openings and closings by officials in the political bureau of the Destourian party, that the regime is determined to direct these meetings toward a contained and limited political direction which will definitely deprive them of their serious and democratic character. As long as this is the case, everything will remain as it is, the party, its branches and associations will remain like the "bird that sings and its wing answers back" and will remain in one valley and the real emigre workers, in another.

The emigration of labor is an indication that confirms the failure of development plans to solve the employment crisis.

The emigration of the Tunisian labor abroad is another aspect of the failure of consecutive development plans to solve the crisis of employment and is not a "natural phenomenon," as the government insists on considering it. The obstacles and difficulties that face that emigre workers meet in their search for work, the danger of unemployment, the work disasters of the job, related diseases, the misery of the social life and the separation from their families clearly confirm again the emigration of our workers is not an optional solution as much as it is compulsory, dictated by the unemployment and misery. The Moroccan writer Tahar Benjelloun was creative when he described these miserable workers away from home. He said: "They were expelled from their lands under the stress and ferocity of need and they emigrated to places where they have no shelter but selling their working power which would be their only capital to secure some kind of guarantees "for survival."

The Quantitative Importance of the Tunisian Community Abroad

The Tunisian community abroad was estimated in the year 1981 at 415,000 persons; which represents 6.2 percent of the total population residing in Tunisia. The importance of the Tunisian community abroad stands out through a comparison between the number of emigres and the number of the families living in Tunisia. We can deduce that on the average there is one person abroad for every two families in Tunisia. Europe's share is two-thirds of the total Tunisian community of emigres. France is in first place, as its colony there is 55 percent Libya comes second with 21 percent and the other European countries 13.52 percent. The Gulf countries, Iraq and Saudi Arabia come in the last place with an estimated 9.46 percent.

If we go back a little, we find that emigration was and still is a permanent element in the government planning for employment policy. During the fourth plan, emigration contained 34,680 work slots, thus achieving 21 percent of the total of new slots in the plan. However, the source of the results achieved by emigration through the fifth plan, 38 percent of the total of new slots, is the great and unexpected drive recorded by immigration to Libya. Of the total of established 82,290 work slots abroad, Libya got a lion's share, 72,243 i.e. 37.8 percent.

Absence of the Democratic Representation for the Emigre Workers

Along with this quantitative importance of the Tunisian workers abroad, the issue of the structures and cadres that represent them, defend their interests and protect their rights is brought up. In addition to the Destourian branches that are spread abroad, these are several associations which the Destourian Party still controls and to which exist till now. However, the party still refuses to give any kind of independence. The ruling regime, as it acts on other levels, still practices the "Ostrich Policy" and deals with the emigre workers problems in a superficial way, making the political containment side, the first of its concerns even if this is at the expense of the workers' real concerns.

The Tunisian General Federation of Labor [UGTT] has tried to make these associations an independent framework that represents, in a democratic way, all the workers however different their political affiliations and inclinations were, along with rejecting any kind of political control over them, especially since the funds of the associations came from contributions by the workers, and it is inconceivable that they would be squandered on activities that serve nobody but the party. This stand by the UGTT was on the level of its trade-unionist and national responsibilities and it is based on the deep aspirations of the emigre workers deep aspirations and is supported by the opposition and all of Tunisian public opinion. We have learned that the UGTT has established a national committee for that purpose, and this committee will organize meetings with the emigre workers within the next days.

Crisis and Horizons of the Emigration of Labor

The emigration of labor to European countries has experienced a substantial set-back following the protective measures taken by these countries due to the

economic crisis which has afflicted them and which emanates primarily from inflation which has caused an economic disruption which had a great repercussion on employment by aggravating unemployment; thus shrinking the capacity of the European markets to absorb foreign labor. In France, there are almost 20,000 Tunisian workers with no documents. The Tunisian Government is trying to settle the status of 15,000 of them. Despite the suspension of emigration due to the protective measures taken by the traditional host countries (West Europe), which are represented by the expulsion of resident aliens with no legal status and urging them to return to their countries of origin there are several factors and indications that predict an increase in the number of immigrant workers through the coming years. Among these factors are:

--The demographical evolution of the Tunisian community abroad.

--The recourse to emigration within the scope of Tunisia employment policy. Through the sixth governmental plan, new work applications are estimated at 324,000, while the work slots which are expected to be established are estimated at 300,000. The balance of 24,000 will be directed towards emigration, with an average of 5,000 slots a year.

Due to the measures taken by several European countries to restrict in a serious way the arrival of new immigrants, Libya and the other Arab countries, which had employed only 1,500 workers this year, remain the strategic and future solution for the regime to solve the employment crisis. This will have several important political consequences and repercussions represented in the need to maintain good and normal relations between Tunisia and Libya in view of the fact that occurs in any change that develops on these relations will be the cause of a severe employment crisis in Tunisia. Tunisian labor in the Gulf nations, Saudi Arabia and Iraq is also facing a serious competition from labor from Asiatic nations which is characterized by its low cost, compared to the Tunisian.

Problems and Demands Emigre Workers

In the face of the fluctuations of the employment market abroad, the emigre workers are exposed in most cases to unemployment for a long or short period, to the extent that workers accept hard and exhausting jobs and turn to earth moving and construction work which represents their only recourse for them when some firms, such as the textile, close their doors. Workers are also exposed to many job accidents which in many cases cause their death or to their being unable to continue to work. A great number of emigre workers do not enjoy social benefits such as Social Security retirement and child allowances, and many of them work at their own risk with no documents and are not in a legal status. In addition, the Social Security deductions made by the employing countries meet with difficulty in reaching their owners because they have to pass through the Tunisian Social Security Fund which grants them only but a little. The emigre workers often spend their vacation in Tunis frequently visiting the fund's office in order to solve their pending administrative problems.

Upon his final return, the worker is subject to many difficulties such as the customs procedures for his belongings and appliances and the difficulty and slowness of bank procedures for those who try to invest in Tunisia. As for those who have chosen to stay away from their native country and move their families, the first thing that faces them is the problem of teaching their children the Arabic language. According to official sources, there are at the time being almost 7,100 Tunisian pupils studying the Arab language abroad spread over 262 districts which have 84 teachers. If these figures are true, the Ministry of National Education is called on to make a greater effort in this area because it appears, through the statements and complaints of workers, that the teaching of the Arabic language is still substantially inadequate and is not at the required level.

9973

CSO: 4504/516

OIL CUTBACKS, PROJECT EXPENDITURES REDUCE PAYMENTS SURPLUS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 286, 14 Aug 82 p 49

/Article: "The Emirates' Balance of Payments Surplus Drops by 5 Billion Dirhams"/

/Text/ The balance of payments surplus in the state of the United Arab Emirates registered an obvious drop in 1981, coming to 12.9 billion dirhams in comparison with 18 billion in 1980.

The bulletin the emirates' central bank issued expects that the downward trend will continue this year, especially if the current account balance records a decline as a consequence of conditions in the oil market and a drop in oil production in the emirates on the one hand and the government's determination to continue the restrictions on current government spending, with the objective of guiding it, while continuing to carry out economic and social development programs.

The publication pointed out that preliminary commodity trade balance estimates point out that a surplus of close to 44 billion dirhams was realized in 1981, in comparison with a surplus of 49.4 billion dirhams in 1980, or a decline of 10.9 percent. This may be attributed to a drop in the value of the country's oil exports from 72.1 billion dirhams in 1980 to 67.2 billion dirhams last year, as a consequence of a production drop of about 12.5 percent, in spite of the increases in the price of oil exported in 1981 and the increased value of natural gas exports, which came to 4.4 billion dirhams as compared with 2.2 dirhams in 1980.

The value of non-oil exports and re-exports also rose from 7.2 billion to 8.4 billion dirhams, thus registering an increase of 17.2 percent over the 2 years.

Conversely, the value of imports rose from 32 billion dirhams in 1980 to 36 billion last year. This increase, which amounts to 12.5 percent, should be considered minor, in light of the annual increase in import prices.

The bulletin pointed out that the net value of services, incomes and other transfers to and from the state of the emirates came to 6.3 billion dirhams, accounting for an increase of 600 billion dirhams over last year's estimates.

The volume of grants and aid the emirates gave to Arab and Islamic countries dropped from 6.3 billion dirhams in 1980 to about 4 billion in 1981. Last year

the government's contributions to many Arab and regional economic organizations and development funds stayed at their former level, which was half a billion dirhams.

The estimates of the net flow of government and private capital show that an outward flow of money of 20.9 billion dirhams took place, which represented an increase of 1.6 billion over the previous year. This included loans, which tripled, reaching a value of 5.8 billion dirhams last year.

The Central Bank pointed out that current accounts receipts, from which a surplus of 33.8 billion dirhams was realized in 1981 as compared with 37.3 billion, shows the government's principal reliance on oil exports for hard currency and shows that the increase in receipts from gas exports, along with some other commodity exports, is a healthy indicator whose effect on the change in the structure of exports should be considered great, especially since new industrial projects connected to petrochemical products and aluminum have entered the production stage, with the surplus directed toward export.

The bulletin pointed out that the net increase in foreign assets with monetary institutions (the Central Bank and the commercial banks) took first place, following a decline in foreign government assets to second place in importance; the foreign assets of the monetary institutions recorded an increase of 8.5 billion dirhams in 1981 as compared with 6.4 billion last year, while foreign government assets dropped to 4.3 billion dirhams, having been 11.5 billion dirhams the preceding year.

11887

CSO: 4404/636

INFORMATION OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DOMESTIC, ARAB DEVELOPMENTS

Manama SADA AL-USBU' in Arabic No 569, 3 Aug 82 pp 22-26

/Article by 'Isamat al-Musawi: "You Fear the Truth and Listen with Sorrow!"

/Text/ This conversation took place between female journalist and an information official!

The person asking the questions is a fledgling in the world of the press, and still has a long road before her in her thousand-mile journey!

The person answering them is a young man in whose veins flows the love of the media, to the point where it has become his sole preoccupation and eternal love, as if he had concluded a compact of "eternal love" with it!

I am the woman asking the questions, and 'Abdallah al-Nuways, the deputy minister of information in the United Arab Emirates, is answering. The interview was not so much formal one as it was a "discussion session" between people in the same profession!

He is balanced, talks with confidence and vitality, and is a man clad in humility. In front of him, you feel that you are talking to a friend whom you have known for a long time. Therefore I found no embarrassment in any question I asked!

Before all else, we had to pause together before the question: "Who is a media personality?"

'Abdallah al-Nuways began the discussion:

"The media are a difficult field, one that requires a specific kind of person, because they are not an administrative or technical process but rather a function of innovation and an artistic gift. They are not linked to a fixed period or a specific time. The media personality must be in a state of maximum alert, with his five senses, over a 24-hour period, in order to be able to understand what is going on around him, great or small. There are no media that do not have men who love the media behind them--men who sense people's feelings and grasp things with their senses, men who are as close to people as they are to themselves, men who are honest with everything they pick up, all of which is crowned with truth, in the sense that the media personalities are true to themselves and the people."

Before I made a journey into the mind of the emirates' deputy minister of information, I sought to learn from him how he viewed the Gulf media at the present time.

'Abdallah al-Nuways told me,

"The Gulf media are better, relatively speaking, than elsewhere in the Arab nation, but they have not yet attained the requisite maturity, perhaps because they are a new field in Gulf society. Therefore they are not bold, nor are they assimilated by the people.

"It is true that the Gulf countries have the material resources to establish a strong media industry, but they, that is, the Gulf countries, are faced with the greatest of problems, which is their poverty of local personnel, and consequently the lack of a national flavor in the media field. The reason for this problem might be the difficulty of working in this area, since all university graduates prefer other jobs to working in the media, especially since the people in the media here do not possess any special privileges in spite of the harsh nature of the profession they are pursuing. In European countries, people in the media have their status and weight in society and they have many privileges which reduce the difficulties they face in their work and help them to keep doing it."

Since that was a conversation between a journalist and a media personality, frankness was its character!

The deputy minister listened attentively, and I told him,

"A communications scholar defined the mission of the media in a nice metaphor. He said, 'The media are a watchman, a platform, a teacher and finally a form of entertainment.'"

The deputy minister smiled and I went on, laughing,

"But don't you agree with me that our Gulf media are proficient in the process of entertaining at the expense of other functions?"

'Abdallah al-Nuways said,

"Since I started work in the media, I have embraced the principle of 'a resurgence in the Gulf media,' but I have met with many difficulties. As I told you, our society is not mature and has not yet assimilated the idea of the media, since that is a field which is new to the society. Therefore we find that the media's means and methods here are not bold. I will give you an example, so you can learn how great the difficulty facing us as media persons in the development process is.

"A while ago, I tried to improve the system for presenting news bulletins on Abu Dhabi television. I proposed to go to the announcer in the studio to bring him all the important, urgent items of news that reached us while the bulletin was being presented; the announcer would tell the viewing audience that that item of news had suddenly arrived and would read it out to them--a procedure which is followed in Europe and America--so that the news bulletin would be lively and would cover the

latest news. However, the following day I was surprised to see that the emirate's newspapers had come out in sharp criticism of this technique.

"I realized that our society does not accept rapid, sudden change, but rather prefers to have it come about gradually, in order to absorb it. Therefore I decided to postpone the development process until a suitable later time."

'Abdallah al-Nuways stopped speaking a moment, then went on to say:

"Through my experience in the media, I have become convinced that the Arab people are oppressed and are afraid to face facts. Therefore they derive enjoyment and pleasure from sorrow, and do not want anyone to awaken them from their sleep as they follow news bulletins, watch plays, read newspapers or listen to love songs!"

He fell silent again, then stated, in clarification,

"We must not ignore the serious role that is laid upon the shoulders of the people in the media to enlighten the society; this task is not restricted to the official media. All of us media people bear a great trust and responsibility. Unfortunately, however, there are people in the media who twist the facts and publish tendentious news with the purpose of being provocative, or in a mercenary vein. We must expose them."

/I asked/ "You say that the Gulf media suffer from a scarcity of local personnel. What, then, have you done, as people who are responsible for the media, to create specialized local staffs in this field?"

/He answered/ "We have made great progress toward this goal. In the emirates more than 60 percent of the people working in the media field are now natives of the country; the issue is not just one of study courses for preparing the requisite staffs--it is also an issue of creating media people, so that we can create a generation in whose veins the love of media work flows, and which will not be enticed to relinquish its work by other jobs. It is just a matter of time. I believe that in 10 years' time we will realize this goal."

The deputy minister went on to say,

"In this context, the University of the Emirates has founded an independent media faculty which is meeting with a large response from citizens. The university, in its courses, also relies on a new method which has the goal of introducing the subject of the media into all fields of specialization; therefore, it compels its students to study the media as a supplementary subject, alongside whatever basic subjects they choose."

2. I entered the broad gateway of the media with 'Abdallah al-Nuways, coming to the press. I wanted to hear the deputy minister's "impressions" concerning some issues in the press, and asked him,

"How do you explain this tremendous recent leap forward in the emirates' press?"

/He replied/ "There are a number of reasons for it. First, the people who issued the papers in the emirates believed in the mission of the press and its national role in the development of society. Therefore, they bore the material and moral burdens of issuing them bravely. They did not consider them a source of gain or a commercial activity which would yield rapid profits. I am not revealing any secrets when I say that most papers in the emirates, up to now, are realizing no financial returns--indeed some lose money for the sake of realizing their desired objective. The second reason for the development of the newspapers in the emirates is the great material aid the government pays out to them. That enables them to raise and develop their professional and technical levels by bringing in exceptional journalistic experts and using advanced technical and technological methods for printing and receiving news. There also is an intention to establish a company to distribute the emirates' papers abroad the day they are issued.

"No doubt these two causes are behind the development the press is witnessing in the emirates, but perhaps the main direct reason for it is the existence of a sort of balance between the thinking and orientation of each newspaper and the general policy of the government. In this field, the newspapers show great cooperation and understanding of government positions, and the government in turn is flexible and permissive on most occasions. Therefore there is no official censorship over the press by the government, although there is a press law to which we seek recourse in the event newspapers violate any of the sections in it."

/I asked/ "A group of specialized magazines has appeared recently in the emirates. What is your opinion on the issue of the specialized press?"

/He replied/ "There is nothing by the name of a specialized press. The specialized publications in the emirates are issued by publishing houses which issue many magazines edited by a group of journalists. The people who write for women in one magazine are the people who write for children in another, and so forth."

3. Since we were talking about the media, I raised an important question:

"To what extent has media cooperation and coordination among the Gulf countries progressed? What is your evaluation of the joint Gulf media projects?"

'Abdallah al-Nuways told me with a frankness which is one of the most important features of his personality:

"Let me relate an event to you, after which I will speak about the extent of cooperation among Gulf countries. Some time ago we presented the Ministry of Information in Bahrain with an application to open an information office for the emirates, but that application was rejected. After a while, the Abu Dhabi newspaper AL-ITTIHAD opened an office in Bahrain, but the Bahraini Ministry of Information quickly closed it down!

"As far as joint Gulf plans go, unfortunately these have not realized the objectives that were desired of them; although some of these organizations presented a

number of successful "experiments," we consider that the existence of these joint organizations is a necessary, important matter and we are concerned about it, because it is an ambitious context for a better Gulf media future."

Since this was a conversation between members of the same profession, frankness was its characteristic!

/I said/ "The media in the emirates are accused of not coordinating their activities. We see a radio and television station in each emirate."

He smiled and stated calmly,

"That is not true. All of these agencies are politically and administratively subject to the supervision of the Ministry of Information. All the matter requires is that we apply a policy of decentralized management, which is the best type of management suited to the media field, because centralization is fatal to the media. As regards the proliferation of radio and television stations in the emirates, this is a virtue, not a defect. All the countries in the world follow this system. In the United States, for example, there are dozens of radio and television stations, including serious ones, light ones, commercial ones and stations broadcasting news, in order to provide the greatest amount of media services."

Where are you from?

From the Arab Gulf!

You have a lot of camels. Are you familiar with cars?

That is something that happened to me with a foreigner. I related it to the deputy minister, along with an accusation:

"What have you done to acquaint people abroad with the facts about the people in the Gulf?"

The deputy minister replied,

"We provide advertisements in the world's newspapers and magazines. We also send invitations to many journalists abroad. However, the tragedy is that the Arab media, instead of playing this role and defending their national interests, sometimes strip other Arabs naked before the world and spread out their dirty laundry. I am not exaggerating when I say that the exchange of Arab media attacks is greater than the Arab media attacks against Israel."

4. We have now reached the end of the journey with 'Abdallah al-Nuwayd as the deputy minister of information in the emirates; let us start another journey with 'Abdallah al-Nuwaysi as /a citizen of/ the emirates:

What is the emirates' position regarding the Israeli aggression against Lebanon?

That was a question; the deputy minister's answer to it was:

"At the outset, I would like to point out that after the United States' latest anti-Arab position, I don't think that there is any Arab citizen or official who wants to be friends with America. Its attitude of hostility toward the Arabs will remain as long as the Arabs remain fragmented and dispersed. The world of today does not respect small, weak countries. Unfortunately we have condemned ourselves to weakness because of our arguments, which has caused the big and the small alike to snap out at us. America supports Israel because it is a strong force; otherwise, America would not have neglected its interests with the Arabs and sacrificed its friendship with them for Israel's sake. Therefore we must create unity in our statements, prove to the world that we are strong, wrest our legitimate rights from all aggressors and not expect compassion from any particular country. The world is no longer compassionate, and today the weak do not master their own lives."

/I asked/ "You said that Israel is a strong force, but this strength is the doing of America, with its unlimited material and moral support!"

/He said/ "That is not true. Israel depends economically and politically not on America, but on the Jews of America. Moreover, the Zionist entity, in the period of its occupation, has built up its people on a democratic foundations which are based on respect. Therefore we find them fighting as if they were defending a sacred national cause!"

"What have the emirates done in the face of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon?"

"The emirates are in favor of all forms of Arab unanimity. As far as the Information Ministry goes, that has mobilized people, explained the goals of the invasion to them and published news of the resistance and its perseverance in the headlines of the media. The emirates' papers have been more than bold, disclosing weak points and deficiencies in Arab policies, and have cast light on the Arab retrenchment in the face of this oppressive aggression. This has reached the point of disclosing and criticising Arab personalities and positions by name."

I asked a question which deviated from his leisurely monologue:

"In the face of this Arab fragmentation, do the emirates support the convening of an Arab summit?"

The deputy minister stated, in a voice heavily charged with depression,

"Yes, we support the convening of an Arab summit. We have not in the past needed an Arab summit more than we do now. I ask people who say that Arab disarray will make the summit fail: If we do not meet, how can we resolve our disputes? The disputes and the fragmentation can be eliminated only with frank talk in an open session, so that every country can bear its national responsibilities in these critical circumstances the Arab nation is going through, in order to take care of the dangers that surround us by bringing the Arabs back together again and eliminating the disputes."

"What is the emirates' opinion on inviting Egypt to attend such a summit?"

"We are in favor of every effort to bring Egypt back to Arab ranks and there is nothing wrong with inviting Egypt to such a summit."

"But how can that happen, while the causes for the boycott of Egypt are still in effect?"

"In general, the boycott is related to the future intentions of the Egyptian president. We must not put pressure on Egypt lest we drive it farther away than it is. Rather, we must strive to bring it back to the Arab fold quietly and persuasively because the Egyptian president is held down by a 'net' of commitments and agreements with Israel and America which it will not be easy to get rid of."

5. I asked the deputy minister of information in the emirates, whose face was a mirror of tolerance:

"What is your appraisal of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a year after its establishment?"

"The Cooperation Council is a pioneering, ambitious idea which has been attracting the people of the Gulf for a long time. It is not important that we now evaluate what the council has offered in the recent period--rather, the important thing is what it will offer in the future."

"Do the emirates intend to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union?"

"It is not important to establish such relations at the present time. We believe that relations among peoples are not established on a basis of embassies. Many countries have diplomatic relations at times when their relations are bad; to the contrary, there are countries which do not have such relations but have friendships and strong links.

"Moreover, why should we, in the emirates, which is a small developing country, be asked to establish relations with the Soviet Union while there are countries larger than us that ought more properly to establish such relations, though they have not? In general, though, we in the emirates believe in the principle of 'mutual understanding with all just peoples in the world!'"

We continued our discussion. I asked,

"The issue of Gulf security is often bruited about. What is the emirates' conception of this issue?"

'Abdallah al-Nuways stated, in his chair,

"Gulf security is an old conception, and the emirates' notion of it is that we should be strong, by arming ourselves and through knowledge and belief, that we should take only what is compatible with our religion and our traditions from the cultural ferment in the world, and that we must cooperate and stand side by side with one

another, because that is a religious obligation more than a security obligation. We must also talk with a single voice and a single personality. At that point, Gulf security will be achieved, since no one will have designs on us and no one will dare to move against us."

6. Since the character of the conversation between the journalist and the media personality was frankness,

I asked 'Abdallah al-Nuway:

"How long will the emirates rely on foreign labor, in spite of the social and security dangers it entails? Why isn't it replaced by Arab labor?"

The deputy minister told me,

"Foreign labor is to be found in all countries of the Gulf, not just the emirates. It is true that it is more numerous in the emirates, but it is less dangerous than other forms of labor in the countries in the region, since it is labor whose nationalities we choose and bring in in accordance with the labor laws, which control all the violations. We usually choose Asian labor, with which we are linked by bonds of Islamic belief and friendship; therefore, it does not constitute a threat to us, in spite of some problems it causes which are essentially related to the nature of the working class everywhere, since workers are a special kind of human being. However, these problems have not reached a point that would prompt fear or anxiety.

"As far as the use of Arab labor goes, we have concluded a number of agreements with many Arab countries, but they have not been carried out, for one reason or another."

It is well known that we are venturing on the post-petroleum era: what is in the emirates' plan to diversify income sources and cope with the times to come?

That was my question; the deputy minister's answer was:

"We have started preparing for this period. We have approved a plan to get agriculture and industry to take the place of oil production; the government of the emirates is almost totally self-sufficient in agricultural products. It has allocated amounts of money to generate electricity by nuclear power and operate large generators to provide water for agriculture in the oases. As for our industrial plan, our oil industries have been rounded out by the establishment of the al-Ruways industrial city, which produces petroleum products rather than importing them from abroad. There are also other industries, such as aluminum, fertilizer, cement, fodder and other light industries, and we are proceeding with this plan."

'Abdallah al-Nuways is now a citizen of the emirates, and I asked him:

"How far has the course of the democratic experiment in the emirates gone, following the experiment in union?"

"It has covered a great distance, and has reached a stage which we did not believe it would reach in this short time. Everyone is witnessing this. Stability is evident in the federal state's institutions, and every day proves that it is the proper alternative to the fragmentation which we had experienced. Absolutely no one is thinking of going back on the federation, neither ruler nor subjects, because the federation is not an alternative, it is destiny--indeed, it is permanence."

7. At the end of the journey, I told 'Abdallah al-Nuways, the deputy minister of information in the emirates,

"Your answers have been brief."

He stated, laughing,

"Yes, brief and succinct, so they do not cost me a great deal. The best statements are those that are brief and cogent. Isn't that so?"

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